

quick look at the draft speech, and that the détente "cabal" of Brzezinski, Owen, and Rostow managed to override the strenuous objections of these officers by deft maneuvering through the upper strata of the Department. (In any event, on the basis of this speech, which was an attempt to disarm the Soviets psychologically by accepting their postwar power position in Eastern Europe, Brzezinski—the leading "hawk" of the Carter regime—emerged the leading "dove" of the Johnson administration.

In Bonn, German political leaders of both Right and Left, including the now Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, were so disturbed by this peremptory U.S. withdrawal of support for the mainstay of their foreign policy that for several weeks they were talking about a West German neutralization that would involve Bonn's withdrawal from NATO and the departure of U.S. forces stationed in West Germany. But such talk was abandoned before long and Bonn began to step up its nascent détente policy toward Eastern Europe. Bonn was saying in effect that if the U.S. would not help it seek formal reunification, then the Federal Republic would pursue East-West détente as vigorously as possible as a substitute means of eventually achieving reunification, in substance if not in form.

It was this aggressive West German *Ostpolitik*, in concert with the new U.S. détente approach, that led to misinterpretation by the Czechs and the subsequent Prague Spring. It was a subtle matter. Western policies at that time did not, of course, offer military aid in the event of Soviet military intervention against liberalization in Eastern Europe. What encouraged the too ambitious Czech liberalization was the fact that the West Germans were suddenly proposing an entirely new East-West relationship, and the Czechs assumed that the powerful U.S. Government not only supported this approach but also had the means and the will to make it effective. (They would have been wise to have paid more attention to Johnson's 1966 speech on German reunification, which gave the Soviets virtual "carte blanche" in Eastern Europe.)

The sweeping Czech liberalization measures of 1967 were of concern to only a few in the U.S. Government. Most policymakers had climbed hurriedly on Brzezinski's "bandwagon," and they regarded Bonn's new détente tactics and the Czech response as evidence of the correctness of the way in which the U.S. had changed its position on German reunification. The 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia came as such a surprise to most career officers and politicians in Washington and Bonn that we failed to react in any significant way; and by our failure we seemed to accept the notion that the Soviets had the "right" to conduct such a rape within a sphere of hegemony that, under our new détente policy, we acknowledged as their own.

The principal lesson to be drawn from this history is clear. The U.S. and its NATO allies should take great pains to avoid actions or statements that might convey the impression to the Poles that we would intervene or retaliate militarily in the event of a Soviet invasion of Poland. It would be foolish, in fact, for the U.S. to threaten any type of retaliation that we were not fully prepared to invoke should our bluff be called. We have performed rather well so far. There is, of course, little danger that the Reagan administration would renew the sort of vigorous détente efforts that characterized the Johnson regime. The possibility of the U.S. assuming a bellicose posture is another matter, however.

The Poles themselves presumably are less likely to be misled by careless statements from the West than were the Czechs, for the Poles have much more historical experience on which to draw. Lech Walesa, leader of the Polish

workers' "Solidarity" movement, as well as leaders in both the Polish Communist party and the Polish Catholic Church, obviously has been taking care to avoid too great a provocation to the Soviets. Moscow is itself deterred, it would seem, not only by the adverse consequences it would suffer in its relations with the rest of the world, but also by the prospect that invasion might provoke a general uprising in Poland. (If there were to be an invasion and resistance, the Poles would of course lose.) However, ill-considered U.S. statements could yet produce a replay of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, a possibility underscored by the likelihood that U.S. foreign policy will be dominated by military "hawks" on East-West relations.

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EXCURSUS 2

David Linebaugh and Edward Doherty on GETTING BACK TO SALT II

Since the failure of the Senate to ratify SALT II, both the U.S. and the USSR have observed the limitations set in that agreement—the U.S. explicitly, the USSR tacitly. Will the new administration understand the importance of continuing to do this, whatever else they do?

Secretary of State Haig told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the U.S. is ill-prepared "to negotiate successfully the kinds of arms control breakthroughs I would like to see. I would like to have some rather dramatic improvement in our overall posture...we've got to change the backdrop...." Secretary of Defense Weinberger told the Senate Armed Services Committee that it would be "a good six months" before the Reagan administration is ready to discuss a new agreement. He wants a clear signal "that we are resolutely embarked" on the path to redress the strategic balance.

It does not seem unreasonable for the new administration to want six months before resuming strategic arms talks with the USSR; but it is difficult to see how a dramatic improvement in our posture or a redressing of the strategic balance can be achieved in so short a time. If the intention is also to ignore the SALT II limits, one may assume the Soviets will ignore them too. And if the Soviets are already ahead, as Haig and Weinberger imply, will they not remain so?

On the other hand, assuming that for six months or so the SALT II limits will be observed by both sides, what choices are then open to the United States? The apparent lesson of Carter's early failed démarche in 1977 to open up the talks for drastic reductions in weaponry is that the Russians will insist on staying with the SALT II they know, perhaps with minor modifications. But will they?

On the contrary, after reading Haig's and Weinberger's signals, they may leap at the opportunity to renegotiate SALT II and escape from its limitations. For the Russians, SALT II is a treaty of prohibition: It restrains them at many points. They cannot interfere with national technical means of intelligence collection; they may not deploy the SS-16, a mobile missile; they may not increase the production rate of the Backfire bomber; they must retire a Yankee-class submarine with the deployment of each Delta-class submarine; they must dismantle 250 missiles and bombers by the end of 1981; they cannot add six thou-

sand warheads to their three hundred giant SS-18 missiles; they cannot deliberately conceal their weapons.

