Most of the work was actually done by groups like the Catholic Conference, Church World Service, Lutheran Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the (Jewish) United HIA Service. The plan for easing the transition period of resettlement was based on having sponsoring American families or institutions (usually church groups) help individual Vietnamese families. The private groups, with their connections across the nation, handled the job far better than the government. In fact, while Washington appropriated $500 per refugee, the voluntary, religious-related groups provided an additional $1,000 in donated time and services.

The second phase of the refugee programming is now in full swing. It is designed to help the Vietnamese toward “self-sufficiency,” toward full assimilation into American society. This task has been greatly simplified by the high motivation of the average refugee. Despite early misgivings, the great majority of them have proven hardworking and ambitious for advancement. Yet the U.S. is now facing its highest rate of unemployment since World War II. Actually, the Vietnamese have done better finding jobs than most people expected, with about 82 per cent of those considered employable able to find work.

The short-range problem is underemployment. A government survey shows that 40 per cent of the refugees are earning less than poverty-level incomes, although many are also receiving welfare or private assistance. Most of the Vietnamese have had to take jobs below their level of training and education. Language problems remain a serious barrier. Current emphasis of aid programs is, therefore, on bilingual education, vocational training, and upgrading job skills. The American Nursing Association, for example, has helped forty-five Vietnamese nurses obtain licenses and find jobs, another program seeks to do the same for 350 refugee doctors. Those with marketable skills do best. Vietnamese fishermen are being taught American techniques and set up in business. A group of textile workers is being trained on modern machinery in another part of the country. At the same time, the former South Vietnamese Ambassador to the U.S. is still unemployed, and General Ky, once one of South Vietnam’s most powerful figures, has failed in his attempts to become a college lecturer because of demonstrations against him.

Perhaps a more typical story is that of a former Vietnamese Navy captain. He was resettled in the Washington area last June and found a job for himself within a month, working as a cashier in a restaurant. His children are now in public school, working hard to master English, and he attends evening courses. Eventually, he hopes to get into a better paying job involving more skill, perhaps computer programming. Americans have been friendly, he says, but only a few ask him questions about life and war in Vietnam.

“Resettlement is far more than just having a job or having an income,” a relief official explains. Adjustment to radically different cultural styles is most difficult. Yet the Vietnamese refugees have made the first key decision in the process: They have no illusions about returning home, they have decided to stay here permanently.

Traditionally, immigrants to the U.S. have gone through a recurring pattern over three generations. The actual immigrants remain heavily influenced by the language, culture, and worldview of their native land; their children become fully Americanized, ashamed of their parents’ accents and quaint customs; the third generation rekindles its interest in its heritage, developing a sense of ethnic pride. Perhaps the Vietnamese refugees will also follow this cycle.

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EXCURSUS II

Shinkichi Eto
Three Pessimistic Scenarios for Japan

In blind optimism and in blind pessimism there is the possibility of disillusion and self-fulfilling prophesy. The balance between reckless optimism and paralyzing pessimism requires readiness to look at the facts, to accept their implications, and to make ready for the unforeseen. In Japan our economists have tended to be optimists, while political scientists have been plagued by visions of disaster that could suddenly loom on the horizon of international politics.

During the prospering 1960’s I was deeply disturbed by Japan’s great economic dependence on the United States, by its heavy reliance on Middle East energy resources, and by the vulnerabilities of the international economic system. During those years Japan’s economists would not accept the possibility that Middle Eastern countries would reduce oil sales, that the United States would retreat to protectionism, or that anyone would gain from disturbing the elaborate interrelationships of the international economic system.

The economists were proven correct in their forecasts so far as the decade of the 1960’s was concerned. And, even though early in the 1970’s the United States waged its textile war against Japan, and the fourth Arab-Israeli war placed in jeopardy the security of Middle East energy resources, most Japanese economists still confidently predicted something like a 9.6 annual rate of GNP growth for the rest of the decade. Even in the face of quadrupling oil prices and the virulence of worldwide inflation and recession, most of Japan’s non-Marxist
consumers still foresee a sustained 5-6 per cent rate of economic growth in the offing.

