

CONNECTIONS

Some Undecided Issues

Shifting events of the present and one massive, unassimilated event of the past. All of which affect our future. That's *Worldview* for this month.

O. Edmund Clubb assesses the growing importance of the Soviets in world trade. The USSR has built up, in the last several decades, a strong competitive trade position. The ten-year pact President Nixon recently signed in Moscow is an acknowledgment of an impressive economic reality. We have traveled some distance from 1960, when a task force reported to President-elect Kennedy that Americans regarded trade with Soviet countries to be "immoral, dangerous and of doubtful economic benefit." Nor are the other sectors of the capitalist world neglected in the Soviet's expanding economy, flourishing as it does in countries of Western Europe and Japan. And although Russia concentrates its present economic efforts on the capitalist and socialist worlds, the developing countries are not omitted from their overall program.

The economic enterprises of the United States are not encompassed by multinational enterprises—nor are all multinational enterprises American—although much of what is written on multinational enterprises would lead the unwary to think so. Part of the difference between reality and current myth. Jack Behrman attempts to elevate reality and lay myths to rest as he discusses one crucial aspect of multinational enterprises—the issue of ownership of affiliates. Is local ownership better than foreign ownership? For whom is it better? The host country, the parent company, the local entrepreneur? Is ownership to be equated with control? What are the advantages of keeping them joined, and of separating them?

Mr. Behrman does not offer conventional answers to what have become conventional questions, and he challenges many of the assumptions and presuppositions that many discussants bring to the ongoing and critical debate on these issues.

Both Raymond Gastil and Raul Manglapus deal with issues of freedom, the former undertaking the difficult task of evaluating the degrees of freedom that exist in countries around the world, the latter evaluating the repression of the Marcos regime in the Philippines. Mr. Gastil is aware of the difficulties of his undertaking. Even if we could agree on an abstract definition of freedom,

we would inevitably perceive particular situations in different ways. But he is also aware that people do make judgments, however crudely, and in the belief that such judgments are in order, he offers a survey of a good part of the globe.

Mr. Manglapus concentrates on one small part of the globe, the Philippines, a country he knows well, which he has served in official capacities, and from which he is now exiled. Part of his judgment and advice is directed to people in these United States who can bring more pressure to bear on the Philippines than he can.

And the editors decided to include in this issue a piece on Vassilikos, Greece, and the military regime. The regime has changed, but art endures, and we've decided to let stand this piece on one of the more famous Greek exiles.

These are some of the shifting events. The unassimilated past event is the Holocaust. The event does not grow smaller and quietly recede into the past. It continues to pose hard, bruising questions—to Jews, to Christians, to the secular humanist, to Western civilization. As David Glanz makes evident in his report on a New York symposium devoted to the Holocaust, the subject inspires opacity as well as profundity, and what appears as hysteria to one person is common sense to another. The possible approaches and responses to the Holocaust are many, and in this issue of *Worldview* we offer, in addition to the Glanz report, only two. The large space between these two Christian theologians suggests, however, the range of other possible alternative responses.

And we haven't even mentioned Michael Harrington, Peter Berger, Michael Novak, Paul Sigmond, et al.

EXCURSUS I

Cyprus: Red Sky at Morning

Not quite a century ago, as part of a general effort to find some temporary resolution to the perennial Eastern Question, The Powers handed Cyprus over to Great Britain. Europe was relieved. Today Americans are probably equally inclined to give thanks: The cease-fire in Cyprus seems, at this writing, reasonably effective; the change of regime in Greece, welcome on its own account, promises to make a settlement easier; the Cypriote government has stabilized, and the Archbishop is likely to return to power. A few

regrettable deaths; a number of hotels destroyed and vacations inconvenienced or enlivened; Turkish troops on the island. Otherwise, things seem much as they were, and possibly better.

Europeans of the last century had similar sentiments after the Berlin Conference, and Bismarck, Mr. Kissinger's ideal, was the man of the hour. Bismarck himself, however, almost surely realized that the Eastern Question was still a running sore; his fears that "some wretched affair in the Balkans" would upset the European balance proved, eventually, only too correct. One hopes Mr. Kissinger remembers: There is a risk of proving Marx right once again, that the great events of history occur first as tragedies and recur as farce.

Turkey, in the old days, was the "sick man of Europe," and her malaise was the cause for the general disorder. So far Turkish policy seems overhealthy, if anything. American intelligence regarding Turkey's intentions and capabilities was wretched, a piece with the fumbling and arrogant handling of the opium-poppy issue. The fact that Turkey chose military intervention at all—a policy with some risks and obvious costs—indicates that she has lost trust in the willingness of the United States (not to mention the ability of Great Britain) to uphold the treaty of 1960. Obviously Turkey did not even bother to ask. If the Soviet Union's rather gratuitous eagerness to support her did not especially comfort the Turks, it should not please the United States overmuch: The "spirit of détente" evidently has not reached the Eastern Mediterranean. The events suggest that in 1974 American foreign policy has become the "sick man" of the East, if not of a wider area.

Cyprus will be the source of continuing, probably increasing, tensions. Greece, surrounded by hostile powers, has always been an intensely nationalistic country, and the departure of the junta has only removed a barrier to Greek patriotic sentiment. Battered by the worst inflation in the world, destabilized by massive urbanization, Greece is agonized by the ordeal of change. The social props of the old village morality are falling, and no new code except the main chance has developed, creating an acute, ill-defined, moral anxiety. That sort of passage has always encouraged nationalism, even under the best political conditions, and our enthusiasm for the end of dictatorship should not obscure the fact that Premier Caramanlis and his associates are "old gang" parliamentarians of the center, unlikely to be imaginative and certainly unapt to produce miracles. Under other circumstances America might be a logical object of xenophobia, but Greece is too dependent to afford much of that luxury, and the Caramanlis government will

be delighted to receive American support. Moreover, rivalry with Turkey over offshore oil is a substantial reason for continued tension.

For a time Cypriotes will probably defer hopes for *enosis* out of a frustrated, embittered realism, but we should not count on a long adjournment. Repeatedly, in the last century, The Powers intervened in Crete to preserve a nominal Turkish suzerainty or autonomy. With equal frequency Cretans rebelled, and their persistence was eventually rewarded. And Greeks, in Cyprus and on the mainland, *remember*. Crete made Venizelos a national hero: We should not be surprised if Mr. Sampson sees himself in the same mold or if others aspire to the honor.

Sooner or later Cyprus will have to become Greek, and temporary relief should be a time to seek ways for making *enosis* as painless as possible. Partition is as silly as it was in the days when The Powers invented forgotten "solutions" like Eastern Rumelia, but it might have some short-term uses. If King Constantine is restored it would be possible to explore a personal union between Greece and Cyprus, leaving the internal politics of Cyprus untouched, though Turkey would doubtless recognize the dynamics that would work to make such a union more substantial. As it has in the past, a long-term solution may require the drastic measure of population transfer.

In any event, this is no time to put Cyprus on that "back burner" which has scorched American foreign policy so often: It is not only in seaman's lore that a red sky in the Orient is a reason for alarm.

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EXCURSUS II

Watergate and Amnesty

As early as 1967 some peace groups began pushing the idea of amnesty for resisters and deserters. It was commonly admitted that amnesty would have to await the ending of the Vietnam war. It was also widely assumed, however, that there would be some kind of general amnesty. In 1968 in Paris, Stockholm, and Toronto I was told by some activist resisters that they could muster no enthusiasm for an amnesty after the war is over. That, they said, would indicate no more than an after-the-fact attitude of forgive and forget. It would, they thought, trivialize their action, which they viewed as a political blow