

many organizations in the unpleasant position of giving up either their government grants and contracts or their efforts to engage in advocacy. This dilemma is as real for secular nonprofits as it is for religiously based agencies.

None of these developments of the past year directly addresses the question of religious freedom; the *Bob Jones* decision studiously avoids it. In sum, however, they invite religiously based organizations and others to reexamine their commitments to political advocacy and their willingness to accept a complementary role alongside established government programs. Through these separate policy actions, the various branches of government have introduced new and particularly modern political dilemmas into the realm of church-state interaction abroad.

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## EXCURSUS 3

### Walter C. Clemens, Jr., on A FIVE-POWER NUCLEAR PACT

Nuclear arms issues have become indivisible. They must be dealt with comprehensively rather than piecemeal. Conditions are ripe for a pact limiting *all* nuclear arms of *all* nuclear weapon states.

The Soviets' SS-20 missiles and Backfire bombers compel us to fuse the separate negotiations on intermediate and strategic weapons, for these weapons are nearly intercontinental in range. From European Russia they threaten Asia; from Siberia they threaten not only China and Japan but parts of the U.S. and Europe. Tokyo complains that NATO pressures may induce Moscow to move more missiles to Asia. But the shift may not matter, for, to rephrase Laura Huxley's book, "We are all targets."

Distinctions between strategic and other arms have always been academic to Moscow. What difference for Russians if exploding warheads come from North Dakota, the Pyrenees, or the Mediterranean? Brezhnev twice signed SALT accords, ignoring British, French, and U.S. forces stationed in or near Europe. The prospect of Pershing II and the MIRVed British and French forces led Andropov last December to propose parity between his SS-20s and the combined London-Paris arsenal.

China is also concerned. Beijing broke precedent on June 21, 1983, by declaring that if the superpowers cut their arsenals by 50 per cent, the PRC would be "willing to undertake corresponding obligations for nuclear disarmament together with all other nuclear states." Even for an opening posture, the PRC demand is not excessive. Many specialists believe that deep cuts of such magnitude need not erode U.S. or Soviet security.

China's promise of cooperation is an important development. The 1972-74 U.S.-Soviet curbs on antiballistic missile defenses helped Beijing acquire an effective deterrent at much lower cost than if it had to consider penetrating a heavy ring of Soviet ABM defenses. But until now China has impeded further progress in arms control by its disdain for negotiated limits and by its gradual buildup of nuclear forces, alarming Russians and others.

Several other factors press for a comprehensive nuclear treaty now:

- There may still be time to head off deployment of ground and sea-launched cruise missiles, which are unnecessary

for the security of either Moscow or the West and, because resistant to any arms control verification, profoundly harmful.

- A treaty would help hold the number of nuclear weapons states to five. Others stand at the threshold but have not passed through.

- A treaty would reverse the spiral of U.S.-Soviet tensions. All these developments make it both urgent and feasible to open five-power talks with the aim of concluding a treaty along the following lines:

First, establish ceilings for all nuclear arms of the five signatories—a high common level for Washington and Moscow, but one requiring them to make substantial reductions; a lower level for Paris and London, but one comparable to their existing arsenals; and a ceiling that permits China to match the combined French-British level.

Britain, France, and China will see themselves to gain because superpower arsenals come down closer to their own. But the Soviets and Americans also gain because the present hierarchy of power is preserved and there is less prospect of change from any quarter. Each country may improve the quality of its weapons but must stay within the agreed quantitative ceilings. Moscow, with a greater number of foes, suffers more from deep cuts than does Washington, but the Kremlin may retain some "heavy" missiles. Each signatory thus maintains an adequate deterrent but at lower cost and with fewer uncertainties than previously.

Second, fix ceilings for particular categories of nuclear weapons—launchers, warheads, or both, as in SALT II—whether battlefield, theater, or strategic and whatever their range. Each party is free to deploy its quota on planes, at sea, or elsewhere. Since ground and sea-launched cruise missiles are difficult to verify, however, they should be banned.

Contrary to Soviet physicist Andrei Sakharov, perfect symmetry in the force structure of each superpower is neither necessary nor negotiable, because each country has its own problems and assets. If Moscow emphasizes land-based missiles, Washington may count more on those that are submarine-launched and not at risk from an ICBM attack.

Since quotas are limited, the parties may also wish to withdraw battlefield nuclears altogether and establish a nuclear-free zone from the French to the Soviet border. Resultant savings could be used to enhance NATO's conventional arms. Many Western experts concur that NATO's tactical nuclears should be reduced—if necessary, unilaterally. To use them would be horrendous; to depend on them illusory.

Several other lines might also be followed profitably in talks, among them: calling a halt to all nuclear tests and deployment of new weapons within twelve months from the date of signing, thence to proceed with pledged U.S. and USSR reductions over five years; turning over dismantled warheads to the International Atomic Energy Agency, their fissionable material made available to Third World reactors; enforcing the nuclear nonproliferation treaty; and working to curb conventional arms buildups worldwide.

Utopian? No, practical and urgent.

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