I remain a pessimist. My basic interpretation of Japan's present position in the world is that it is "Phoenician." Whereas pre-1945 Japan was of the "Roman" type, with a persevering and thrifty people living in a basically agricultural society, postwar Japan turned to the "Phoenician" model of an affluent, urbanized society based upon private initiative and the competitive free enterprise system. The Japanese have become commercially minded and physically weak. Japanese industry relies upon imports for 90 per cent of its necessary natural resources, and 95 per cent of the wheat the Japanese consume is grown outside Japan. Political scientists like myself can see much cause for alarm in the vulnerability of Japan's economic system.

Let me illustrate my pessimism with three plausible scenarios for Japan's future. The first scenario begins in the Korean peninsula. North Korea at the moment has three means of achieving its national aim of reuniting the peninsula under its political control: (1) to launch a full-scale attack on South Korea, (2) to send guerrilla squads to the South covertly to provoke a Vietnam-type civil war, and (3) to infiltrate politically liberal movements in South Korea, stir up antigovernment sentiments, and agitate for antigovernment activities.

The first alternative is opposed by both Moscow and Peking, and as long as the present balance of military power in the peninsula is maintained, a full-scale attack is unlikely to occur. The second alternative is also unlikely to be adopted, since the strong anti-Communist sentiment of the South Korean people has so far prevented Communist squads from establishing a base area in the South.

The last alternative is the most likely of the three. It is very difficult for the Seoul Government to distinguish Communist-instigated antigovernment movements from genuinely indigenous liberal ones. The more suspicious the government becomes of Communist political infiltration the more repressive its policy toward antigovernment movements will become. The American and Japanese media will condemn Seoul for its repressive policies. The United States Congress will radically reduce its military aid to South Korea, and Japanese business will be hesitant about increasing its involvement with South Korea. Economic difficulties and an increasing distrust of the United States could then lead to popular unrest, culminating in nationwide, large-scale, anti-Park demonstrations. President Park would then fall from power and a more pacifist government would take over. This government might be more acquiescent toward North Korea's goal of "peaceful reUnification" of the peninsula, for although the great majority of the South Korean people are instinctively anti-Communist, the students and intelligentsia often tend to be conciliatory to the North.

If this were to happen, the Japanese people might then lose confidence in Western democracy, since they might feel that American incompetence contributed in part to the transfer of power in Korea. A series of events similar to what occurred in Korea would begin to unfold in Japan. The distrust of Western democracy would accelerate the decline of the Japanese conservatives, and the political pendulum would swing toward socialism. Japanese stocks would fall drastically in foreign markets at first, in the domestic market next, with the result of a stagnating Japanese economy. Opportunistic intellectuals would readily fall in step with any decisive totalitarian political party.

The second scenario begins with a lack of faith in the banks. Suppose the Japanese media were to attack banking activities so vehemently that the people began to distrust the banks and withdraw their deposits. Popular unrest or any rumor could touch off a run on the banks. Japanese private enterprise is characterized by its heavy reliance upon bank financing; thus the bankruptcy of a major bank would deal a fatal blow to related enterprises. A chain reaction of bankruptcies would spread through all sectors of the Japanese economy. Even a government declaration of a general moratorium on financial and commercial transactions could not stop the bankruptcies. The entire financial and economic community would be thrown into total panic. The Liberal Democratic Party would prove helpless, and Japan would be plunged into chaotic disorder, not only economically, but politically as well.

The third scenario begins in the Persian Gulf. Suppose that a radical Arab faction became disillusioned with the Sinai truce and its aftermath and plotted a rocket bombardment of both oil depots along the Persian Gulf and oil tankers cruising through the Straits of Hormuz. The destruction of one or two oil depots would probably not lead to a protracted shortage of oil for Japan. However, should the radicals succeed in destroying a number of the major depots on the Gulf, Japan would suffer substantially. The Straits of Hormuz are even more vulnerable to the radicals' attack. The Straits have so many sand bars on the Iranian side that tankers can only cruise through a four-mile-wide channel that is near the coastal areas of Muscat and Oman. Should the insurgencies in Muscat and Oman intensify, the Arab radicals would not hesitate to occupy these coastal areas. The occupation might continue for a few months before the Iranians or the Soviets intervened. A complete suspension of oil supplies from the Persian Gulf would deal the Japanese economy a decisive blow, and economic paralysis would be followed by political chaos, which is the best hotbed for a totalitarian revolution.

