

EXCURSUS 1

Julian Crandall Hollick on FRANCE: THE REPUBLIC COMES OF AGE

The election of François Mitterrand to the French presidency on May 10 was an event of truly historic significance for France and the world. After twenty-three years the Right's seemingly inevitable monopoly on political power in France has been broken. The Left's triumph may yet prove short lived, but it has removed a major psychological barrier and demonstrated that the Fifth Republic has finally come of age.

No one who was in France on the night of May 10 will readily forget the mood—first of incredulity and then of sheer joy as the reality and magnitude of Mitterrand's achievement sank in. Not even an ominous thunderstorm that swept over Paris soon after midnight could dampen the enthusiasm of the tens of thousands who marched to the Bastille to celebrate the overthrow of "*le roi Giscard*."

Everything had pointed to a repetition of the 1974 election, when Valéry Giscard d'Estaing defeated Mitterrand by 300,000 votes. The 1981 campaign, short by U.S. standards, had been dismissed as predictable and boring. "France yawns," concluded one newsweekly on the eve of the first-round poll on April 26. All the opinion polls had given Giscard a wide margin over Mitterrand, although it began to narrow dramatically by early March. Moreover, the one man likely to defeat Giscard, the young Socialist Michel Rocard, had been outmaneuvered in his bid to gain the investiture of the Socialist party by Mitterrand—a veteran with a reputation as a loser (this was his third attempt at the presidency) and a political intriguer, whom the public had long mistrusted.

It was not just his past that seemed to be against Mitterrand. The Left in France had missed its chance too many times for many observers to take it completely seriously. The Socialists and Communists had failed this time even to make a serious effort to convince the uncommitted electorate that they could offer a credible alternative to the Right. In 1977, on the eve of apparent victory in the legislative elections of March, 1978, the Communists deliberately smashed the two parties' electoral alliance, fearing a possible Socialist edge at the polls. Between then and last April 26, the Communists turned away from so-called Eurocommunism and back to unconditional support of the Soviet Union, while the Socialists—and Mitterrand in particular—became the target of their most bitter attacks. In the eyes of the French Communists the real enemy has always been the Socialists and not the Right.

Giscard d'Estaing, on the other hand, seemed to have nearly everything going for him. He had succeeded so well in guiding France through the prolonged recession caused by the leaps in world energy prices that France was able to enjoy in the '70s the industrial world's highest growth rate. Social legislation and the role and status of women were liberalized. France began to emerge as a society at peace with itself. In retrospect this newfound tolerance may well have been one of the factors that finally convinced many conservative voters they could vote against the Right and for change without the sky falling down on them.

Giscard also possessed several handicaps, the importance of which may have been underestimated. Unemployment had risen fourfold and inflation was still in dou-

ble figures. Giscard was loathed by the Gaullist supporters of his rival and former prime minister, Jacques Chirac, who broke with him in 1976 and ever since has coveted the presidency—even at the price of seeing Giscard defeated and Mitterrand elected. Finally, the president had accumulated such power that he began to be compared to a "republican monarch," whose friends controlled France in the name of a caste. Tainted by scandal, aloof and overbearing, Giscard began to irritate, then to disgust many of his earliest supporters.

If Giscard was betrayed finally by his own character and the rivalry that pitted him against Jacques Chirac, Mitterrand was also helped by the Communists' attempt to portray him as the enemy of the Left even as they tried to exploit racist fears against immigrant workers in a crudely orchestrated and xenophobic campaign. The Communists miscalculated badly, slumping to just 15 per cent of the April 26 vote, while the Socialist share rose to 26 per cent, putting Mitterrand within striking distance of the incumbent for the run-off on May 10. Giscard d'Estaing was forced to launch a series of wild attacks on Mitterrand once it became clear that the Communists would indeed support the latter. Freed from the charge that he would be the hostage of the Communists because dependent on their support, Mitterrand preferred to project the image of a calm and steady statesman who would seek to unite, rather than divide, the electorate. It was now Mitterrand who appeared presidential and Giscard the shrill challenger.

