

only to this Administration but to the country. Resignation at this point would be irresponsibility of a high order, a frivolity not to be entertained by a serious man.

James Finn

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EXCURSUS II

Taxonomy

In an ancient Chinese encyclopedia entitled *Celestial Emporium of Benevolent Knowledge* it is written that animals are divided into (a) those that belong to the Emperor, (b) embalmed ones, (c) those that are trained, (d) suckling pigs, (e) mermaids, (f) fabulous ones, (g) stray dogs, (h) those that are included in this classification, (i) those that tremble as if they were mad, (j) innumerable ones, (k) those drawn with a very fine camel's hair brush, (l) others, (m) those that have just broken a flower vase, (n) those that resemble flies from a distance.



Janice Stapleton

In the 1974 *Encyclopedia of Benevolent (aga-peic) Knowledge* all rational moral or political arguments are divided into (a) those that I win, (b) embalmed ones, (c) *ad hominems* that have just been used by a feminist, (d) those that resemble bias from a distance, (e) sex-laden ones, (f) others, (g) those that tremble, (h) *post hoc ergos* used by revolutionaries and theologians of hope, (i) those that prove that justice should be done because whatever he/she has is not an illness or not inherited, (j) stray ones, (k) counter-examples, (l) those that prove Adam was a racist,

(m) unpleasant ones, (n) those that have just broken the consensus, (o) those that belong to emperors like Episcopal or Methodist bishops or news reporters ("That's the way it is"), (p) those that prove stealing someone else's truth depends on the stealer (or the situation), (q) jeremiads that show what's wrong with us is what's wrong with us (in a loud voice), (r) those that reason from Paul Tillich's foot fetish, (s) others, (t) those that prove liberation is liberation is liberation (Alice B. Toklas), no one-two-three about it, or one-two-three of course, (u) suckling ones, (v) those that are included in this classification, (w) those not included in any classification, (x) those that couldn't knock over a flower vase, (y) those trained to be modest, (z) innumerable others.

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EXCURSUS III

India's Nuclear Test: They've Been Trying to Tell Us Something

We should not have been so surprised. There were advance signals for India's "peaceful" underground explosion. India's small but sophisticated nuclear program was no secret, and Indian speeches on the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) during 1965-68 made her position quite clear. Yet the announcement of the recent test evoked an interesting mixture of reactions. While Third World countries quietly congratulated India on her scientific achievement, America and Japan expressed regret, and Pakistanis and Canadians were downright bitter. With high emotion Mr. Bhutto and his countrymen charged that the test changed the South Asian balance of power and threatened Pakistan with nuclear blackmail. In a brief matter-of-fact comment Peking also noted the danger of nuclear blackmail. (In 1964 Indians expressed anxiety about Chinese nuclear blackmail.)

The Canadian and American reactions reflect both moral outrage and envy. Canada's outrage stems in part from a humanitarian impulse that seeks to develop a greater global security through preventing *further* proliferation. There is also outrage because Canada signed the NPT and India did not; and then Canada tried in vain to impose its NPT view on NPT Indo-Canadian atomic agreements. Not the least reason for Canadian unhappiness is that Pierre Trudeau,

who tries hard to display his understanding of the Oriental mind, does not enjoy being outmaneuvered by the Indian Prime Minister. Canadian politicians seem to be going through a phase of frustration similar to the experience of Messrs. Nixon and Kissinger in the 1971 war over Bangladesh.

From the mid-1950's Canada has been party to the evolution of India's nuclear policy. It is well known that Ottawa has along the way tried to persuade India to accept stronger safeguards, but the Indians have been both consistent and articulate in their refusal. Thus, from the mid-1950's on Ottawa and Delhi have never agreed about the meaning of peaceful uses. Canadian atomic energy and external affairs officials knew precisely what the late Dr. Homi Bhabha was driving at when he made sure that India did not sign any agreement placing her nuclear program under stringent safeguards. The 1956 agreement allowed Canadian inspection of India's CANDU reactors only when Canadian fuel was used. In effect this meant inspection only of a first generation use of fuel. Therefore, India is quite right in claiming there was no violation, in letter or spirit, of the Indo-Canadian agreements.

Despite the overreaction by the Canadian and American media in suggesting that the Indian test was a step toward nuclear proliferation, the official American reactions appear more subtle and subdued. Maybe this was because the Americans could let the noisy Canadians do the speech-making. There was no tendency in Washington's speeches to go off the deep end. One suspects that a CIA and Pentagon reading of the test underscored its purely scientific nature. No doubt the American Embassy in New Delhi drew the distinction between a test and a weapons program, concluding that this test signaled a political and technological rather than a military commitment. The State Department, a bastion of the anti-India constituency in American foreign relations, reacted typically at first by preparing a long-winded statement against India. When this was shown to Secretary Kissinger, he wisely turned it down, choosing instead to signal American concern and regret and let it go at that. The U.S. Atomic Energy authorities sensed the commercial implications in India's test and recognized the potential competition if or when peaceful explosives technology becomes economically viable. This aspect was important but not necessarily central in Washington's assessment of India's move. Canadians have also expressed an interest in the commercial aspect, making it obvious that Canadian reactions were not entirely motivated by concern for saving humanity from nuclear war.

In assessing the impact of the test it is worth

noting, first, that the timing of the test was obviously related to Indian politics. Indian Defense Minister Jagjiwan Ram stated that the decision to test was made in 1971, and the chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission said he had a free hand to determine the timing. The point of their statements is that the decision to test was made before Mrs. Gandhi ran into economic trouble. Be that as it may, the test did give Mrs. Gandhi some extra time to demonstrate her economic leadership.

