

major source of Arab antipathy would abate and finally disappear.

Parke's proposals were enthusiastically received ten years ago by certain Israeli intellectuals and leaders. They were struggling, primarily for domestic reasons, to correct the disparity between Israel's public, official face—which is almost unequivocally Western—and the Middle Eastern identity of the majority of Israel's population. The prejudice directed against the "Sephardim" (as the Middle Eastern Jews are called in Israel) by the dominant European minority, and their feelings of alienation and anomie, could only be countered, some thought, by validating the Sephardic identity through the organs of the Israeli state. They urged that the state make it its business to shape the emerging Israeli identity along primarily Middle Eastern lines, that the school curricula, the programs broadcast by radio and TV (government monopolies), the aesthetics of public architecture and design, the events and individuals commemorated as heroic—all should reflect the Middle Eastern nature of Israel's demography and geography. The Middle Eastern Jew, as a *Middle Easterner*, should be able to feel at home in the Jewish state. Indicative of the depreciation of the Middle Eastern identity is the fact that at the time Parkes wrote, less than 2 per cent of Israeli high-school students were studying Arabic rather than English or French as a second language. . . .

Official Israelis, then as now overwhelmingly European, dismissed the Parkes thesis outright. They offered a number of counterarguments: Israel can maintain its military superiority only by Westernizing its population; the Arabs themselves, as any visitor to Beirut could at once tell, are enthusiastically pursuing a Western identity themselves; Arabs would hate Israel no matter *what* its identity, among other reasons because they hate Jews; the Sephardim do not in any case have an identity worth preserving. "They are too much like the Arabs," Ben Gurion once said.

Ten years later the controversy might be usefully revived. The effortless and arrogant association of "Western" and "superior," or the even more silly association of "Western" and "modern" has, at least in the military context, suffered considerably in Vietnam and, closer to home for the Israelis, in the Yom Kippur War. The Israeli occupation of heavily populated Arab territories after 1967 gave most European Israelis a new experience, that of seeing, working among, and even living with large numbers of Arabs. While the results of this experience may not be unambiguous—we do, after all, interpret experience through our prejudices at least as often as we

permit experience to challenge our prejudices—the Arabs will at least have been demystified for many European Israelis. Many of them will have discovered that there could be a worse fate than becoming a bit more like them. European Israelis may have come to recognize the boorishness of their former belief that the Arab Jews (as we may call them) "have no culture."

Even more important, a new spirit of introspection is sweeping Israel today. It has already resulted in a change of government and may, before long, lead to more basic changes in the Israeli political system. Israel's new rulers will undoubtedly be of European origin (although most of them will have been born in Palestine), but in many respects their attitudes are likely to be different from their predecessors'. They know something rather fundamental has gone wrong in Israel during the past two decades or so. Maybe new perspectives will include the recognition that the *image* Israel presents, both to its own citizens and to its neighbors, needs to be changed. "Image" is an elusive and much abused concept. Clearly the problems that now beset Israel will not vanish by the acquisition of a more Middle Eastern image. Just as clearly, there is a subjective, psychological component to these objective problems that makes them as intractable as they now appear to be. Changing Israel's image is relevant to breaking down the ghetto walls which isolate Israel from its neighbors and the two main sections of its population from one another.

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EXCURSUS IV

Portugal After April

Portugal, where some say the Virgin once appeared at Fátima to warn mankind against the Communist threat, has now become the first NATO country with Communist cabinet ministers. Extinction of the hated political police, implementation of freedom of speech and of the press, the prospect of ending seemingly endless colonial wars and the promise of free elections suddenly released pressures weighing heavily on the politically conscious population and induced a wave of euphoria which temporarily obscured

the host of critical problems which Portugal must confront.

The chain of events precipitated by the publication of General Spínola's book, *Portugal and the Future*, would seem to rule out successfully applying the book's plan for preserving the empire. The General's program was based on the presumption that his sociopolitical work in Portuguese Guinea already had won the hearts and minds of a majority of the inhabitants, who, consequently, were ready for self-government in a scheme not dissimilar from the relationship between the United States and Puerto Rico. It differed in that Portugal, Guinea, Angola and Mozambique would also participate in a federal government concerned with foreign affairs, finance, defense and coordination. The smaller dependencies of Cape Verde, São Tomé, Macao and Timor would have varying degrees of autonomy to be worked out according to their individual circumstances.

The system, as Spínola described it, was to be democratically based on free elections. He recognized the necessity of convincing not only the blacks already close to the Portuguese but those who actively or passively supported the guerrillas. It was his hope that with the colonies thus transformed into self-governing states the new Portuguese commonwealth would regain the support of the "free world" and frustrate the machinations of those who persisted in attempting to promote subversion. The plan required time to be implemented, but, quite aside from other considerations concerning its validity, time seems to be running out faster than expected.


Portugal and the Future quickly sold fifty thousand copies before being removed from circulation. Much of its appeal was due to its criticism of previous policy and the stale slogans supporting it. Spínola, due to his rank and record, became a symbol for those within the regime who wished to change it radically, if only to save it. The generals who forced Caetano to squelch Spínola and reaffirm the ancient battle cries underestimated the changes which had taken place among their subordinates.