Mitterrand has won only half the battle. If he is to be able to implement his program of rapid growth through the now-unfashionable Keynesian methods of deficit spending and public-sector jobs, he must translate his May 10 majority into a parliamentary majority in late June. Will the French decide to give Mitterrand the benefit of the doubt? Or will they decide that one act of daring is enough for now and return the Right to power in the National Assembly? If the latter, France will have a left-wing president and a right-wing government—an unprecedented situation—and Mitterrand may come under pressure to resign. But for now nothing has been decided and there is much left to play for.

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EXCURSUS 2

John V. H. Dippel on WEST GERMANY'S GHOSTS

A generation ago, as much of Europe lay in rubble, "Germany," "Nazi," and "political persecution" were practically synonymous. Hitler's Holocaust had taken its grim toll. Not only had millions of Jews perished in the death camps, but also Social Democrats, gypsies, Jehovah's Witnesses, Communists, homosexuals, criminals—Germans who, for one reason or another, did not fit into the totalitarian, Aryan folk community or had opposed it.

This was the legacy of the new West German state in 1949. To the Germans recovering from defeat it was essential that this infamous chapter of their history be forever closed. "Never again" became a rallying cry as much in Bonn as it was in Jerusalem. To make clear to the world their repudiation of Nazism, the founders of the

Federal Republic drafted a Basic Law that not only forbade political and religious persecution at home, but also opened Germany's borders to refugees fleeing from oppression. By stating that "the politically oppressed enjoy the right of asylum," West Germany was signaling its deep sympathy with victims of the Nazis and with the peoples (including millions of Germans) of Eastern Europe, where the Red Army had dug in and showed no signs of tolerating political freedom.

Over the years the West Germans have made good on their offer. Following upheavals in Lebanon, Ethiopia, Chile, and Indochina, people who have lost their homes or who have feared for their lives have found a haven in the Federal Republic. From Vietnam alone twenty thousand refugees have resettled in its towns and cities. When Alexander Solzhenitsyn was stripped of his Russian citizenship and deported, it was West Germany that became his first refuge in the West. There he joined the ranks of millions of East Germans who had "voted with their feet" by scrambling over the Berlin Wall or across the deadly no-man's-land. But today refugees are arriving who are not as welcome; in fact, most West Germans would like to keep them out.

The problem is that these newest refugees are not trying to escape prison, torture, or possible death. The evils they are fleeing are economic ones—inflation, meager wages, joblessness. If West Germany is attractive to them, it is not because of its political liberty but its wealth. To many people in economically lagging countries such as Turkey, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, Germany is a dreamland where, if the streets are not paved with gold, they are at least full of Mercedes.

Foreign workers have been drawn to German assembly lines since the early 1960s, when more jobs opened up in industry than there were Germans to fill them. At that time, West German companies sent representatives abroad on recruiting missions and the workers came in droves—from Italy, Yugoslavia, Spain, Portugal, and Turkey. Many of these *Gastarbeiter* stayed on for several years and brought over their families to settle in West Germany. But by the beginning of the 1970s there were too many of them. OPEC price hikes had slowed industrial production and now, instead of full employment, there were close to a million people looking for work.

In 1973 the government of Willy Brandt declared a freeze on foreign hiring: New *Gastarbeiter* would not be welcome "guests" in the Federal Republic. Yet as economic conditions around the world worsened, West Germany looked more tempting than ever. Determined to enter and stay in the country one way or another, foreign workers hit upon the idea of asking for asylum upon arrival. This is a relatively easy process. A Turk in Ankara, say, simply purchases a plane ticket to Munich, convinces airport officials he has come to spend a "holiday" in West Germany, and then, after several weeks, goes to the nearest alien-registration office and fills out a request for asylum. West German authorities cannot turn down any such application out of hand: Exhaustive inquiries have to be made to find out whether a foreigner has actually suffered persecution in his home country. This investigation and court appeals can drag on for up to eight years. In the meantime, foreigners claiming refugee status qualify for public subsidies totaling as much as \$600 a month for rent and living expenses. They may also—illegally—look for work, putting aside valuable German marks for the day when they will have to return home. Eventually, eight out of ten applicants are denied asylum.

