

This all took place in Ahmedabad, a city of three million and a center of Gandhi's most effective campaigns on behalf of the "untouchables." There is great fear that the hatred and violence triggered by the events in Ahmedabad may spread to the rest of India and release a bloodbath comparable to that of the Muslim-Hindu massacres at the time of partition.

It is not without irony that I write this from an international meeting in Calcutta devoted to considerations of public health and the medical care and health needs of developing countries. With the Indian Public Health Association as host, we are discussing how to achieve (in the World Health Organization phrasing) "health for all by the year 2000." The sympathetic and unselfish devotion of physicians to this cause is frequently discussed at the meetings as a sine qua non of the endeavor. Apparently this will have to be achieved, if at all, over the dead bodies of minority doctors.

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EXCURSUS 2

Walter C. Clemens, Jr., on THE LEGACY OF ERIC WILLIAMS

Small countries are overshadowed by large ones. The passing of one of the developing countries' most outstanding leaders was overshadowed by the assassination attempt on President Reagan. But Dr. Eric Williams, prime minister of Trinidad and Tobago since independence in 1962, has left a legacy that is almost a model for other Third World leaders.

First of all Williams knew his business. The leading scholar of all statesmen in the world for over a generation, he had written widely on the history of capitalism and slavery; on relations between Europe and the Caribbean; on the history of the Caribbean and his own country. Indeed, he produced almost overnight a major history of Trinidad on the eve of independence. A lecturer at Howard University in the 1950s, he returned to the Caribbean and to Trinidad as independence swept the region. But he never gave up his scholarly pursuits. During my year at the University of the West Indies in 1977-78, for example, he gave a long and detailed speech on Islam, relating it to the Muslim minority of Trinidad.

Second, he was a skillful politician. He set up a powerful political machine that ensured his primacy in the elections and within the government even as he promoted parliamentary democracy. Leader of what was perceived as the black man's party, he included a sufficient number of East Indians in cabinet and party leadership to lend hope that the party would be multiracial. Though very stern against leftists and Rastafarians, Williams treated the other major party—composed mostly of East Indians—with the kid gloves respect of the British parliamentary system.

Third, he maintained a semblance of order without terror or paranoia. Though Williams's police force was brutal in rooting out marijuana cultivators in the hillsides, his practices were almost angelic in comparison with the terror in Haiti or Uganda, the one-party rule of Cuba and Grenada, and the street violence in Jamaica and Guyana.

Fourth, Williams knew how to mix private and government enterprise, fusing foreign investors and developers

with gradually increasing local responsibility. He chafed at the multinationals and resented Trinidad's dependence on them, but he recognized this dependence as a fact of life. How then to make the most of it? He pressured the foreign oil companies to train and elevate nationals to positions of responsibility at every level. As I can testify from visits to various oil facilities, this principle was implemented and worked to mutual advantage.

Fifth, the ex-professor knew the importance of education. He invested much of the national wealth in education at every level, from primary to university extension programs. A foreigner might think the curriculum and methods too nationalistic, too conservative, too rigid, but important resources were invested and, with time, have yielded good if not ideal results.

Williams's legacy also includes major warnings to the Third World. His country was blessed with oil and the wealth it generated. Williams tried to develop a program to use this wealth wisely—for the present and the future. Unfortunately, such programs are not easy to plan and even more difficult to implement. Attempting to use oil wealth to create a kind of WPA, for example, Williams drew off labor from coconut plantations and other difficult but important jobs. The results were that weeds were cut along roads and some potholes were filled, but the country became more and more dependent upon imported food, which needed to be subsidized. Political influence could also be gained from distribution of petro-dollar riches, and this generated corruption and cynicism.

A second signal concerns personal and political succession. Having run his party since the late 1950s, Williams became more and more rigid, if not dictatorial (senile, some said). The decisions of his later years were not up to those of earlier years in office. His handling of a British West Indies Airways strike in early 1978, for example, proved costly in every sense. His handling of autonomy demands from the sister island of Tobago was high-handed and arrogant. Still he held on, without training or designating an able successor.

Withal, Williams did not stomp out the critical genius of his culture—Carnival and Calypso. The islands of Trinidad and Tobago continue to have major problems, as do most nations; but the Republic is richer for having had a gifted leader. And his legacy is important to us all.

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EXCURSUS 3

John Crothers Pollock on THE IMPACT OF BELIEF

A national survey taken last fall and released this spring provides important new information about the influence of religious commitment on American attitudes toward family, work, and civic affairs. The *Connecticut Mutual Life Report on American Values in the 80's: The Impact of Belief* is the result of a national sample of over two thousand members of the public, conducted by Research & Forecasts, a New York City-based survey research firm.

The study set out to explore American values in the coming decade: what Americans think about their families, their occupations, civic affairs, and the national polit-

ical system. What the survey found regarding public attitudes in each of those areas was less surprising than the emergence of a single dimension exerting a strong impact on American values: Whether old or young, well or less well educated, rich or poor, professional or blue-collar worker, American attitudes and behavior are profoundly affected by religious commitment.