For the Americans, SALT II is a treaty of permission. SALT II limits no program now planned by the Pentagon. It interferes in no way with the development or deployment of the ground-launched cruise missile, the MX missile, or the Trident II missile. It permits the build-up—the “redressing”—the Republicans are talking about. And under SALT II the United States can even increase the number of missiles and bombers it has deployed.

Russian hawks thus may welcome the chance to up the ante if we reopen the negotiations *de novo*. For instance, through skillful negotiations at Vladivostok in November, 1974, President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger got the Russians to drop their demand that American “forward-based systems” (FBS)—hundreds of U.S. medium-range nuclear weapons that can hit the Soviet Union—be included in SALT II. Now that NATO has decided to “modernize” its theatre nuclear forces (TNF) by adding to those FBS new medium-range ballistic missiles (Pershing II) and ground-launched cruise missiles also capable of striking targets in the USSR from European bases, the Russians are almost certain to insist upon including the new TNF systems as well as the FBS in any such negotiations.

The inescapable policy conclusion of these considerations is that the Reagan administration should ask the Senate to take up again and quickly ratify SALT II. Only in this way can the president hope to put a hold on a further Soviet build-up as well as gain the time his advisors think they need to “redress the balance.” The U.S. would then have set the stage for negotiating the arms control breakthrough Secretary Haig envisages.

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EXCURSUS 3

Walter C. Clemens, Jr., on TIME FOR MOSCOW TO SWING “RIGHT”?

Nations, like our bodies, have their own rhythms. Walter Lippmann noticed that the United States alternated bouts of innovative expansion with those of conservative consolidation. Soviet Russia, history suggests, has swung from a hard to a soft line in foreign affairs, shifting gears every four to six years. Mechanical repetition of this pattern is not assured, but if past patterns hold, the Kremlin may soon be ready to submerge the harsh chords that now dominate its external behavior with harmonious leit-motifs of détente and conciliation. Indeed, the first such notes have already been played.

The hard, aggressive line commenced in November, 1917, when the Bolsheviks seized power in Petrograd, nationalized all land and industry, spurned traditional diplomacy, and promoted revolution in Europe and Asia by arms and propaganda. By 1921 they and their domain were exhausted. Lenin himself had suffered mortal wounds. A New Economic Policy was launched at home—a partial return to free enterprise—while Soviet diplomats donned striped trousers and promoted world peace (in French) at one international conference after another. By 1927, Stalin lurched the country back to the left: five-year

plans and collectivization at home; revolutionary propaganda by the Soviet Foreign Office and Comintern working hand in glove. However, these tactics helped bring Hitler to power in Germany; and in 1933, Kremlin diplomacy moved again to the right, gaining recognition from the U.S. and, the next year, admission to the League of Nations. Stalin’s diplomats labored to strengthen the League and collective security but failed. When they saw Hitler moving eastward, they divided the world with him in 1939, ending five years of rightist tactics.

Stalin’s expansion carried out in partnership with Nazi Germany lasted two years—cut short by Hitler’s invasion of the USSR in 1941. A period of collaboration with the West now began, which lasted until 1945–46. The first bout of the cold war, in turn, lasted from 1947 until 1952–53, when Moscow initiated negotiations for a unified but neutral Germany. These overtures for détente (what Khrushchev called peaceful coexistence) dominated Kremlin policy until 1958, when Moscow began a series of ultimatums concerning Berlin. Khrushchev tried to make the most of the much-publicized missile gap—a time when, as Chairman Mao put it, the east wind was prevailing over the west wind.

The hard-blowing east wind changed course after the 1962 Cuban missile confrontation, and Khrushchev and Ambassador Averell Harriman toasted a “spirit of Moscow” at the signing of the nuclear test ban treaty in 1963. This era persisted until the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, introducing a period of East-West tension that lasted until Nixon clinked glasses with Brezhnev at the SALT I ceremonies in 1972. This era of détente continued until 1976, when Soviet and Cuban policies toward Angola soured U.S.-Soviet relations and made Americans wary about their defenses.

Angola was followed by aggressive Soviet and Cuban behavior in Ethiopia and other parts of Africa, while Moscow’s Vietnamese allies proceeded to attack much of Indochina. But the most egregious Soviet behavior was Russia’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979–80. Is Afghanistan a harbinger of tough actions to come or does it represent a high water mark of a tide that will soon ebb?

The Kremlin’s problems are at least as bountiful as its assets. At home: slow economic growth; low productivity and innovation; dissent and unrest; falling health standards; declining numbers of Russians compared to Central Asians. Abroad: Afghanistan, China, the U.S., and now Poland. This platter might prove indigestible for men in their prime; it makes heavy going indeed for men in their seventies.

Brezhnev’s comments at the Party Congress in February, calling directly upon the U.S. for a renewal of East-West dialogue, strongly suggests a new move toward the “right” and is in keeping with the Kremlin’s usual pattern of exploring détente with newly elected presidents. But what if there is also a change of guard in Moscow? The Kremlin’s new masters will feel compelled to patronize the Soviet military and to control domestic unrest. But they will also want to persuade the Soviet people that their new leaders seek both peace and prosperity.

How then should Western policymakers nudge history’s horse to turn us from a collision course? As usual, a skillful combination of firmness and flexibility is needed. The Russians must see that Western defenses and will power are strong; but Moscow must also perceive that the West is ready to explore common interests in preventing war, limiting arms, increasing trade, promoting exchanges in science and the arts.

If we do enter another round of détente, its duration cannot be assured. We or the Soviets may again edge