In the last few years the influx of "welfare immigrants," as the Germans like to call them, has swelled to the pro-

portions of an invasion. In 1978 there were 33,000; in 1979, 52,000; and during the first six months of 1980 alone over 70,000. These newcomers have kept West Germany's total foreign population inching up to where it now stands at close to four-and-a-half million. In some large manufacturing cities like Berlin and Stuttgart one of every six residents is a non-German. More significantly, with West Germany's birthrate the lowest in the world, children of foreign-born parents now make up a tenth of elementary school enrollment.

By far the greatest number of economic refugees are Turks. Until last year's military coup, Turkey was wracked by both economic and political chaos, with many out of work or fearful of left and right-wing violence. Germany has long had special ties with Turkey, dating back to the days when the kaiser helped bankroll the famed Baghdad Railway and Prussian officers trained their Turkish counterparts in the tradition of Frederick the Great. In economic hard times Turks historically have migrated to Western Europe, and West Germany has remained a favored destination. An area like the Kreuzberg section of Berlin, for instance—a run-down, working-class neighborhood close to the Wall—is now 25 per cent Turkish.

The gulf separating Turks from Germans, however, is immense: In appearance, language, customs, temperament, and religion Turkish immigrants remain alien to their German "hosts," preferring in most cases to preserve their ways. Turks gather to pray in makeshift mosques and often set up separate Muslim schools to keep their children from being "corrupted" by Western culture. Few manage to learn enough German to pick up the training and skills necessary to move beyond the jobs still open to them—heavy construction, sanitation, apprenticeship—work most Germans are unwilling to perform. Cut off from their own country and unable to mesh with the new one, they exist in a cultural limbo.

The Germans, for their part, eye these foreigners with bitterness, anger, and some hostility. Stereotypes feed their resentment, such as stories of Turks smuggling in large families to live free of charge in comfortable, three-bedroom apartments in Cologne. In the subway underpasses graffiti reflect these antiforeign sentiments, and in some urban neighborhoods fights have broken out between German and immigrant youths. In one north German city three Molotov cocktails were tossed into a dormitory for Vietnamese refugees, killing a twenty-two-year-old man. Incidents like these—and a generally antagonistic mood—have caused public officials such as Minister of the Interior Gerhard Baum to warn about *Fremdfeindlichkeit*—hostility toward outsiders—erupting into more violence.

The ruling coalition of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt would like to defuse the situation but finds itself in a bind. For should the government limit the right of asylum, it would appear to be caving in to feelings that, in a sense, recall parochial and racist attitudes of the Third Reich. On the other hand, were it to sit back and do nothing, tensions would inevitably multiply, there would be ugly incidents, and the world would shake its head at this further evidence of continued German Nazism.

Last year, under some pressure from the opposition, Schmidt's Social Democrats came up with proposals to stem the flood of immigrants: In the future, people requesting asylum would not be able to obtain a work permit until they had resided in West Germany for a year; more officials would be assigned to handle asylum applications; Turks would now be required to have visas—as some Africans and Asians already were—before they could enter the Federal Republic.

These policies, which took effect last year, have caused the Turks to wonder why a country as rich as West Germany is so concerned about a few more foreigners. While the visa requirement has led to a slowing of the migration flow, it has not stopped it.

Many Germans feel their government has made only a gesture toward coming to terms with the abuse of asylum. Anger at the bogus "refugees" residing in the country has continued to mount. Local authorities have started to punish some foreigners who have asked for asylum but have not, in one way or another, "behaved themselves," taking away part of their welfare subsidies.

