EXCURSUS 1

E. Ralph Buultjens on
THE POLITICS OF EXPULSION—
THE CONSEQUENCES OF REPATRIATION

In early February shrieking headlines told the world that Nigeria had suddenly decided to repatriate some two million foreigners. These were, for the most part, immigrants from neighboring nations who had come to Nigeria to work in the oil-boom days. Concealed within the drama of this expulsion is a tragic possibility: Nigeria may well be the harbinger of the future.

Since World War II, for reasons of economics, there have been two major waves of migration. The first occurred in the twenty years between 1950 and 1970. During this time relatively healthy economies in the Western world attracted and welcomed large numbers of unskilled workers from poorer regions. Indians, Pakistanis, and West Indians made their way to Britain; Algerians and Moroccans went to France; Turks moved to West Germany; and many southern Europeans found their way to North Europe. By 1972 about seven million postwar migrants were working in Western Europe; with their dependents the number reached twelve million. The United States, Canada, and Australia also received a share of this flow.

Most of these migrants found work, often undertaking the more menial tasks that upwardly mobile natives now considered unrewarding. As they settled in their new homes, the migrants and their children often became citizens of the host countries. By the 1970s it became clear that this movement of people was providing a useful outlet for more enterprising, but unskilled individuals of many Third World nations. Several poor countries were also beginning to benefit from the remittances of their expatriates.

The early 1970s brought two overlapping developments. As economic recession threatened Western economies, partly a result of rising oil prices, unemployment began to rise. With it came migration controls, repatriation incentives, and racial tensions. The flow of new migrants decreased sharply. Yet those already settled tended to remain—and still remain. Most Western nations, if uncomfortably, have come to accept these older Third World migrants and their children.

The second wave of economics-oriented migration took place within the Third World after 1973. The principal regions affected were the Gulf States of the Middle East and Nigeria. To the Gulf and surrounding areas came unskilled workers from Asia—Indians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, Sri Lankans, Filipinos, South Koreans, and others. A million Egyptians moved north, and many Yemenis and Palestinians replaced them. To Nigeria came almost two million Africans from Ghana, Benin, Togo, Upper Volta, Chad, and Niger.

Most of these migrants, magnetized by oil wealth, were solicited and made welcome. They worked on the vast array of projects that oil revenues generated and were usually compensated at well above their earnings at home. Unlike first-wave migrants to the West, they were not settlers and rarely brought their families with them. Expecting to work abroad for some years and then return home, they sent back the bulk of their earnings. Increasingly, many poorer countries began to depend on these foreign remittances as a form of economic assistance and on this employment as a partial solution for growing joblessness at home.

Egypt gathered over $2 billion annually in recent years. The Philippines took in $800 million last year from its 500,000 workers in the Gulf. India and Pakistan each have over two million workers in the Gulf region, returning some $5 billion to the subcontinent annually. The Government of Pakistan went even further: It rented out part of its army to Saudi Arabia, an arrangement that Bangladesh apparently is copying. Millions of workers from Asia and Africa, and those who supervised and hired and supplied them, were now floating on secondhand petrodollars.

And then began the decline in the price of oil. Many oil producers, having embarked on grand development pro-
grams, now are unable to sustain them. Even states with huge financial reserves (Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, for example) are likely to spend more prudently when less revenue is coming in. All of them view the presence of large numbers of foreigners with unease. The Nigerian reaction has already been witnessed. Others may well be tempted to follow this policy of forcible ejection. In any event, many workers will have to go home because of cutbacks or simply because there is no more work.

The economic and political consequences of this repatriation can be startling. Hard-pressed governments, already desperately short of foreign exchange, will find a major source diminishing. Given the overextended condition of global debt, there are few places from which Third World treasuries can borrow. This means massive retrenchment on development projects, which, in turn, means more unemployment and almost no immediate possibility of exporting it.

Two political consequences also follow. First, the present generation of unemployed in the Third World are likely to have a much lower threshold of patience than those of the past. Mass education and communications are among elements that, combined with joblessness, can create political restiveness. Second, the large number of enterprising expatriates who will return can be a serious political force for instability. Conditioned to a different level of compensation, exposed to the availability of better things, they will find little to engage their talents or energies at home. These emotional and economic dissatisfactions may well spill over into political action.

The implications are frightening. A halt in emigration, even without repatriation of those abroad, will find a major source diminishing. Given the overextended condition of global debt, there are few places from which Third World treasuries can borrow. This means massive retrenchment on development projects, which, in turn, means more unemployment and almost no immediate possibility of exporting it.

Two political consequences also follow. First, the present generation of unemployed in the Third World are likely to have a much lower threshold of patience than those of the past. Mass education and communications are among elements that, combined with joblessness, can create political restiveness. Second, the large number of enterprising expatriates who will return can be a serious political force for instability. Conditioned to a different level of compensation, exposed to the availability of better things, they will find little to engage their talents or energies at home. These emotional and economic dissatisfactions may well spill over into political action.

The French, who will never tolerate the idea of a Germany independent of Europe and NATO, warned West Germans against flirting with notions of neutralism. Neutralism is one of those bogeywords that awaken all sorts of fears but which, curiously, seem to defy precise definition by politicians and journalists. The term was used during the campaign to reflect everything from out-and-out rejection of the West and its anticommunism to the briefest murmurings about a need to place "German interests" before those of the United States. Of all the insomniacs it was the American commentators who seemed among the most pessimistic. Not only was Germany about to go "neutralist"; at various times they also detected the specter of "nationalism." A former White House national security advisor solemnly declared that a victory for the Social Democrats would mean the unraveling of the Atlantic Alliance, and therefore this was the most important West European election since the war.

Germany, we were being told, is prey to "angst"—another loaded term that conjures up images ranging from German Romantic literature of the nineteenth-century to the Third Reich—and also that democracy itself was in peril. All sorts of pagan, Germanic notions were supposed to be bubbling just beneath the surface of a staid, prosperous society.

The decisive Christian Democrat victory presumably has changed all that. Now we will turn our pessimistic gaze to other "fragile" societies—maybe our own, as another presidential campaign looms on the horizon.

And that would be a pity, because all is not suddenly right in Germany. Whatever degree of political stability the election results may have bought German society for another four years, it is unlikely to cure many of the real anxieties felt by Germans of all ages and political allegiances. Yes, there is angst, and to alleviate it Germans voted for the promise of a more innocent age—when prosperity and economic progress rewarded hard work and organization, when