Second, the test destroys the effort to make NPT succeed. Although India did not sign the NPT, many knowledgeable observers in the West had begun to assume that India was in practice abiding by the spirit of NPT. It was thought that India talked boldly but was unwilling to do anything to enforce its revisionist view against the superpowers' ordering of international security policy. If Indian military action in 1971 was the first blow for subcontinental self-help, the test is the second blow aimed at altering the way the superpowers deal with third parties. Coming as it does one year before the NPT review conference, the Indian test should force the superpowers to reassess the logic and policy premises of NPT. This should not be too difficult, since Moscow now seems to favor the development of India's peaceful nuclear technology, while the U.S. has on balance developed a more pragmatic view, assessing India's nuclear policy in the context of Indo-American relations. This is not to suggest that Washington now accepts India as a full strategic partner, but, if India is not quite "in," neither is it "out" as it was before 1971.

Third, there is some speculation that the test was untimely. The Indo-Pakistan normalization process was just getting under way. Then too, it came at a time when new decisions have to be made about Indian development. Pakistani spokesmen have made much of the test's effect on South Asian stability, even though Moscow and Dr. Kissinger publicly agree that the test has not altered the balance of power. For some people in Pakistan normalization tends to cramp a lifestyle that depends on permanent hostility between India and Pakistan. In fact it makes little sense for India to have nuclear power against Pakistan. India has adequate conventional military power to strike Pakistan's heartland and, should the need arise, to undertake the more difficult exercise of cutting the Chinese lines of communications from the Karachi seaport to the Tibet-Singkiang areas. If conventional arms can do the job it is unlikely that Indians will seek nuclear arms against Pakistan, *assuming that the existing military imbalance between India and Pakistan remains stable.*

More important than the test's effect on Pakistan is the effect on U.S. Congressional opinion. India can simply ignore conservative opinion in America, since India can do nothing right in the eyes of most conservatives. There are others, however, who still have some sentiment for promoting Indian democracy, and India must devote itself to allaying their fears that have been sparked by misperceptions of the recent test. And misperceptions there are, for the American media managers have not done their homework. For a country noted for its investigative reporting, the American media carelessly interpret India's behavior through the prism of American culture-bound policy premises and experience.

One such premise is that "peaceful uses equals military uses." It is at the center of Article I of the NPT. We can grant for the sake of argument that the technology for a peaceful and a military device is the same. So what? Indians argue that what counts is the intent behind the weapon. The question is one of managing incentives, not managing technology. The media further project the idea that the test is the first step toward an Indian weapons program. This assumption is based on the "fact" that all other five nuclear powers treated their tests as steps toward weapons programs. Americans should take more seriously the fact that India is the first country to say that it is not going into a weapons program. This is more than talk and is not, as some suspect, designed to deceive world opinion. Those not persuaded by Indian talk might take a look at Indian actions. India's commitment of resources to nuclear projects shows convincingly that India so far has not invested in weapons programs other than an investment in ballistics research. Unlike the other five nuclear powers, the Indian defense establishment has not been involved at all in the testing program. Nor is it likely, contra some American media coverage, that India will go around helping others to develop nuclear explosives. (What may happen if China tests an ICBM into the Indian Ocean or otherwise poses a nuclear threat to India is another matter. But India has so far shown great caution.) India is likely to seek commercial and political gain by selling power reactor technology to, say, Argentina and Iran, but this does not mean it will sell explosives technology. Explosives technology is something India learned by itself, and other countries will have to learn by themselves.

The Indian argument that its test is peaceful should be taken seriously. A qualification is in order: It is peaceful at present. If Japan tests, the Indians may expect to be blamed. In fact Indians are hardly responsible for Mr. Tanaka's problems with militant Japanese nationalism.

Whatever military significance the Indian test has, it is directed less at Ottawa and Rawalpindi than at Peking. It may be a way to help avoid miscalculations by a China now largely paralyzed by its leadership problems. Chinese misperceptions are one kind of danger. American and Canadian misperceptions are another. Indians face a major job in educating their Canadian and American friends to recognize the logical and policy flaws in the NPT. It becomes more obvious that the legalism of the NPT is not the best way to manage the incentives and compulsions of nations that fear a world order controlled by a concert of superpowers.

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EXCURSUS IV

In Praise of the Automobile

First of all, let us dispense with the silly notion that Americans have some peculiar love relationship with the automobile. Almost everyone in the contemporary world loves automobiles. Those who own them do, as well as those who desire ownership. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, Americans have a much more sensible attitude to their cars than the people of most other nations, for the simple reason that Americans have lived with the automobile for a very long time now. Middle-aged couples are more restrained in their passions than young lovers.

The American marriage to the automobile has been a generally happy one. It still is. What has happened, though, is that many Americans seem to feel guilty now about their affection for this mechanical spouse. Very few seem to contemplate divorce in a serious way, but some actually seem to enjoy the guilt. Ownership of a big car may soon be for liberal intellectuals what fornication used to be for Puritans, with roughly the same tension between ideology and pleasure in both instances.

It didn't really begin with Ralph Nader. After all, it was the automobile manufacturers, not their customers, who were the objects of Naderite wrath. It began in earnest in the late 1960's, with the counterculture, the New Left and the ecology movement each contributing to the condemnation of the proud products of Detroit's imagination. As with many other elements of this particular ideological brew, the hatred of the automobile