As both foreigners and Germans trade heated accusations, the climate in many German cities grows more hostile. Simply keeping new refugees out—if this were possible—will not resolve the ill feelings. While Germany's dilemma is not at all unique (there are millions of temporary immigrants from countries like Turkey scattered throughout Western Europe), it does have an added dimension: Because of its Nazi legacy Germany remains on probation. Sensitive to criticism, the Schmidt government has declared it will give the highest priority to developing an *Ausländerpolitik* during the 1980s, with the goal of increased understanding and tolerance between Germans and foreigners. Given the enormous economic, social, religious, and language differences—differences that have stubbornly persisted—this is a formidable challenge. If it is to be met, it may well mean that Germany must accept what Hitler vowed it never would—a heterogeneous, multiracial society.

John Dippel is writing a book about modern Germany.

EXCURSUS 3

Robert J. Myers on THE REVOLT AGAINST MODERNITY

Where economic, religious, and political values come in conflict there are consequences for the international political process, for trade, and for business. At a recent CRIA conference the forces of traditionalism and modernism were the subject and the United States was the focus.

Where do these forces come into conflict domestically? it was asked; and where internationally, in ways that affect our relations with other societies? Indeed, are these forces inevitably in opposition, or are various social "models" simply part of a continuum, a mixed model—participants in a long-term historical process with an indefinite outcome?

The conference concentrated not on international case studies but, rather—in the words of Professor Seymour Martin Lipset of the Hoover Institution—on "political movements and political reactions to social tensions involved in modernization," especially in America. All participants agreed that the ethical principles applied to development of our domestic society and to maintaining its place in the world order are central to an informed appreciation of what is happening in the world today.

The process of modernization was described as the change from human energy to other forms of energy—electricity, oil, coal—and the harnessing of those energy sources to produce material goods. "We can specify the institutions that have brought about modernity," noted sociologist Peter Berger. "Above all is the technology that has produced industrial civilization."



That civilization was of necessity a powerful engine of change, pushing aside the traditional ways of ordering society. Until recent decades these changes in the economic scene were welcomed uncritically for the most part. Since the 1970s, and especially in America, the side-effects of what is now called postindustrial society have been attacked by both the Left and the Right.

"Leftists criticize society from the vantage point of a belief in a future Utopia, described as more egalitarian, democratic, more participatory on the part of the mass," said Lipset. "Difficulties of the present are attributed to the exploitative powers of a dominant ruling class. Rightists emphasize the prior existence of a good integrated society that once characterized their nation. They believe that the malaise, the problems of contemporary society are results of abandoning the values and social relationships that characterize the golden age of the past." The public perceives environmental movements, for example, as left-wing protests against modernity; forces opposing changes are generally thought to issue from the Right.

The mainstream religious bodies in America have probed at modern economic development all along the way, testing and appraising economic changes to determine whether they pay due regard to the whole of creation and how well the system answers mankind's material and spiritual needs at a given time.

As Berger expressed a contemporary point of tension: "What is involved is modern values against postmodern values. The Moral Majority represents those values that produced the industrial order; the other side represents a reaction against those values."

Dr. Richard Whalen, president of Worldwide Information Resources, Ltd., had a different formulation: "The revolt against modernity is a revolt of the confident against the self-critical, self-doubting, the postmodern."

Phyllis McGrath of Stauffer Chemical Company emphasized the need to resolve a conflict that, in some cases, was more apparent than real: "There are things in traditionalism that none of us wants to do away with, even though we are for modernity. The 'small is beautiful' people are against technology, but they are for information technology. The same groups talk about alternative technologies or appropriate technologies rather than antitechnology. This is true for both sides of the argument."

It is the sluggish growth of the American economy that has made postindustrial society increasingly subject to criticism, both of its objective shortcomings and its underlying values. The Moral Majority, to cite a frequently named group, champions the values of the industrial age—the family, the work ethic, traditional religious values. Robert Smylie of the United Presbyterian Church