

regrettable deaths; a number of hotels destroyed and vacations inconvenienced or enlivened; Turkish troops on the island. Otherwise, things seem much as they were, and possibly better.

Europeans of the last century had similar sentiments after the Berlin Conference, and Bismarck, Mr. Kissinger's ideal, was the man of the hour. Bismarck himself, however, almost surely realized that the Eastern Question was still a running sore; his fears that "some wretched affair in the Balkans" would upset the European balance proved, eventually, only too correct. One hopes Mr. Kissinger remembers: There is a risk of proving Marx right once again, that the great events of history occur first as tragedies and recur as farce.

Turkey, in the old days, was the "sick man of Europe," and her malaise was the cause for the general disorder. So far Turkish policy seems overhealthy, if anything. American intelligence regarding Turkey's intentions and capabilities was wretched, a piece with the fumbling and arrogant handling of the opium-poppy issue. The fact that Turkey chose military intervention at all—a policy with some risks and obvious costs—indicates that she has lost trust in the willingness of the United States (not to mention the ability of Great Britain) to uphold the treaty of 1960. Obviously Turkey did not even bother to ask. If the Soviet Union's rather gratuitous eagerness to support her did not especially comfort the Turks, it should not please the United States overmuch: The "spirit of détente" evidently has not reached the Eastern Mediterranean. The events suggest that in 1974 American foreign policy has become the "sick man" of the East, if not of a wider area.

Cyprus will be the source of continuing, probably increasing, tensions. Greece, surrounded by hostile powers, has always been an intensely nationalistic country, and the departure of the junta has only removed a barrier to Greek patriotic sentiment. Battered by the worst inflation in the world, destabilized by massive urbanization, Greece is agonized by the ordeal of change. The social props of the old village morality are falling, and no new code except the main chance has developed, creating an acute, ill-defined, moral anxiety. That sort of passage has always encouraged nationalism, even under the best political conditions, and our enthusiasm for the end of dictatorship should not obscure the fact that Premier Caramanlis and his associates are "old gang" parliamentarians of the center, unlikely to be imaginative and certainly unapt to produce miracles. Under other circumstances America might be a logical object of xenophobia, but Greece is too dependent to afford much of that luxury, and the Caramanlis government will

be delighted to receive American support. Moreover, rivalry with Turkey over offshore oil is a substantial reason for continued tension.

For a time Cypriotes will probably defer hopes for *enosis* out of a frustrated, embittered realism, but we should not count on a long adjournment. Repeatedly, in the last century, The Powers intervened in Crete to preserve a nominal Turkish suzerainty or autonomy. With equal frequency Cretans rebelled, and their persistence was eventually rewarded. And Greeks, in Cyprus and on the mainland, *remember*. Crete made Venizelos a national hero: We should not be surprised if Mr. Sampson sees himself in the same mold or if others aspire to the honor.

Sooner or later Cyprus will have to become Greek, and temporary relief should be a time to seek ways for making *enosis* as painless as possible. Partition is as silly as it was in the days when The Powers invented forgotten "solutions" like Eastern Rumelia, but it might have some short-term uses. If King Constantine is restored it would be possible to explore a personal union between Greece and Cyprus, leaving the internal politics of Cyprus untouched, though Turkey would doubtless recognize the dynamics that would work to make such a union more substantial. As it has in the past, a long-term solution may require the drastic measure of population transfer.

In any event, this is no time to put Cyprus on that "back burner" which has scorched American foreign policy so often: It is not only in seaman's lore that a red sky in the Orient is a reason for alarm.

WCMcW

EXCURSUS II

Watergate and Amnesty

As early as 1967 some peace groups began pushing the idea of amnesty for resisters and deserters. It was commonly admitted that amnesty would have to await the ending of the Vietnam war. It was also widely assumed, however, that there would be some kind of general amnesty. In 1968 in Paris, Stockholm, and Toronto I was told by some activist resisters that they could muster no enthusiasm for an amnesty after the war is over. That, they said, would indicate no more than an after-the-fact attitude of forgive and forget. It would, they thought, trivialize their action, which they viewed as a political blow


aimed at forcing America to acknowledge the wrongness of its course. Some more militant resisters and deserters scorned the idea of amnesty entirely, no matter when or in what form it may come. They claimed they would never return to the bosom of the imperialist beast that is America. Today, six years later, such rhetoric seems as happily dated as are the strident groups, such as the American Deserters Committee, now defunct. Less happily, we seem to be no closer to a general amnesty.

Maybe the idea of amnesty was pushed too early. Peace groups thought they were sowing a seed that would gradually grow into politically viable policy. It did grow. Already in January, 1972, a full year before the Paris peace agreements, *Newsweek* ran a cover story on amnesty. But as quickly as it grew Richard Nixon and his gang seized it as an additional switch with which to flay his opponents for their lack of patriotic sentiment and for "letting down our boys" in Vietnam. Two-thirds way through Watergate Americans only began to savor the irony of the public passion for law and order that brought Nixon to office. Yet that irony contained yet a still more exquisite irony. His Watergate troubles led Nixon supporters to a position not entirely unlike the position of those who advocate amnesty. To be sure, their notion of amnesty is somewhat muddled, and its benefits would be distributed in a highly selective manner. But they have succeeded in throwing a wrench into the political machine that was slowly lumbering toward general amnesty for war resisters.

