

control over party membership or resist intervention from Moscow? There are no reassuring precedents for "democratic alternation" when it comes to Communists in power; there are many such precedents in the case of non-Communist Socialists and others of more long-standing democratic conviction.

The Italian Communists are undoubtedly closest to converting their conversion into governmental power. Many observers believe the "historic compromise" in Italy is almost inevitable. In the rest of Western Europe there are signs of growing antipathy to the prospect of Communists close to power. It is argued by some that U.S. expressions of antipathy only feed the mood of anti-Americanism and play into the hands of the Communists. Others who criticize Secretary Kissinger's posture seem positively to long for a "grand experiment" of cooperation between communism and Western democracy. While the final decision must be made by the Europeans, it seems obvious that the absence of U.S. expressions of concern would seriously weaken the hand of those Europeans who have good reasons for distrusting Communist declarations of intent. As for the grand experiment, at this point it looks more like a reckless readiness to gamble with the lives and freedoms of peoples who in this century have been betrayed too often by totalitarians and the friends of totalitarians.

EXCURSUS II

Wilson Carey McWilliams on The Moving Doctrine

Very few of those Americans who denounced United States involvement in the Angolan civil war seem to find anything reprehensible in Syria's intervention in Lebanon. There is, if anything, even less interest in Palestinian participation, despite the fact that many of America's critics affect to regard the PLO as a lawful government. But then, military intervention by the PLO in the politics of host states is something of a tradition, if not a necessity, and like many indecencies in the contemporary world has been softened by familiarity.

Syrian intervention, however, is relatively unprecedented and quite extreme. Syria's "mediation" has included threats of invasion, and Syria has virtually dictated the terms of present and future Lebanese politics. Lebanese politicians refer their quarrels to Damascus, and a Syrian proconsul in Beirut would, at least, save them travel expenses. In fact, Syria has transformed Lebanon into a protectorate.

Possibly this is for the best, though I doubt it. But what makes Syrian intervention proper and American involvement impermissible?

The present implicit rule of morality seems to be a

version of the Monroe Doctrine. The essence of the Doctrine, as amended by Theodore Roosevelt's famous corollary, is a geographical "double standard." It is all right for states to interfere in the internal affairs of their neighbors, especially if those neighbors are weaker. "Outsiders," however, are debarred. India, for example, was not wrong in liberating Bangladesh; Hanoi was not aggressing by participating in the war in South Vietnam; Mozambique is correct in regarding racism in Rhodesia as a *causus belli*.

Such a rule would, at least, have a superficial clarity. But I doubt that "world opinion," and especially liberal-left opinion, would approve if *Israel* intervened in Lebanon or if the United States applied such a rule in Latin America (as it did, ten years ago, in the Dominican Republic). The rule of "neighborly intervention" requires an ethnic codicil: One can rightfully intervene only if one's neighbors are "one's own people."

As a rule of morality, that formula is likely to make the historically minded a bit queasy. It brings back memories of Seyss-Inquart and Henlein, the Anschluss and the Sudetenland. It is also a very slippery standard. After all, the Israelis are Semites too. Is religion a test of "one's own"? If so, whence India in Bangladesh? Are the Lebanese Christians without a "people," or would a Christian country be entitled to go to their defense? (That, after all, is how the French got there in the first place.) Who are "our people"? And who decides if some or all of those we decide are "our own" disagree with our decision?

I suspect that the reason that so many Western liberals and leftists find Syria's role acceptable is that it is perceived as anti-Western because it is fundamentally anti-Christian. But they would be outraged if an American, or another Western spokesman, proclaimed that as "Christian countries" we have a right to intervene. This is, after all, a secular age. But I hope it is not so secular as to declare that Christian peoples are fair game, especially in the Middle East. Christianity is also a Middle Eastern religion in origin, with its own claims to protection on indigenous grounds. I am not defending the politics or social policy pursued by Lebanese Christian leaders. I am only contending that to the extent that Christianity is equated with the West, it may become necessary for the West to follow a foreign policy that equates its own interests with those of Christianity. That was Western policy not so long ago, and if we are to agree that those were bad old times, we should have some guarantee that present times are better.

