

The timing of decisions is also crucial. Since all decisions of a technical nature must be made without complete information, how do we know when to act when we do not know what we do not know? If we delayed making plans for permanent disposal until further research and pilot disposal schemes matured, we would know more about the dangers involved. However, if we delay permanent disposal, we will be building up even greater quantities of toxic material in temporary storage, which is probably the most dangerous of all conditions. When, then, do we move toward actual disposal? How can politicians, who have to be reelected in relatively short periods of time, make truly unselfish decisions about the safety of people living a thousand years from now when their best decisions would involve financial sacrifices made within their own terms of office?

After listening to many experts and having been involved in long political and ethical discussions, I have reached some conclusions. I believe that as a nation we do need to build more nuclear energy reactors, probably including breeders. I believe we should begin to dispose of some of the wastes in three or four different pilot programs. There is sufficient research information now available for us to select one or two means of containment and one or two different sites for large, but still experimental, disposal programs. They should have monitoring devices to detect unexpected events such as water and ground movements and undue heat. This process might cause the waste to be retrieved or further safety measures to be taken, or it might mean adopting quite different procedures in future disposal. While we may discover better technologies and sites in the next twenty years, some of the ones presently available represent an adequately safe and satisfactory option for action.

I believe that states rights will have to be subservient to national needs, but economic inducements can legitimately sweeten the burdens involved. Further, costs for radioactive disposal must begin now to be integrated into the costs for electricity produced by nuclear energy. Finally, I am more frightened by the number of atomic weapons in the world and the increasing danger of war by accident than I am of the Russians deliberately choosing to start a nuclear exchange. Thus I would support programs that would reduce production of more atomic weapons while still maintaining a retaliatory strike capability. This in turn would reduce future waste disposal tasks.

Canon Michael Hamilton of the National Cathedral, Washington, D.C., chaired the session on "Political and Ethical Implications of Disposal" at a conference on "High Level Radioactive Solid Waste Forms" sponsored by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in Denver, December, 1978.

EXCURSUS II

Genaro Arriagada on Fidel: So Far From Marx, So Near Clausewitz

What would Marx say if he saw a Latin American professional army "building socialism"—in his name—in African countries not yet in the first stages of industrialization? Surely that would be as great a surprise for the father of scientific socialism as the realization that capitalism had not suffered the crisis he predicted.

And certainly Marx the intellectual would have enormous difficulties debating and reasoning with many political activists today who declare themselves his partisans: The concepts and categories of analysis so central to his work are missing from their language and way of thinking. As Sheldon Wolin, a professor of political science at Princeton University, has put it: "Today the military mode of thinking has all but supplanted the political mode in revolutionary circles. Wherever one turns [in revolutionary circles]...one finds sophisticated discussions of tactics, firepower, guerrilla warfare, and combat techniques, but very little in the way of searching political analysis, let alone theory."

The language and analysis of revolution today are closer to another German who preceded Marx by several decades and who was the first to present a rational analysis of war—Karl von Clausewitz. His was the phrase, often cited but little analyzed in the context of his thought, "war is the continuation of politics by other means." And the revolutionary *organizations* of this century owe their inspiration, not to Marx or to Engels, but to Gneisenau and Scharnhorst, two Prussian generals whom history records as creators of the professional army.

Marx and Engels conceived of the socialist revolution as the consequence of the development of the means of production and the rise of the proletariat in the womb of capitalist society. Certainly neither one denied the role of violence, and Engels's keen interest in military questions is well known. But violence was only the midwife of history, acting in the last stage of a process that already had matured.

Lenin gave revolutionary thought and practice a new twist. He found in military thought an aid to making operative his political schemes, which previously had lacked the force necessary to transform existing conditions. Military organization is the decisive reference point in his elaboration of the theory of the revolutionary party and, later, in his conception of the structure of the state. The conduct of war gave Lenin the framework within which to analyze and resolve political action.

Since Lenin, the definition of a revolutionary situation has come to be viewed as a military situation. Politics is a class war, and social revolution will no longer be the result of the maturation of a historical

process. Rather, it will be possible wherever a favorable "correlation of forces" permits. Socialism is the result of a military victory won by the proletariat's general staff—that is, the Communist party.

A second great wave in the militarization of revolutionary political thought came from Mao Tse-tung. Mao was explicit: "Every Communist must grasp the truth, 'political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.'...Some people ridicule us as advocates of the 'omnipotence of war.' Yes, we are advocates of the omnipotence of revolutionary war; that is good, not bad; it is Marxist. The guns of the Russian Communist Party created socialism. We shall create a democratic republic....In this sense we may say that only with guns can the whole world be transformed." Socialism is born of war. Mao cites Clausewitz: "'War is the continuation of politics by other means.'...It can therefore be said that politics is war without bloodshed while war is politics with bloodshed."



SCOTT MEYERSON

In this intellectual tradition, but with a heightened dynamism, falls Fidel Castro's-Cuban experience, his concept of revolution and socialism, and his political practice. In contrast to Mao—who as an advocate of the "omnipotence of war" still held that "our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the party"—the Cubans hold that the guerrilla is the element that should subordinate the party. In the Cuban theory of insurrection—as written by Ernesto Che Guevara and Frenchman Régis Debray and defended by Castro until 1969—social revolution is the result of a process unleashed by a "*foco guerrillero*." In Guevara's words, "nuclei with relatively few persons choose places favorable for guerrilla warfare" and in that way initiate an absolute war in which "the polarization of forces will become complete: exploiters on one side and exploited on the other....Thus, neutrality will be an exception."

"The struggle between the people's forces and the forces of repression will be to the death," Guevara said. This is a war in which the combatants should be motivated by "hatred as an element of

struggle, relentless hatred of the enemy that impels us over and beyond the natural limitations of man and transforms us into effective, violent, selective and cold killing machines."

The Cuban conception of guerrilla warfare—in its rural form and its urban revision—failed in Latin America, and its proponents were crushed by a bloody, repressive apparatus in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay.

Today Cuba has no conception of social revolution such as that which motivated the dream of the "heroic guerrilla fighter." No theoretical formulation has replaced the failed attempt to produce a "revolution in the revolution." The army created in the Sierra Maestras and the popular militia of the early post-1959 period have given way to perhaps the most professional army in Latin America. The old commanders of small guerrilla detachments, who stayed in the wings, have today become two and three-star generals in gold-embroidered uniforms. And the soldiers, as shown by photographs in the official Cuban press, parade...goose-stepping!

Today a third of the Cuban army—over thirty thousand men—is involved in fighting in Africa, especially in Angola and Ethiopia. This was a decision the Cuban people learned of, at least in the case of Ethiopia, some sixty days after soldiers had become involved in a war in Africa. All this is justified in the name of socialism and the revolution. The words are the same but the concepts are different. A revolution is no longer a work of the people. Today it is a task for trained technocrats, something that "an expert in war-making and in the organized use of violence" (Morris Janowitz's celebrated definition of the professional soldier) can do overseas, among people who have a different history, language, and race.

...Something that would scandalize Marx but perhaps Clausewitz would understand.

Genaro Arriagada is a Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. He was Deputy Director of Política y Espirito, a magazine closed by the current Chilean Government, and he is a leader of the Chilean Christian Democratic party.

EXCURSUS III

Harris O. Schoenberg on Thirty Years of Inaction on Genocide

On December 9, 1948, the United Nations General Assembly unanimously approved a Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. As early as October, 1933, at an international meeting, Raphael Lemkin, the father of the Genocide Convention, had suggested outlawing the premeditated extermination of a people, but it was