Specifically, the more religious someone is, the more likely he is to spend a large body of time with his family, to derive satisfaction from his work, and to participate vigorously in civic affairs. The report confirms what other surveys reveal: a substantial amount of disillusion with national politics. But in the midst of political alienation the study also reveals that religious commitment is a major source of comfort and renewal for many Americans.

Commitment is measured not by posing questions about doctrine or by focusing simply on frequency of church attendance, but by asking respondents how frequently they do or feel each of the following: listen to religious broadcasts; participate in church social activities; encourage others to turn to religion; have a religious experience; read the Bible; attend church worship services; engage in prayer; feel that God loves them. About 26 per cent of the sample (projected to 45 million people age fourteen and over in the United States) can be considered "intensely religious," while another 55 per cent say they frequently engage in at least one religious activity.

Religious issues are now injected directly into mainstream political activity. Analysis revealed a progression of levels of religious commitment on a "ladder" running from low to high commitment. The higher an individual is found on that ladder, the more likely he is to discuss politics with neighbors, to participate in voluntary organizations, to vote, to run for office in local organizations, and to have confidence that he can improve his community. The most committed are the most politically active.

Although highly religious respondents are both highly active and predictably "moralistic" regarding a number of issues (abortion, homosexuality, pornography), high levels of moralism do not correlate strongly with high levels of civic participation. Rather, the involvement of religious people in civic affairs, far from representing moral self-righteousness, appears to represent an affirmation of community and shared values, a search for areas of agreement after the division of the '60s and after disillusion with Vietnam and Watergate.

The impact of religious commitment registers something much larger than a consciously organized movement—larger than the Moral Majority, for example. It represents a cultural shift or evolution. Religious commitment has always assumed significance in the private lives of Americans. Now that private vein is being mined and used to revitalize the nation's public affairs.

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EXCURSUS 4

Francis X. Gannon on AN EMERGING TRIANGLE: THE U.S., EUROPE & LATIN AMERICA

Since the Conquest, European interest in the Americas has remained broad but uneven and unsustainable. Cultural interchange, witness German and French educational

programs, were traditionally extensive, notably so to the First World War. Political ties with Spain were severed during the wars of independence, but only after 1945 did European colonialism in the Caribbean gradually loosen.

Economically, European investment and trade has predominated in the region, until displaced latterly by U.S. economic influence. Between 1958 and 1979—more as a consequence of changes in structures of world trading patterns after the spectacular growth of the European Economic Community which followed the Treaty of Rome than to any conscious design—Latin America's trade relations with Europe suffered a sharp erosion, declining from 11 per cent to 4.1 per cent of total E.C. imports.

Some positive signs exist in the current picture. The European Community, for instance, has worked out various instruments of cooperation with a number of OAS countries, including the currently uncertain Andean Group. Moreover, global economic transitions have stimulated European openness to improving economic ties with the Americas; and for the first time ever a formal meeting was held in Rome in June, 1980, between the European Community and the Organization of American States. Unofficial contacts have burgeoned also, spurred seemingly by the proposed second enlargement of the Community to include Greece (1981) and Spain and Portugal (1983).

In particular, Spain's possible admission into the E.C. has created some Latin American optimism about improving European ties. As Professor Luciano Berrocal points out, Spain's trade with Latin America has "been somewhat marginal over the past twenty years," accounting for only 7.4 per cent of its total trade in 1979. But Spanish exports to the southern half of the Western Hemisphere doubled from 6.2 per cent of the total in 1961 to 15.2 per cent in 1969. These initiatives slowed somewhat after 1970 when, among other things, Spain signed a preferential agreement with the Common Market. But they accelerated again from the mid-1970s onward as trade reached a two-way total of almost \$2.5 billion by 1978. Spanish investments in Latin America now stand at over 25 per cent of its total overseas investments.

A limiting factor in these new departures, incidentally, is that Spanish expenditures for research and development in science and technology average only 25 per cent of that of the OECD countries. "In these circumstances," Professor Berrocal observed at a 1980 conference in Montevideo, "Spain will find it difficult to offer efficient scientific-technical cooperation abroad. Moreover, it depends technologically on the same countries with which it is competing in Latin America."

Whatever the reasons, Europe is increasingly recognizing that the Western Hemisphere's immediate potential for development—in energy and natural resources, food production and distribution, and trade expansion—is enormous. As a result, the Federal Republic of Germany now makes larger investments in Latin America than it does in Europe, and, following General de Gaulle's forays, French investors and industries have steadily moved into a number of countries, notably Mexico. Even in England, where attention was drawn principally to the Caribbean countries under the Commonwealth, some experts believe that British finance and industry sectors will ally themselves closely with Spain once it enters the E.C. As for the United States, the largest OAS member especially finds itself part of an emerging energy triangle—its technology necessary for both Europe and Latin America, particularly if the latter's energy potential is to be fulfilled.

Spain's ambassador to the OAS, Eduardo de Zulueta, particularly feels that Spanish movement into the E.C. will