

process. Rather, it will be possible wherever a favorable "correlation of forces" permits. Socialism is the result of a military victory won by the proletariat's general staff—that is, the Communist party.

A second great wave in the militarization of revolutionary political thought came from Mao Tse-tung. Mao was explicit: "Every Communist must grasp the truth, 'political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.'...Some people ridicule us as advocates of the 'omnipotence of war.' Yes, we are advocates of the omnipotence of revolutionary war; that is good, not bad; it is Marxist. The guns of the Russian Communist Party created socialism. We shall create a democratic republic....In this sense we may say that only with guns can the whole world be transformed." Socialism is born of war. Mao cites Clausewitz: "'War is the continuation of politics by other means.'...It can therefore be said that politics is war without bloodshed while war is politics with bloodshed."



SCOTT MEYERSON

In this intellectual tradition, but with a heightened dynamism, falls Fidel Castro's-Cuban experience, his concept of revolution and socialism, and his political practice. In contrast to Mao—who as an advocate of the "omnipotence of war" still held that "our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the party"—the Cubans hold that the guerrilla is the element that should subordinate the party. In the Cuban theory of insurrection—as written by Ernesto Che Guevara and Frenchman Régis Debray and defended by Castro until 1969—social revolution is the result of a process unleashed by a "*foco guerrillero*." In Guevara's words, "nuclei with relatively few persons choose places favorable for guerrilla warfare" and in that way initiate an absolute war in which "the polarization of forces will become complete: exploiters on one side and exploited on the other....Thus, neutrality will be an exception."

"The struggle between the people's forces and the forces of repression will be to the death," Guevara said. This is a war in which the combatants should be motivated by "hatred as an element of

struggle, relentless hatred of the enemy that impels us over and beyond the natural limitations of man and transforms us into effective, violent, selective and cold killing machines."

The Cuban conception of guerrilla warfare—in its rural form and its urban revision—failed in Latin America, and its proponents were crushed by a bloody, repressive apparatus in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay.

Today Cuba has no conception of social revolution such as that which motivated the dream of the "heroic guerrilla fighter." No theoretical formulation has replaced the failed attempt to produce a "revolution in the revolution." The army created in the Sierra Maestras and the popular militia of the early post-1959 period have given way to perhaps the most professional army in Latin America. The old commanders of small guerrilla detachments, who stayed in the wings, have today become two and three-star generals in gold-embroidered uniforms. And the soldiers, as shown by photographs in the official Cuban press, parade...goose-stepping!

Today a third of the Cuban army—over thirty thousand men—is involved in fighting in Africa, especially in Angola and Ethiopia. This was a decision the Cuban people learned of, at least in the case of Ethiopia, some sixty days after soldiers had become involved in a war in Africa. All this is justified in the name of socialism and the revolution. The words are the same but the concepts are different. A revolution is no longer a work of the people. Today it is a task for trained technocrats, something that "an expert in war-making and in the organized use of violence" (Morris Janowitz's celebrated definition of the professional soldier) can do overseas, among people who have a different history, language, and race.

...Something that would scandalize Marx but perhaps Clausewitz would understand.

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EXCURSUS III

Harris O. Schoenberg on Thirty Years of Inaction on Genocide

On December 9, 1948, the United Nations General Assembly unanimously approved a Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. As early as October, 1933, at an international meeting, Raphael Lemkin, the father of the Genocide Convention, had suggested outlawing the premeditated extermination of a people, but it was

the unparalleled horror of the Holocaust that impelled the U.N. member states to act on this question and adopt the U.N.'s first binding human rights treaty. The U.N.'s international commitment was hailed at the time by the president of the General Assembly, Herbert V. Evatt, who declared: "In this field relating to the sacred right of existence of human groups, we are proclaiming today the supremacy of international law once and for all."

