

Within both the Diet and the electorate he faces substantial opposition to an enhanced role in world affairs. Since the war the Japanese have reached a consensus on limiting Japan's role abroad, focusing attention instead on domestic, and particularly economic, problems. There are critics of many aspects of the Constitution "imposed" by MacArthur after the war, but Article 9, which renounced a military capacity and resort to war, remains popular. When the prime minister compares Japan to "an unsinkable aircraft carrier ... a bulwark of defense against the [Soviet] Backfire bomber," as he was reported to have done in Washington, his countrymen become more than a little nervous.

The second obstacle to an enhanced Japanese role in world affairs is the ambivalence of Japan's neighbors. For those who experienced the brutal wartime Japanese occupation, memories die hard. Those memories fueled a seemingly minor and domestic Japanese issue—the revision of some high-school history textbooks—into an international controversy only a few months before the Nakasone election.

In Japan, as elsewhere, textbooks undergo periodic revision, and in the course of this one the events and policies of the prewar and wartime period were recast. The new version offered a more benign view of Japanese policies toward and behavior on the Asian mainland.

Reaction was swift. There were anti-Japanese demonstrations in Korea, and the Korean Government demanded Japan reinstate the old text. The Chinese Government made its point even more forcefully, mounting photographic exhibits about the Rape of Nanking and elevating the "textbook problem" to the status of a Sino-Japanese crisis. Former Prime Minister Suzuki's trip to China was placed in jeopardy, and when it finally did take place, much of it was taken up by discussions of the tension the revisions had caused. Indeed, in anticipation of the China trip, several Japanese Foreign Ministry officials and Dietmen were dispatched to Seoul and Peking in an attempt to calm the waters. Prime Minister Suzuki promised a revision of the revision the next time around, if not sooner.

In Southeast Asia the reaction was more muted, but the anti-Japanese riots during former Prime Minister Tanaka's trip to Jakarta in 1974 were never far from mind.

No doubt this tension will pass. The textbook revision does not touch on anyone's vital interests; its resolution one way or another has no material or geopolitical consequences. But in another, perhaps more fundamental sense, it will not pass, for it is symptomatic of a more serious problem: the fear of Japanese hegemony.

In the Philippines and Indonesia there is deep concern over an expanded Japanese military role in Asia, and both governments are particularly anxious about the U.S. proposal that Japan assume responsibility for the defense of a zone radiating a thousand miles from the center of Japan—a zone that would include the edge of the Philippine Sea at the tip of Southeast Asia. China, on the other hand, has in recent years changed its position about a stronger Japan, particularly toward the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty. Previously hostile to any such arrangement, China has now begun to encourage both an American and a Japanese presence in Asia and has endorsed the U.S. link with Japan. Further, the prime ministers of Singapore and Malaysia have inaugurated "learn from Japan" campaigns, and Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew has often voiced the need for U.S. and Japanese involvement in Southeast Asia, primarily as a balance to the growth of the Soviet Navy in the area. Thus, while a substantial, constructive role for Japan is crucial to the balance of power in Asia and fundamental to its future, the uncertainty of Japan's neighbors makes it difficult for them to agree upon just what sort of

role that should be.

Their own aversion to an enhanced military capability apart, the Japanese are understandably perplexed about their neighbors' views. Urged to show themselves as more than economic animals, they confront ambivalence whenever they talk about doing so. If a tentative government and an even more tentative public meet opposition each step of the way, they are likely to continue concentrating on economic matters and limiting their international activities, as now, to relatively small contributions to U.N. agencies. It is obvious that the other Asian nations will soon have to come to terms with their own ambivalence if the Japanese are to be encouraged to overcome a preference for the status quo.

In resolving this ambiguity, the United States could play a useful role. We could encourage Prime Minister Nakasone's impulse for engagement, signaling to the Japanese public our desire for Japan's participation as a major international player and ending its postwar parole. The signals would have to be substantive as well as symbolic: joint international ventures; clear, public, regular consultations between Cabinet members; a more visibly central role—again, substantive as well as symbolic—at international forums such as the Williamsburg "economic summit" just past. Militarily, we might mitigate regional fears by linking Japanese forces with our own—for example, conducting joint exercises or offering an incipient version of our relation with Australia and New Zealand. Most important, perhaps, the two nations could play a complementary role, with each undertaking constructive steps in areas in which the other is less welcome. In the subcontinent, where our relations with Mrs. Gandhi's government are shaky at best, there is an obvious opportunity for Japan to do what is difficult for us, namely, balance the influence of the Soviets. The same might be true in Iran or even in Angola—places where anti-Americanism is virtually part of the state ideology. Economically, there is plenty of opportunity for burden-sharing. At present, Japan does not carry its proportional share of international obligations at the U.N., at the World Bank, at the IMF, and elsewhere.

Beginning, for domestic reasons, where Japan now has a clear national interest and, preferably, some experience, the idea is to draw Japan more deeply into the web of international relations, to nurture for Japan the same kind of role and the same kind of obligations we ourselves have undertaken. In setting the pattern for growing Japanese participation in international affairs, one that would more accurately reflect Japan's strength and resources, we would be able to shift from our own shoulders a number of commitments that are becoming increasingly onerous and unrealistic for the U.S. to bear.

All in all, an appropriate role for Japan—one acceptable to the Japanese public and to Japan's neighbors—ought to be an item high on the Pacific agenda.

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EXCURSUS 3

Walter C. Clemens, Jr., on A STRATEGIC PRECEDENT

Two decades have passed since a landmark event in U.S.-Soviet relations—President Kennedy's "Toward a Strategy of Peace" address at American University on June 10, 1963.