No one would say that the above scenarios are impossible. Some people, however, including the majority of the economists, do not think that they are very likely, while others, like myself, feel they are highly probable. Those who take a less than optimistic view should strongly advocate that the Japanese people and government do their best to reduce the probability that one or more of these scenarios
would actually occur. And if one of these undesirable outcomes does occur, its effects will be minimized only if the Japanese people and government have previously made plans and preparations to counter them. A reckless optimism here would lead to the most pervasive and corrosive disillusion.

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EXCURSUS III

Ross Snyder
To Friends in South Africa

As a boy growing up at the turn of the century on my grandfather's farm in Ohio, I read again and again The Rise of the Dutch Republic. How it happened that the volumes on Dutch civilization were in the library of a Midwest farmer who owned, at most, fifty books, I do not know, nor could I now find out. I am different because of my early knowledge of the beginnings of the Dutch Republic. And to my horror, you in South Africa are also different because of that history.

Years later I came to learn about the English Pilgrims who landed in America at Plymouth and to own them as one source of myself as spirit. The story of the Pilgrims' prior refuge among the liberty-loving Dutch connected the best of my American heritage with the best of the English and Dutch heritage. At the time of the Pilgrims' sojourn Holland was the place where the persecuted from all over Europe fled for freedom of conscience, intellect, and history-making. In England the Pilgrims were in the struggle to establish that the human spirit and its rights were a gift from God, not a permission from a political/religious/economic complex.

Your present government actions and public silence cannot be a project of this Dutch-English heritage. You profane your heritage—both national and religious. You are trying to exist outside the basic covenant of human being into which we are all born, the covenant we must affirm for ourselves if we are to be whole and not fibrous shreds.

Some of your sensitive Christians (whom I honor) have said that your major concern is for “order,” rather than for justice. That is a misleading distinction. There is great disorder within yourselves and within those you would teach to call you “boss.” Both of you are, as one American philosopher said in another connection, “estranged actors condemned in hatefulness to walk a common stage and admit there is no authority beyond the authority which force exerts or fear allows.” Societal order can come about only when there is communication, communion, inward allegiance to the rightness of the order. That happens when people can stand in each other's presence related to each other in the dignity of being persons, when the one wielding power is seen as a human dignity—who honors rights in others, who has a principled originality. In these respects you have become deficient.

Order does not consist in apparent power to shut people up or to force obedience. Nor is order to be found in police and government empowered to imprison indefinitely adults who ask for nothing more than face-to-face talk and consultation, and to repress young people who can no longer believe in a South Africa whose future would be determined by its present leaders.

You must not pretend that there is order when the whites of South Africa have forsaken the covenants.

I write this not only out of a concern for order—a justice order—and for your traditions in the long reaches of history. I write out of a love and regard for the children, both black and white. Over the years I have devoted much time to the children of the nursery school at our seminary whose parents are in theological studies. Their eyes and faces, their exceptional minds and outstretched arms often rushed to embrace me—and an unknown future. What is the future you are preparing your children for? My wife and I remember the children of the Center at Soweto and outside Cape Town whom we visited some ten years ago. Is there any expectancy left in their faces now—or in yours?

"Fellow citizens, we cannot escape history."

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EXCURSUS IV

Mark A. Bruzonsky on What to Do About the Middle East

When the political niceties of this election year fade, the future President must confront the new Middle East stalemate.

He will do so amidst the widespread conclusion that the U.S. should not return to step-by-step diplomacy but should urgently pursue an overall Middle East settlement and even consider imposing it. When spelled out, such a comprehensive, possibly imposed, settlement will include Israeli withdrawal from nearly all occupied territories, creation of a Palestinian "entity" or state, a novel arrangement for a united but dually administered Jerusalem, and various forms of security arrangements and "guarantees" for Israel. For many, the tragic and shocking events in Lebanon have even exacerbated