nizations should establish an impartial international fact-finding body composed of individuals of the highest integrity, whose conclusions can be used, as appropriate and necessary, to apply global pressure on any party or state found, on a prima facie basis, guilty of genocide as defined in the Convention.

Third, survivors of a program of genocide, as defined in the Convention, should be granted automatically the right of self-determination. What is at stake is the physical survival of ethnic, racial, or religious groups in the face of attempts to effect their complete and utter destruction. Certainly, self-determination for the Jewish people was supported on these grounds, and they also helped to justify self-determination for the people who formed Bangladesh. Universal recognition of this concept might deter those considering the crime.

Fourth, the extermination of a population by its own government, as in the case of Democratic Kampuchea (Cambodia), underscores the urgent need to fill a gap in the Genocide Convention in the area of mass slaughter "for reasons of state." At Soviet insistence this definition was dropped from the Convention at the time it was drafted. But politically motivated annihilation can no longer be ignored. Ironically, had international machinery existed to deal with the Cambodian tragedy, the Soviets and their Vietnamese allies could not have justified the invasion of Cambodia, which in turn triggered the Chinese invasion of Vietnam.

Nobody can bring back the millions who have been slaughtered. The most meaningful memorial to them would be the assurance that genocide can never happen again.

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EXCURSUS IV

Robert D. Bond on Our Troubled Friendship With Venezuela

The turmoil in Iran has served to emphasize that Venezuela is the most secure source of United States oil imports. Venezuela sends a million barrels of crude and refined products to American shores every day. Equally significant, the inauguration on March 12 of Luis Herrera Campins as the fifth democratically elected president of Venezuela since 1958 highlights the value to the U.S. of having an open, progressive, and stable democracy located at the top of the South American continent.

Five years ago the coincidence of upheaval in world petroleum markets and the inauguration of a Venezuelan president led to a serious slide in relations between the United States and Venezuela. President Carlos Andrés Pérez (1974-78) took full advantage of international circumstances and the influx of petrodollars to propel his country onto the world scene. Frequently that meant opposition to U.S. policies. At home Pérez nationalized the iron ore and petroleum industries, each of which was dominated by U.S. companies. In Latin America, Venezuela undertook initiatives to lessen U.S. hegemony, including the creation of an exclusively Latin American forum for economic consultation and cooperation (SELA). It also promoted efforts to reintegrate Cuba into the Latin American community and to expand Venezuela's economic presence in neighboring countries, especially in Central America and the Caribbean. On the wider stage Venezuela was active in establishing OPEC policies and in championing Third World demands for a "new international economic order." Thus, a long list of irritations arose in U.S.-Venezuelan relations.

Venezuela's assertiveness met staunch U.S. disapproval in the Nixon-Ford years, the most significant conflict being over oil prices. The central goal of U.S. oil policy then was to deny OPEC the power to set international oil prices. The resulting conflict of interest between the United States and Venezuela was real, and not susceptible to compromise. Typical expressions of U.S. disapproval were two strong notes from President Ford to President Pérez protesting Venezuela's OPEC policies and its petroleum nationalization decision. The U.S. Congress also passed the "OPEC Amendment" to the 1974 Trade Act, which excludes Venezuela from trade benefits even though it did not participate in the Arab oil embargo. Apparently American statecraft was unable or unwilling to respond constructively to the challenges posed by Venezuela in this period. Frictions were allowed to override the fundamental, long-term U.S. interests in Venezuela: security of oil supply and support for Venezuela's effort to build a stable, legitimate, industrialized democracy.

The first two years of the Carter administration saw a decided improvement in the climate of U.S.-Venezuelan relations. In part this is due to a warm personal relationship between Presidents Carter and Pérez. At the ceremonial signing of the Panama Canal treaties in Washington in September, 1977—an event attended by all Latin American heads of state—President Carter remarked of Pérez, "He is my first adviser on Latin American affairs and my very good friend." At a subsequent state visit to Caracas in March, 1978—the first stopover on a marathon trip to cement U.S. relations with the "new influentials" in Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East—Carter spoke of a "complete harmony of interests" between the U.S. and Venezuela. Even with allowance for rhetorical excesses, it was clear Carter and Pérez got along remarkably well.

