

strata, the mounting centrifugal pressures of the non-Russian nationalities (about to become the majority of the Soviet population), and the restiveness of the captive nations of Eastern Europe (whose historic mission, Todd believes, is to hasten the disintegration of Soviet power). In view of all this, so runs the argument, it is illogical to assume that the system can sustain for long the kind of imperialistic exercises in which the Soviets are now engaged in Africa. The military, like every other Soviet institution, is permeated with inefficiency and corruption; even the repressive organs of the system are in a process of rot.

It is a little early to tell what the foreign policy of the Carter Administration will turn out to be, but there is some reason to think it is tending toward something like the Todd view of Soviet power. If that view is correct, then some recent actions of the United States constitute an important regaining of the initiative in the face of an adversary whom past administrations may have overestimated. Then, quite apart from moral considerations, the recent emphasis on human rights is good international politics—the United States going on the ideological offensive instead of maintaining a defensive position. Then it is wise to remain relaxed about Eurocommunism—the Eurocommunists, far from being a Trojan horse for Soviet expansion into Western Europe, may be yet another force subverting the Soviet empire. Then it also makes sense to give the Soviets a good deal of rope in Africa and in other parts of the Third World—they will soon outreach themselves, and the putative victims of their imperialist ambitions will soon find that only the West is in a position to be useful economically to them. A foreign policy that may look soft at first glance may therefore be very realistic, even Machiavellian.

The further question—whether, given the “greened” climate of opinion in this country, domestic politics will impose a soft policy on any administration—need not be pursued here. But there certainly is no reason to reproach the optimistic view of Soviet power with lack of sophistication; it may even turn out to be *more* sophisticated than the alternative view. At present, nobody knows—not the Sovietologists, not the Administration (which, one assumes, has the same intelligence sources that were available to its predecessor), perhaps not even the Kremlin. This, however, is precisely the most important point: *Nobody knows*. There are two Sovietological hypotheses. American foreign policy may favor one over the other. If the Carter Administration opts for the hypothesis favored by Amalrik, Todd, and others, the option is defensible. What would *not* be defensible would be the absence of alternative plans if the hypothesis turns out to have been erroneous. Economic pressures, ideological offensives, and deft diplomacy would then, once again, have to take second place to other means—most important, to the old means of credible military power. It is unwise to gamble everything on the hypothesis that Genghis Khan will run out of horses.

## EXCURSUS II

*Elliott Wright on*

### Muzorewa's Last Hope for Rhodesia

The breakdown of the Geneva talks late last year dampened hopes for any negotiated settlement between Rhodesia's ruling white minority and black nationalists in the recalcitrant British colony. True, Her Majesty's Government and the United States remain committed to peacefully achieved majority control. In April Foreign Secretary David Owen persuaded Ian Smith to agree once more to a constitutional conference. But many Africa-watchers, including much of the U.S. press, dismiss the likelihood of orderly transition in Salisbury. The prevailing scenario projects an expanding Viet Cong-style guerrilla struggle against Smith's superior military machine, the now rather small Patriotic Front of Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe sooner or later whipping the whites with Soviet guns, the blessing of Kenneth Kaunda, and, perhaps, some Cuban troops

Bishop Abel T. Muzorewa, head of the African National Council of Zimbabwe (ANC-Z), is the only major African figure in the Rhodesian drama still clinging to the always fragile dream of black liberation by negotiation. The United Methodist cleric is a politically fascinating amalgam of idealism and realism. He abhors the bloodshed and destruction of property already under way in his people's battle for independence, yet concedes violence will, and must, continue in the absence of other alternatives. He cannot, however, rest easy with a military solution as long as nonviolence has a breath of a chance. And he believes a “very last chance” to attain nationalist goals without carnage is possible—possible though fading fast.

Muzorewa's last hope is a peace plan revising the standard diplomatic design for the transfer of power. His plan—actually a program approved by ANC-Z in March—entails no preliminary agreement among the contentious Zimbabwean liberation groups, and rejects a constitutional conference as automatic first step in the shift to majority rule. The bishop once accepted British logic that a constitutional framework, approved by all parties involved, is prerequisite to a new order. No more. Muzorewa is too skeptical of Smith to swap theories with him. So in April, while Owen traversed Africa on behalf of initial constitutional talks, Muzorewa visited London and New York to enlist support for a scheme culminating in a constitution.