This statement was one of the major elements in the package of firmness and conciliation that led from the Cuban missile crisis to the nuclear test-ban treaty.

The world has changed in many ways since '63, but the lessons of that era point the way to improving American-Soviet relations today. Provoked by Soviet advances from Angola to Afghanistan, Presidents Ford, Carter, and Reagan have moved toward building positions of military strength to deal with Soviet expansionism. Yet it is not strength alone that makes effective policy. Strength must be invoked with skill and care, as in the Cuban confrontation of 1962. This done, it is the job of creative diplomacy to reach an accord that offers benefits for both sides. Such was the case with the test-ban negotiations of 1963.

Kennedy stood firm on Cuba: Soviet nuclear arms must be withdrawn, never to be reintroduced. In return came the promise that Washington would never attempt to overthrow Castro by force. The firmness with which Kennedy was able to assert his position derived in part from America's small but adequate strategic nuclear force—an arsenal numbered in hundreds rather than the thousands of today. More important, though, was America's supremacy in conventional forces, at least in the Caribbean, and the solid support it received from NATO and the Organization of American States. These reeds have grown thin since 1963.

Soviet behavior in the Berlin crises of 1958-61 and its Cuban gambit of '62 posed a greater threat to world peace than any of its actions in recent years. It was a time of even more uncertainty about the balance of strategic arms; and in that pre-Kissinger era there was a far greater tendency to think about Russia and America in simplistic terms ("Better dead than Red!"). Still, Kennedy did not gloat publicly over Khrushchev's retreat from Cuba. Instead, he worked to move from the brink of war to a strategy of peace.

His American University address called attention to steps already undertaken to improve communications between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, most notably the creation of a Hot Line; and it announced that a ranking diplomat, former Ambassador to the USSR W. Averell Harriman, much respected in Moscow, would be sent to negotiate a ban on nuclear tests.

Apart from these announcements, Kennedy's speech was important for a compassion that embraced all humanity, including the peoples of the Soviet Union. The president spoke movingly of their sufferings in World War II, implying that Soviet citizens have reason to value peace. This point and others made by Kennedy were appreciated by Khrushchev, who reciprocated with conciliatory statements and gestures (e.g., an end to the jamming of Western radio broadcasts) in the weeks and months following.

As the American University speech was being drafted, Kennedy and his advisors worked out a flexible negotiating posture for Harriman to take to Moscow. Washington was ready to negotiate either a comprehensive or partial ban on nuclear tests. When the Russians opted for the latter, Washington concurred. Half a loaf was better than none; first steps could become significant strides.

This, in fact, is what happened, for the test ban was quickly followed by other U.S.-Soviet agreements—on outer space, military budgets, and the production of fissionable materials. The idea of freezing offensive and defensive weapons came early in 1964 in the wake of the test-ban accord. The first major Soviet wheat purchases came in late '63, helping to reinforce the momentum toward normalization of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Neither Kennedy's untimely death nor Khrushchev's ouster in October, 1964, derailed the "spirit of Moscow" that commenced with Harriman's 1963 visit to the Kremlin. That came in a confrontation halfway around the world, where neither

superpower had vital interests: Indochina. And here we find another, albeit negative, lesson: If Moscow and Washington should again manage to reverse the spiral of conflict and move toward a systematic reduction of tensions, both should take care that this progress be sustained despite temptations to exploit fleeting opportunities in the Third World.

To balance firmness and conciliation: that is the supreme challenge in statesmanship. It is a pressing challenge, but there are useful precedents to guide us toward a strategy of peace.

Walter C. Clemens, Jr., Professor of Political Science at Boston University, edited Toward a Strategy of Peace, a collection of essays by U.S. and Soviet leaders and scholars on the themes of John Kennedy's 1963 address.

EXCURSUS 4

Robert J. Myers on THE MORAL HIGH GROUND

The Council on Religion and International Affairs (CRIA) has been asserting for years its strong belief that ethics is an inevitable and integral component of all U.S. policy decisions.

One obvious demonstration of this truth is in the economic realm, whether the decision involves our own domestic budget or the type of aid to send to country X. At the same time, in economics as elsewhere, the ethical component of decision-making remains implicit, rarely coming under scrutiny. As George J. Stigler, recipient of the 1982 Nobel Prize for Economic Science, has written in *The Economist as Preacher, and Other Essays*:

Economists seldom address ethical questions as they impinge on economic behavior. They (and I) find the subject complex and elusive in comparison with the relative precision and objectivity of economic analysis. Of course the ethical questions are inescapable: One must have goals in judging policies, and these goals will certainly have ethical content, however well concealed it may be.

There are those who agree immediately with this assertion, others who disagree. Members of this latter group come in two flavors: One smiles and says that ethics has nothing whatever to do with foreign policy. The other group, seemingly contradicting, raises its eyebrows at the very notion that United States foreign policy can be anything *but* ethical; CRIA's concern, these people say, is simply redundant.

It seems to me that these groups have little difference between them. The one that appears to reject the notion of a relation between ethics and U.S. foreign policy has created its own ethic—the purity and transcendental quality of the American national interest—and why say more about it? The other group believes that America's moral purpose, its ethics, is readily and regularly projected onto the world scene as American foreign policy—and why confuse the issue?

I think these two views are incorrect. If they are true, they do not make *moral* sense. If U.S. foreign policy creates its own ethic or is moral by definition, then there is no room for judgment, choice, and responsibility, which are at the heart of any ethical system.

A recent example of the popular and mistaken notion of a separation between ethics and policy was offered by Wil-