There is an even more fundamental question: Who are "our" neighbors? Humanitarianism, to say nothing of religion, makes that question problematic. In material terms the world is becoming a smaller place, as we all know, and physical proximity is no real indication of "closeness." In the fifties, piqued by U.N. criticism of their regime in the Congo, the Belgians mocked the "salt-water fallacy," the belief that imperialism was possible only when salt water

separated two territories. Soviet imperialism, the Belgians argued, was no less imperial because land connected Russia and its subject territories. Current reasoning in the Soviet camp apparently agrees: There is salt water, after all, between Cuba and Angola. And, like the Belgians, the Soviets have evidently concluded that if imperialism is all right in one place, it is all right in another.

Of course Cuba, the Soviet Union, and their supporters do not concede that Cuban intervention is imperialistic. It was, after all, directed against the West and specifically the United States. That, for many "Third World" regimes, and for the liberal-left in the West, is excuse enough. And that is the really disturbing aspect of Syrian intervention in Lebanon.

At the very least we must be willing to agree that intervention is not a simple matter to be settled by some rule like "keeping out of other people's quarrels." The kind of people we are determines whom we regard as others, and in this world it is hard to separate the agonies and conflicts of others from our own.

EXCURSUS III

Peter L. Berger on Elements of Terrorism

It may be helpful to start with a definition: Terrorism is the politically motivated use of violence in order to spread fear. Both the motive and the goal are important to understand the phenomenon. The motive distinguishes terrorism from ordinary crime, the goal from acts of violence of a more functional character (such as, for instance, sabotage). Terrorism is not necessarily directed against civilian populations. Thus Che Guevara, during his Bolivian campaign, deliberately decided against this option, limiting his attacks to military and police forces (a decision, by the way, that probably had nothing to do with his eventual defeat). One of the most alarming aspects of the recent rise of terrorism in Western countries is its increasingly indiscriminate choice of civilian targets.

Terrorism is as old as human history. The peculiarity of modern terrorism is due to the peculiar vulnerability of societies that are *both* technologically sophisticated *and* humane (at least relatively humane) in their methods of law enforcement. Both qualities are essential if one is to understand what is now going on. A modern urban society, with its enormously complicated and interdependent institutions of life support, is peculiarly vulnerable to terroristic disruptions: Terrorism against fragile means of transportation is a promising strategy for exactly the same reason that strikes against municipal services are so effective. But, for example, the Soviet Union is almost as

technologically sophisticated (certainly its cities are) as Western countries, and yet there is no terrorism (just as there are no strikes). The reason, of course, is that the repressive apparatus of the Soviet Government is unhampered by humane scruples, at least as compared with Western societies, in which such scruples are not only a fact of public opinion, but in which there is an *institutionalization of scruples* in the law enforcement system.

The conventional wisdom is that terrorism is always rooted in oppression or misery, and sometimes it undoubtedly is. But human beings feel oppressed or miserable for very different reasons. My earliest memories with a political context are of the 1930's, when the Nazi underground conducted a campaign of terror against the Austrian Government: The Nazis felt oppressed because Austria was not a part of the Third Reich. Terrorists will invariably cite oppression or misery as legitimating their acts; one will have to decide case by case whether such legitimation bears moral scrutiny; an important element of such scrutiny, I should think, is the question of whether violence is the only available option.

Regardless of their cause, however, terrorists tend to resemble each other. To be sure, there are situations where individuals become terrorists against their natural inclinations. I don't think there are many such individuals in the terrorist groups making headlines today. Rather, most of them, by the evidence, are individuals for whom terrorism provides profound personal satisfactions. These satisfactions can be specified: a sense of fulfillment through total dedication to a political faith, to the point of self-sacrifice; a sense of power through inflicting fear, pain, and death upon other human beings; sheer adventure. These psychological components are probably present in different mixtures in different individuals. Only those in whom the second component is dominant have good employment prospects in the event of a terroristic movement succeeding in taking over a national government. They become the troops of the new repressive apparatus. The others are likely to become quickly disillusioned—and bored.

In the contemporary world democracies are more vulnerable to terrorism than dictatorships. This is due, however, to their ineffectiveness in developing instruments of internal self-defense, *not* to the democratic character of the political institutions. There have been very harsh democracies in history—and very ineffective despotisms. Contemporary dictatorships also vary in their success in dealing with terrorism. Spain, for instance, is a dictatorship that has been increasingly ineffective in coping with terrorism, probably in the exact degree to which the regime has relaxed its repressive apparatus (the same, very interestingly, may be true of Yugoslavia). There is only one contemporary form of government that seems immune to terrorism, and that is Soviet-type totalitarianism.