The ANC-Z five-point plan pivots on a national referendum to elect a leader to whom Smith would hand over power. Point One—Smith's categorical and unequivocal surrender of authority—must be taken as both the black goal and the condition the white-dominated Rhodesian Front must accept at the outset. Surrender of power requires a structure,

and the other points provide a rough sketch for change.

ANC-Z wants the referendum supervised by Great Britain or, on British invitation, the United Nations or Commonwealth organization. Before the vote all "political prisoners" would be released and time would be guaranteed for "free political activity" throughout the country. "All Zimbabweans, wherever they may be and including nationalist guerrillas" would have a chance to take part in the process. After selection of the national leader would come a British-convened conference to draft a constitution. Transitional government would be in the hands of the new national leader.

Perfect the plan is not. It has gaps and raises immediate questions, but Muzorewa deserves a better hearing than he got six weeks ago in the U.S. press and among American church specialists in African affairs. The cool reception was not surprising. The bishop is currently out of vogue almost everywhere except, most likely, inside Rhodesia. Presidents of the five "front-line" states (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia) have designated another (Nkomo) "Father of Zimbabwe." Britain and the U.S. seem reluctant to consider any settlement that is unattractive to the Patriotic Front's guerrilla chiefs. Muzorewa has even fallen from favor with many American religious internationalists, some of whom are apparently most happy when, at safe distance, they hear the roar of battle. About the only backing ANC-Z has in U.S. Christian circles comes from the United Methodist Church, which has considerable financial and emotional investment in Muzorewa.

Despite problems, the ANC-Z peace plan is worth exploring for at least two reasons. First, it is without doubt more acceptable to a large segment of Rhodesia's blacks than is any external proposal sanctioned by Smith. Muzorewa is enormously popular. His estimate of 90 per cent black support inside Rhodesia may be too high. He may be naïve in saying a "majority" of the 10,000-11,000 armed men and women outside are loyal to ANC-Z. Still, the bishop is Mashona (as is Robert Mugabe) and the reportedly gentle—not docile—Mashonas comprise 8 per cent of the 6.5 million blacks. Given support by Britain, the U.S., and the "front-line" states, ANC-Z just might be able to bring off its referendum. The West may have forgotten too quickly that six years ago, as a political novice, Muzorewa successfully mobilized the blacks to defeat Pearce Commission proposals that, in effect, would have recognized the status quo.

Second, the ANC-Z plan deliberately aims at avoiding protracted civil war. Muzorewa insists that white, colored, and Asian minorities in Rhodesia increasingly support ANC-Z when they contemplate the alternatives: killing, destruction of property, and further deterioration of the economy. At an April press conference in New York Muzorewa was unambiguous in saying his council envisions all races taking part in the referendum. He even held the door

open for Smith to stand for national leader, although that eventuality clearly was not expected. The bishop has repeatedly heralded Zimbabwe as a multiracial democracy. Yet, were he chosen to lead a transitional government, his word is hardly blueprint for a new nation hungry for justice. At the same time, the foundation of a just society may be stronger when the architect is willing to take a risk on peace even when war is handier.

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## QUOTE/UNQUOTE

### Plagiarism

The author of the edition of the *Book of the Dead*, under review here, follows in a long procession of "European experts" who have co-opted, plagiarized, misrepresented, or otherwise attempted to give their treatment and interpretation to some aspect of the philosophical and religious culture of the ancient Blackman. A portion of this large store of knowledge, which has been misnamed by Europeans *The Book of the Dead*, is but a segment of the very large and complex Egyptian religious and philosophical system called the Mysteries. The ancient Blackman was the true source of the Mystery teachings, even though the Greeks stole the entire system and called it "Greek philosophy."

—Review of *The Egyptian Book of the Dead* by E.A. Wallis Budge in *Black Books Bulletin*, Winter, 1976

### She's No Feminist

...the church, in fidelity to the example of Our Lord, does not consider herself authorized to admit women to priestly ordination...

—"Declaration on the Question of the Admission of Women to the Ministerial Priesthood," made public by the Vatican's Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, January 27

### Equality & Uniformity

In discussing the role of women in the church—a role that everyone agrees should be expanded—it is important not to lose sight of the unique contributions which women can make. There is, I believe, a danger that this might happen if the gospel value of the essential equality of men and women were to be