A second and more fundamental reason for better relations was a convergence of policy objectives between Washington and Caracas in certain areas. The Carter administration had abandoned the American commitment to "break OPEC," there-by blunting the edge of conflict with Venezuela on oil prices. In addition, both countries agreed on the importance of such concerns as respect for human rights in the hemisphere and beyond, the need for the United States to negotiate an equitable treaty with Panama, the desirability of achieving a more just international economic order, and even the critical necessity for the United States to implement a more realistic and conservationist energy policy. In Venezuela the Carter administration also found an important supporter of its new Latin American policy, particularly on the issues of the Panama Canal, normalizing relations with Cuba, and respect for democratic elections in the Dominican Republic.

Despite these surface improvements during the first two years of the Carter administration, little progress was made on the fundamental economic issues between the two countries. Collaboration on some issues diverted attention from the fact that there was no resolution of the bedrock issues of oil and Venezuela's drive to make its economy less dependent on oil earnings. For example, the U.S. Government rebuffed Venezuela's proposals to negotiate a government-to-government agreement on the development of the nonconventional crude contained in Venezuela's Orinoco Oil Belt (estimated at 700 billion barrels); no decisions were taken by the United States to grant Venezuela special status as a source of U.S. oil imports; and the Carter administration failed to mount a serious effort to persuade Congress to repeal the OPEC Amendment to the 1974 Trade Act as it applies to Venezuela. Conflict also continued over the issue of unresolved compensation settlements for the 1976 petroleum nationalization, although the U.S. Government has limited its role to that of an interested observer.

The new government of Luis Herrera Campins inherits a friendly but troubled relationship with the United States. The Carter administration has been largely successful in accommodating Venezuela's assertive diplomacy (with the exception of serious disagreement over Nicaragua because of Venezuela's unrelenting support for Somoza's opponents), but the two countries remain deadlocked on oil policy and related matters. Now that oil prices are again on the rise, these problems may well come to the fore. What are the prospects for resolving these issues during the five years of the Herrera Campins administration?

On the Venezuelan side, foreign policy objectives are not likely to differ significantly from those of the Pérez administration. Substantial continuity can be expected for two reasons. First, maintaining and if possible increasing the flow of oil income to government coffers will remain Venezuela's highest priority for the foreseeable future. As in the past, oil income will continue to be a key element influencing Venezuela's political stability and its drive to develop a more diversified economy. Indeed, despite a massive industrialization effort begun in 1974, Venezuela still relies on petroleum for approximately 90 per cent of its export earnings, 65 per cent of government income, and 20 per cent of the gross domestic product (GDP). The Herrera Campins government may be even more addicted to oil income than its predecessor because it has pledged to continue the industrialization program *and* to provide an expanded system of services and social welfare. Venezuela will thus maintain its commitment to higher prices and to OPEC solidarity.

A second reason to expect continuity in foreign policy is that most of the initiatives of the Pérez government were not all that new. The general lines of policy had been pursued by former President Caldera (1969-73), the founder of the Christian Democratic party (COPEI), to which Herrera Campins belongs. What was novel about the Pérez years was the combination of greatly increased oil income, a general loosening up of the international system, and high presidential interest in foreign affairs.

Assuming foreign policy continuity from Venezuela, what can be said of the United States in its dealings with the leading Western Hemisphere member of OPEC? First, tensions over oil prices may rise considerably. International petroleum prices could rise to $18-$20 per barrel by the end of 1979, forcing conservation measures in the United States and causing an economic downturn. Now that the race for the U.S. presidency has begun in earnest, pressures to lash out at OPEC members will mount. Second, the recent turmoil in the international petroleum market probably will not cause the United States to reconsider its stance on the security value of Venezuelan oil. For a number of reasons—the influence of major oil companies with a continuing stake in technology and marketing agreements with Venezuela, the lack of coordination in U.S. energy policies, and the lack of congressional expertise on petroleum—Venezuela will be denied the special arrangements it has repeatedly sought. As happened following the 1973-74 energy crisis, the U.S. will probably drift along without an energy policy that recognizes the security value of Venezuelan—or Mexican—petroleum. Finally, the U.S. Government will probably continue to try to enlist Venezuela's support for its Latin American policy, provided frictions over oil policy do not severely strain relations between the two nations.

The prospects for friendly relations between the United States and Venezuela over the next five years are not encouraging. It is doubtful that the two countries will be able to initiate policies that would be in their mutual long-term interests, such as the creation of a hemispheric energy institute to consult on regional supply decisions, nuclear power, and petroleum exploration. The most that can be hoped for is continued cooperation on those hemispheric policies both countries support.

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