In the light of thirty years' experience, this judgment was painfully premature. There has not been one single case in which the Genocide Convention, now accepted by eighty-three states, was invoked to prevent or punish acts intended to destroy a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group. There have been at least a dozen reported instances of mass butchery in just the last twenty years, including, in 1978 alone, Cambodia, Uganda, and Lebanon. Yet no United Nations organ has even taken upon itself the task of investigating a possible case of genocide. There has not even been a U.N. agenda item on the subject, with the exception of a technical, 187-page study on genocide. This study took almost ten years to prepare in the U.N.'s Subcommittee on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. The meetings of that little-known body were moved to Geneva several years ago, several thousand miles from U.N. headquarters, so it is difficult even to find the study in New York.

Legally, the crime of genocide is no longer exclusively a matter of domestic concern. Article VIII of the Genocide Convention states that "Any Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of Genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article III." (The latter include, in addition to genocide, conspiracy, direct and public incitement, attempts, and complicity in genocide.) From a practical standpoint, most governments do not even care to speak on the issue. When genocide is mentioned at the U.N. these days, it is usually within the context of politically motivated accusations against rival states. In particular the State of Israel, peopled by families of Holocaust survivors and (mostly) by Jews who escaped persecution in Arab lands, and one of the few states to have prosecuted someone for genocide, is increasingly the target of fraudulent charges by spokesmen of Communist and radical Arab states. Thus, at the U.N.'s World Conference to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination held in August, 1978, in Geneva, the Ukrainian representative charged that Israeli colonizers are conducting massive policies of terror and genocide against the Arab population in the Occupied Territories, policies that thousands of visitors and journalists in the area had failed to detect. A state like Burundi, where genocide really did take place, also attacks Israel.

As the Nazi propaganda genius Joseph Goebbels would have proposed, the victims are depicted as

the perpetrators. Thus, the president of Uganda, Idi Amin, cabled a justification of the extermination of the Jews to U.N. Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim, then to Prime Minister Golda Meir of Israel and Yasir Arafat of the Palestine Liberation Front (the PLO) on September 12, 1972, just a few days after the Munich Olympic games massacre. "Germany," Amin wrote, "is the right place where, when Hitler was the Prime Minister and supreme commander, he burnt over six million Jews."

The choices of the U.N. and Arafat as recipients of Amin's cables were significant. Just two years later the terrorist chieftain, whose own organization, Al-Fatah, defines its purpose as not only the "liquidation" of Israel but the "obliteration" of its Jewish society, was to be given a hero's welcome and highest honors at the U.N.

The policy of most United Nations member states to limit attention to the crime of genocide meant there was no commemoration on December 9 of the thirtieth anniversary of the Genocide Convention. But the U.N. is spending over \$500,000 annually to promote the PLO.

Curiously, American opposition to ratification of the U.N. Convention has always entailed fear of hasty or ill-advised demands by other governments for international action against alleged violators of the treaty provisions. What we have witnessed instead is an extraordinary refusal to use the Convention's rudimentary machinery even under the most pressing and tragic circumstances.

Almost half the U.N.'s present member states, including the United States, have not ratified or acceded to the Genocide Convention. As the first progress made in this field at the international level, the Convention should not be abandoned. Approval of the Convention carries a commitment to the proposition that genocide is a violation of international law, and that is very desirable. It also means, according to Article IV, that government officials, as well as private individuals, can be punished for committing genocide.

The truth remains that legal means for preventing, halting, or punishing genocide can never really be effective as long as states have other priorities or adopt positions like the one expressed by the Soviet Union in March, 1973, when it stated that "there does not appear to be any great urgency about the matter." Thus additional new modes to deal with the crime of genocide are necessary to help overcome deficiencies in the Convention.

First, to help prevent genocide broader and more intense efforts are needed in every country to combat the false beliefs that lead to racial prejudice and religious intolerance. Good intergroup relations between majorities and minorities should be promoted. In particular, young people should be brought up with an understanding of the dignity and worth of every individual, without distinction as to race, color, religion, national or ethnic origin.

Second, to stop genocide nongovernmental orga-

nizations should establish an impartial international fact-finding body composed of individuals of the highest integrity, whose conclusions can be used, as appropriate and necessary, to apply global pressure on any party or state found, on a prima facie basis, guilty of genocide as defined in the Convention.