The point is that politics is governed more by moods than by principles. The mood of amnesty is one of minimizing offenses, of placing the best construction on everything, of putting Vietnam behind us, of getting on with the business of building a better and more united America. Substitute "Watergate" for "Vietnam" and one has there all the themes marshaled in Mr. Nixon's desperate defense against impeachment. Voices speaking for amnesty for Vietnam victims are muted, lest they be accused of urging a double standard. If forgiving and forgetting is the order of the day, why not for Watergate as well as for draft resistance? If, on the other hand, devotion to strict observance of the law is this hour's mark of good citizenship, we had best not confuse the public mood with talk about amnesty and pardon. Amnesty was once told to wait its turn until after the war. Now it is told to wait until after Watergate is put behind us.

The confusion of moods is understandable. The confusion of principle is a deplorable failure of moral understanding. Obstruction of justice, burglary and bugging, betrayal of the oath of

public office, contempt of Congress, bribery, income-tax evasion, and illegal interference with agencies of government are all crimes with which Mr. Nixon has been charged or of which he is reasonably suspected. Except for his curiously twisting and patently self-serving assertions of "national security" and "executive privilege," even Mr. Nixon did not suggest that the laws pertinent to these crimes are unjust or should be repealed. He claimed he did not break the law.



Janice Stapleton

He hedged his claim by suggesting that, even if he is technically guilty, it is all much ado about very little. Watergate, he said not very long ago, "is the broadest but the thinnest scandal in American history, because what was it about?" The answer, to put it briefly, is that Watergate is about the survival of constitutional government in the United States. While one hopes there are few people who will insist upon Mr. Nixon spending time in jail, the prospects for American democracy are very dim if we view lightly the assertion of executive power above the law. That is, quite simply and quite chillingly, a definition of dictatorship.

Draft resisters and deserters do not deny that they broke the laws. Those laws, they insist, were unjust, supporting a war that was unjust and probably illegal. The legality of the Vietnam war is a question on which the courts have consistently refused to rule. The injustice of the draft system under which many thousands went into exile has long been recognized and rectified by the Congress. The injustice of the war, or at least its grievous error, is now acknowledged by an

overwhelming majority of Americans. It is not too much to say that many thousands of resisters and deserters are now being penalized for having opposed the war before it was popular to do so. No doubt there are others who acted out of less honorable motives. Proponents of a general amnesty argue that it is neither possible nor appropriate for the government to explore individual motivations and intentions that prompted decisions made five or eight years ago. Whether they wish to exercise it or not, these tens of thousands of Americans should have the right to come home again.

We are faced simultaneously with the issues of Watergate and the American exiles. If policy is ruled by mood, people will choose between strictness and liberality, perhaps even between compassion and vindictiveness. If we reflect upon principles, however, the distinction between the two issues is not hard to make. There is no serious questioning of the legitimacy of the laws Mr. Nixon has violated. The Vietnam resisters opposed policies and supporting laws that have been overwhelmingly delegitimated by the people and their representatives. In a democracy that is a very crucial difference. Those who see the difference should not be distracted or inhibited by the quite different considerations pertaining to Watergate.

Fortunately, some do press on, undistracted and uninhibited by momentary moods. Ramsey Clark, former Attorney General, Paul Moore, Episcopal Bishop of New York, and others have recently formed Americans for Amnesty (235 East 49th Street, New York, N.Y. 10017). The group is headed by Mrs. Louise Ransom, whose son, Michael, was an officer killed in combat in Vietnam. The amnesty issue has been with us for a long time, too long. Many people are tired of it. But those who take their cues from what is right rather than from what is faddish should not be deterred. "Wars and Watergate have mired us down," Ramsey Clark has written. "To restore our faith we as Americans desperately need to do something decent for a change. Amnesty is a decent thing to do."

RJN

How Many?

The last time, more than two years ago, Mr. Nixon addressed the issue of amnesty for Vietnam-related offenses, he said his views "remain exactly the same." "We cannot provide forgiveness for them. . . . The price is a criminal penalty for disobeying the laws of the United States. If they want to return to the United States they must pay

the penalty. If they don't want to return, they are certainly welcome to stay in any country that welcomes them." He spoke of "those few hundreds who went to Canada or Sweden or someplace else, and chose to desert their country because they had a higher morality."

Advocates of a general and unconditional amnesty suggest we are dealing with somewhat more than a "few hundreds." Using government and independent sources, Americans for Amnesty comes up with what may be the shocking figure of 534,700 Americans "in need of universal, unconditional amnesty." (Meaning that every offense would be legally blotted out except those offenses that would be punishable under criminal or civil law in the nonmilitary world.)

The figure breaks down in this way: There were 52,143 draft resisters during the Indochina war. 7,443 of these were convicted and classified as felons. 3,666 were imprisoned for up to five years. 39,000 cases were referred to the Department of Justice as draft "violators." 5,700 more face outstanding indictments and further legal action. In addition to the 52,143 there are unknown numbers of young men—believed to be in the thousands—who never registered for the draft at all and are subject to prosecution if discovered.

Then there are 32,557 members of the Armed Forces "at large" and listed as AWOL or as "deserters." The Pentagon has another list on which it includes only those whose whereabouts have been determined through intelligence information. As one commentator notes, "Obviously, large numbers of deserters have been remiss in reporting changes in address."

The largest number in need of amnesty, according to Americans for Amnesty, is the 450,000 young men handicapped by a "less than honorable" discharge. Most of these discharges, they report, resulted from 550,000 courts martial for sundry military offenses, many under Article 134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice ("all other acts prejudicial to good order and discipline"), which has since been ruled "unconstitutionally vague" by the Washington Court of Appeals.

RJN

EXCURSUS III

Brazilianization of the Hemisphere?

Latin America today presents a gloomy picture for the American radical, liberal, or civil libertarian conservative. Thirteen years after the start