grams, now are unable to sustain them. Even states with huge financial reserves (Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, for example) are likely to spend more prudently when less revenue is coming in. All of them view the presence of large numbers of foreigners with unease. The Nigerian reaction has already been witnessed. Others may well be tempted to follow this policy of forcible ejection. In any event, many workers will have to go home because of cutbacks or simply because there is no more work.

The economic and political consequences of this repatriation can be startling. Hard-pressed governments, already desperately short of foreign exchange, will find a major source diminishing. Given the overextended condition of global debt, there are few places from which Third World treasuries can borrow. This means massive retrenchment on development projects, which, in turn, means more unemployment and almost no immediate possibility of exporting it.

Two political consequences also follow. First, the present generation of unemployed in the Third World are likely to have a much lower threshold of patience than those of the past. Mass education and communications are among elements that, combined with joblessness, can create political restiveness. Second, the large number of enterprise expatriates who will return can be a serious political force for instability. Conditioned to a different level of compensation, exposed to the availability of better things, they will find little to engage their talents or energies at home. These emotional and economic dissatisfactions may well spill over into political action.

The implications are frightening. A halt in emigration, even without repatriation of those abroad, will create severe problems in Egypt. Other Middle East nations would be affected as well. South Asia could have serious difficulties, and the troubles could reach as far away as South Korea and the Philippines. Forced repatriation of migrants from the Gulf areas might trigger demands for similar action in Western Europe. The results of sending back almost ten million illegal immigrants from the United States to Mexico cannot be imagined, let alone assessed.

As we contemplate the apparently benign impact of declining oil costs on Western economies, we should remember the potential for global political instability inherent in a rapid price erosion. The dream of economic policymakers may become the nightmare of foreign policymakers.

Ralph Buultjens, the author of several books on international affairs, is Professor of Political Science at the New School, New York, and Chairman of the International Development Forum.

EXCURSUS 2

Julian Crandall Hollick on THE GERMAN VOTER

"I grow sad when I think of Germany in the night," wrote the poet Heine. The March elections in West Germany troubled the sleep of a great many people both within and outside Germany.

Take the non-German insomniacs, for instance. The Soviet Union injected itself into the campaign on the side of the Social Democrats and their candidate, Hans-Jochen Vogel, hoping to return to office a party that vowed to do everything possible to render "superfluous" the NATO two-track decision to station Pershing II and cruise missiles on German soil.

The French, who will never tolerate the idea of a Germany independent of Europe and NATO, warned West Germans against flirting with notions of neutralism. Neutralism is one of those bogeywords that awaken all sorts of fears but which, curiously, seem to defy precise definition by politicians and journalists. The term was used during the campaign to reflect everything from out-and-out rejection of the West and its anticomunism to the briefest murmurings about a need to place "German interests" before those of the United States.

Of all the insomniacs it was the American commentators who seemed among the most pessimistic. Not only was Germany about to go "neutralist"; at various times they also detected the specter of "nationalism." A former White House national security advisor solemnly declared that a victory for the Social Democrats would mean the unraveling of the Atlantic Alliance, and therefore this was the most important West European election since the war.

Germany, we were being told, is prey to "angst"—another loaded term that conjures up images ranging from German Romantic literature of the nineteenth-century to the Third Reich—and also that democracy itself was in peril. All sorts of pagan, Germanic notions were supposed to be bubbling just beneath the surface of a staid, prosperous society.

The decisive Christian Democrat victory presumably has changed all that. Now we will turn our pessimistic gaze to other "fragile" societies—maybe our own, as another presidential campaign looms on the horizon.

And that would be a pity, because all is not suddenly right in Germany. Whatever degree of political stability the election results may have brought German society for another four years, it is unlikely to cure many of the real anxieties felt by Germans of all ages and political allegiances. Yes, there is angst, and to alleviate it Germans voted for the promise of a more innocent age—when prosperity and economic progress rewarded hard work and organization, when
Germany's friends and enemies were so easy to distinguish that no one seriously questioned the future.

Chancellor Helmut Kohl, an affable bear of a man, is much given to vague and uplifting references to the "fatherland" and to a Germany of happy, laughing children. In a sense he couldn't lose. The Social Democrats, on the other hand, were fatally compromised by having been in power for a long time—thirteen years—and by association with the high unemployment and steady slowdown of the Wirtschaftswunder, the economic miracle. Consequently, they had little option but to campaign on the emotional theme of the U.S. missiles and peace.

Following politicians up and down Germany, observing the record-size crowds, and speaking to individual Germans, one forms a picture of German society as one fearful for its future. While there appears to be a general consensus that some fat must be trimmed from the social welfare program, which protects Germans from cradle to grave, and that the Social Democrats were exhausted and bereft of new ideas, agreement pretty much ends there. Only committed Christian Democrat voters—usually those near retirement age and those who view all Social Democrats as closet Marxists—seemed to have voted for a party and its program. The rest, with varying degrees of political sophistication, voted against someone or a party, choosing the lesser of several evils. It would be misleading to conclude that the public attitude was one of apathy or boredom. Meetings brought out record numbers and almost 90 per cent of all those enrolled actually voted, including over 80 per cent of first-time voters.

Some voted for the CDU to prevent the Greens—the idealistic, alternately naive, dangerous, and harmless new entrant into German politics—from holding the balance of parliamentary power. Others voted against the SPD in the hope that a dose of opposition would do wonders for its soul. Still others voted against Herr Franz-Josef Strauss, an engaging, baroque politician from Bavaria, the man they all love to hate. Few people seemed to know anything about the program of the swing Liberal party (Free Democrats); but they voted for its candidates because they wanted to prevent Strauss from becoming foreign minister and favored having three parties in the Bundestag. To supporters of the Greens, weighed none of the above but voted to prevent the death of Germany's forests from acid rain and to halt possible deployment of the cruise and Pershing missiles.

Unfortunately, no one really seemed to want to address the deeper problems of German society. Fat may be cut from the "social net." Growth may be recorded again. But the German economy suffers from its very successes. Industrial costs are far too high. Economic growth has come to depend on exports for its impetus. There has been far too little investment in high and new technologies. Many Germans fear, with cause, that there cannot be a return to sustained high growth; that Germany's traditional strengths in machinery and electrical goods will be eroded rapidly by low-cost rivals from Japan and Southeast Asia; that it will suffer the fate that has been Britain's since the '60s.

Perhaps the Greens' small victory, enabling it to enter the Bundestag for the first time, ought to be read as a sign both by the German establishment and the country's allies that new agendas and new faces have increasing appeal in troubled times. Unless those now in power address the citizen's real fears, some of the insomniacs' more generalized fears may be realized.

Julian Crandall Hollick is a freelance reporter currently traveling in Europe.