Third, survivors of a program of genocide, as defined in the Convention, should be granted automatically the right of self-determination. What is at stake is the physical survival of ethnic, racial, or religious groups in the face of attempts to effect their complete and utter destruction. Certainly, self-determination for the Jewish people was supported on these grounds, and they also helped to justify self-determination for the people who formed Bangladesh. Universal recognition of this concept might deter those considering the crime.

Fourth, the extermination of a population by its own government, as in the case of Democratic Kampuchea (Cambodia), underscores the urgent need to fill a gap in the Genocide Convention in the area of mass slaughter "for reasons of state." At Soviet insistence this definition was dropped from the Convention at the time it was drafted. But politically motivated annihilation can no longer be ignored. Ironically, had international machinery existed to deal with the Cambodian tragedy, the Soviets and their Vietnamese allies could not have justified the invasion of Cambodia, which in turn triggered the Chinese invasion of Vietnam.

Nobody can bring back the millions who have been slaughtered. The most meaningful memorial to them would be the assurance that genocide can never happen again.

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EXCURSUS IV

Robert D. Bond on Our Troubled Friendship With Venezuela

The turmoil in Iran has served to emphasize that Venezuela is the most secure source of United States oil imports. Venezuela sends a million barrels of crude and refined products to American shores every day. Equally significant, the inauguration on March 12 of Luis Herrera Campins as the fifth democratically elected president of Venezuela since 1958 highlights the value to the U.S. of having an open, progressive, and stable democracy located at the top of the South American continent.

Five years ago the coincidence of upheaval in world petroleum markets and the inauguration of a Venezuelan president led to a serious slide in relations between the United States and Venezuela. President Carlos Andrés Pérez (1974-78) took full

advantage of international circumstances and the influx of petrodollars to propel his country onto the world scene. Frequently that meant opposition to U.S. policies. At home Pérez nationalized the iron ore and petroleum industries, each of which was dominated by U.S. companies. In Latin America, Venezuela undertook initiatives to lessen U.S. hegemony, including the creation of an exclusively Latin American forum for economic consultation and cooperation (SELA). It also promoted efforts to reintegrate Cuba into the Latin American community and to expand Venezuela's economic presence in neighboring countries, especially in Central America and the Caribbean. On the wider stage Venezuela was active in establishing OPEC policies and in championing Third World demands for a "new international economic order." Thus, a long list of irritations arose in U.S.-Venezuelan relations.

Venezuela's assertiveness met staunch U.S. disapproval in the Nixon-Ford years, the most significant conflict being over oil prices. The central goal of U.S. oil policy then was to deny OPEC the power to set international oil prices. The resulting conflict of interest between the United States and Venezuela was real, and not susceptible to compromise. Typical expressions of U.S. disapproval were two strong notes from President Ford to President Pérez protesting Venezuela's OPEC policies and its petroleum nationalization decision. The U.S. Congress also passed the "OPEC Amendment" to the 1974 Trade Act, which excludes Venezuela from trade benefits even though it did not participate in the Arab oil embargo. Apparently American statecraft was unable or unwilling to respond constructively to the challenges posed by Venezuela in this period. Frictions were allowed to override the fundamental, long-term U.S. interests in Venezuela: security of oil supply and support for Venezuela's effort to build a stable, legitimate, industrialized democracy.

The first two years of the Carter administration saw a decided improvement in the climate of U.S.-Venezuelan relations. In part this is due to a warm personal relationship between Presidents Carter and Pérez. At the ceremonial signing of the Panama Canal treaties in Washington in September, 1977—an event attended by all Latin American heads of state—President Carter remarked of Pérez, "He is my first adviser on Latin American affairs and my very good friend." At a subsequent state visit to Caracas in March, 1978—the first stopover on a marathon trip to cement U.S. relations with the "new influentials" in Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East—Carter spoke of a "complete harmony of interests" between the U.S. and Venezuela. Even with allowance for rhetorical excesses, it was clear Carter and Pérez got along remarkably well.

A second and more fundamental reason for better relations was a convergence of policy objectives between Washington and Caracas in certain areas. The Carter administration had abandoned the American commitment to "break OPEC," there-