The officer corps was in the process of subversion by its own experiences and the prevailing attitudes of the nation's professional élite. The military academies being unable to recruit enough cadets to staff the expanded army with officers, it had been necessary to train conscripted university graduates, the group least susceptible to the rhetoric of imperialism. The professional officers were affected by the antipathy to the service of their nonprofessional colleagues. They also suffered from low pay, the conduct of the wars and Portugal's severe do-

mestic problems—inflation, emigration and what were seen as archaic social structures preserved by decades of geriatrarchy.

Fear of the supposedly ubiquitous political police—which, in fact, had little idea of what was happening in the army—also became a radicalizing force. Officers who discussed national problems crossed a psychological Rubicon which gave them a sense of sharing danger with the traditional opposition. The junta's opening to the left may have been an attempt to keep ahead of radicalizing tendencies.

With the ultras purged, the army is less conservative than ever before, but this does not mean most officers have adopted leftist ideologies represented in the new government. The captain who took Marcello Caetano into custody told an interviewer that he and his colleagues had been encouraged to proceed with their political activities after reading Spínola's book and discovering that his thinking was along lines identical with theirs. It seems likely that Spínola can count on a large faction within the armed forces to support him should he deem it necessary to dismiss the government or otherwise influence political events. As president he is legally entitled to appoint a new government.



If the present government is overcome by the magnitude of the problems confronting it, Spínola's image will be relatively untarnished and may afford him latitude in trying to reorganize the nation. The Socialists and Communists clearly want this government to work. The Communists, who now control the Labor Ministry, are attempting to discourage a proliferation of strikes by workers who sorely need higher wages. Marxist grouplets to the left of the Communists doubtless will seek to take advantage of this. Mário Soares, the Socialist Foreign Minister, has been attempting to open negotiations with the Africans. The PAIGC of Guinea-Bissau has already agreed to talk with the Portuguese. At this time the Mozambique Liberation Front, encouraged by a deteriorating sociopolitical situation in Portuguese Mozambique, has delayed formally meeting representatives of the new government. In Angola the

situation is complicated by three rival nationalist movements reportedly attempting to improve their military situation before initiating talks.

The Portuguese Communists and Socialists have been committed to the ideal of immediately recognizing the liberation movements as sovereign governments. Spínola had argued for plebiscites after a campaign to convince the Africans to remain associated with Portugal. Events may compel all sides to modify their positions. Spínola can do so consistently, for he closed his book emphasizing that his was only one of possible solutions which should be presented for debate.

There still are many people in Portugal, including leftists, who feel that Angola and Mozambique should not be quickly handed over to the insurgents. They are variously motivated by economic, philosophical and sentimental concerns, but nearly all are concerned about the fate of the African whites. No Portuguese government can easily negotiate an agreement without some provision for their well-being.

Portugal's forty-eight years of rule by the authoritarian Right were preceded by a time of extraordinary political turmoil. Conditions conducive to the same type of turmoil are still present. Countervailing forces are the resurgent Old Left's awareness of past errors, its hunger to share power, the Soviet Union's interest in détente, the moderation of the moderates and Spínola and the army ready to step in again if the new popular front falters.

Lawrence Nevins

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QUOTE/UNQUOTE

Forest, Miss.—More than 1,100 workers have been laid off in four poultry plants in Scott County, Mississippi, after the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ordered the disposal of millions of chickens, contaminated by unacceptable levels of dieldrin, a harmful pesticide.

Most of the workers affected by the crisis are members of the Mississippi Poultry Workers Union (MPWU), which is the certified bargaining agent in three of the four plants. . . .

From the very beginning of the crisis, the companies have shown little concern for the workers or consumers. According to the *Scott County Times*, the first sign of pesticide contamination

was found in breeder hens last January 16, and in early February chickens at Poultry Packers and Southeastern Poultry were found contaminated.

The response of the poultrymen was to dicker, to try to get the government to raise its tolerance for the level of the poison permissible in chickens. After that failed, and the public was informed of the crisis, bills were introduced to indemnify the companies, retroactive to January 1, 1974, and continuing for one year. . . .

The racism of the poultrymen was out in the open from the beginning. One of them was quoted as saying to reporters, "I don't know why they couldn't have shipped them [the chickens] to India. The people there are starving anyway." (A letter to the *Jackson Daily News* suggested Africa instead.)

—*The Southern Patriot*, April

[The President's use of profanity] has no meaning, no moral meaning [but is] a form of emotional drainage. This form of therapy is not only understandable, but I think, if looked at closely, good, valid, sound. . . . Mr. Nixon will be regarded as the greatest moral leader of the last third of this century. . . . We certainly don't want a saint in the Oval Office. . . . This is going to be the greatest Administration in the history of the republic and therefore everything ought to be preserved.

—Father John McLaughlin, White House aide, *New York Times*, May 9

I just want to know the time and place that [Father McLaughlin] hears confessions because I'd like to go to him. He presents a very, very fine prospect for me.

—George Meany, *New York Times*, May 10

. . . in the current morality one man's crime is another man's worthy cause. Crime we have always had with us, including malfeasance of office; amoral behavior is a human constant. The present peculiarity is in the rationalization for it. Somewhere along the line there has been an erosion of our sense of right and wrong; that is, we have lost our belief that certain actions are wrong simply because they are wrong, whether or not they violate civil statutes. The preachment has been that morality is relative, that ethics depend upon the situation. It is not wrong to steal, to commit adultery, to bear false witness, in and of themselves—it all depends. If bearing false witness results in convicting a man who is in fact guilty, then is not justice done in the end? If crime is done from sincere motives or with good provocation, should we not absolve it? It is not that we