

World. But something had to "give," politically speaking, to make possible heavy government support for numerous worthy domestic goals *and* stepped up foreign aid.

The obvious victim was NATO. Americans had been seen to waste billions against poor Indochinese peasants. Later, when war seemed a remote contingency in an era of détente, Americans continued to prod NATO members to reserve scarce resources for a forever-to-be-upgraded defense apparatus that had not been used in more than twenty years. Many conscientious Dutchmen had a hard time justifying further investments in what seemed an historically obsolete alliance.

The military competition of the superpowers forms the permanent frame of reference for an analysis of the European military situation. Holland is located on, or certainly adjacent to, the Central Front in Europe. NATO's long-standing unfavorable balance of conventional weapons is well known. The likely contingency, in military analysis, of a massive tank invasion by the Warsaw Pact armies across the Central Front, the equally probable need to resort to first use of nuclear weapons by the defenders, and the virtual absence of territory that these defenders could trade remains a problem to NATO planners.

A solution of sorts was thought to have been found in the enhanced radiation warhead (ERW), or neutron bomb, which would be deadly against invaders while leaving German territory largely intact. The clumsy handling of advance public relations for this weapon project was disastrous. Insofar as the Dutch had to be involved in the program, it provided just the kind of issue—given the strong latent dissatisfaction with NATO—that made for a small explosion, sending tremors down the alliance.

An interesting sidelight is provided by the story of the hitherto unprecedented Soviet interference in national decision-making on a defense program within a NATO member-state. This interference was covert as well as overt: Warnings and propaganda from the Soviet side were mixed with—in the Dutch case—an active role by the Soviet embassy in the setting up of a national "peace campaign" to forgo this gruesome mistake that served the U.S. war machine.

In fairness it must be noted that around the same time as the ERW affair, Holland dutifully complied with the adoption by NATO of a Long-Term Defense Program. This program involved the improvement of various Alliance projects and included a politically courageous 3 per cent annual increase of the defense budget (although it did not entail tactical nuclear innovations). The Soviets understood as much: No major propaganda campaign was unleashed against the LTDP. But it had become clear in recent years that the West was going to have to deal with some of the issues raised by SALT II—notably, restrictions on cruise missiles, with no restrictions on the Soviets' Backfire bomber or SS-20 to compensate.

The SS-20 posed a particularly troublesome problem: It was not a gray-area weapon, i.e., it could only be intended for use against Western Europe or China. Why did the Soviets build such a superior Euro-specific nuclear weapon when their conventional superiority was already widely assumed? Chancellor Schmidt of Germany alerted NATO that it had to make a hard choice, namely, to face up to the need to develop an offsetting tactical nuclear capability. Germany's Dutch neighbor on the Central Front came first to mind.

All this hitting home came extra hard to many Dutch, who (a) were still enthralled by the promise of détente, (b) were nonetheless still alert (after the neutron bomb shock) to the possibility of other nasty surprises from the U.S. "military-industrial complex," and (c) felt that the

nuclear fancies held by the "big leaguers" such as Germany and the U.S. should not involve a small, peaceful country. And the Soviets sensed another great opportunity to stir trouble within NATO, beginning with an agitated Holland. After all, a pattern had possibly been set with the neutron bomb episode, and it might now be built upon by letting Dutch anxieties spill over to Belgium, Denmark, Norway, and perhaps even to Germany itself, where Schmidt confronts a potent left wing in his own party.

It is known that in December, 1979, a large majority in NATO favored the production of its new TNWs, with only the Dutch and (less forcefully) the Belgians dissenting. Yet the decision, and doubtlessly others equally charged, will come up for further discussion in the days ahead. Two national debates in short succession may have started a ball rolling in Holland, stirring a temper of disquiet, a sense of alienation from NATO. As long as Germany stands, Holland cannot fall. But Holland is beginning to look like Finland.

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EXCURSUS 2

Cynthia McClintock on PERU: HOPE'S TRIUMPH OVER EXPERIENCE

On July 28, 1980, Fernando Belaúnde Terry was inaugurated president of Peru. Elected with over 45 per cent of the vote, a landslide in a field of fifteen candidates, Belaúnde was returned to office after almost twelve years of military rule—a triumph of hope over experience.

The election revealed that, contrary to the conventional image of Latin America, the Peruvians had an intense desire for liberal democracy. The consensus appears to be that military rule was a disaster in good part because it was a dictatorship. Peruvians reasoned that, bound only by the law of the jungle, the military "inevitably" swindled the nation and led it into the worst economic crisis of recent decades. Although Juan Velasco Alvarado, the first of the two military presidents, had carried out important structural reforms, the country was beset by economic disaster less than a year after his departure; right or wrong, many Peruvians blamed the crisis upon the reforms. The second military president, Francisco Morales Bermúdez, had presided over a hungry and dismayed people as the IMF pressed upon Peru its usual "medicine" for foreign debt difficulties.

As in 1958 in Venezuela, which is still enjoying electoral democracy, the vast majority of citizens in Peru—peasants, taxidrivens, and professionals alike—agreed that the military should give way to a civilian regime. Peruvians affirmed this consensus at the polls: The choice was an obvious symbolic reprimand of the military for its decision to oust Belaúnde in 1968.

In choosing Belaúnde, the Peruvians also revealed their willingness to compromise ideologically to launch their fledgling democracy. According to the new constitution, if no candidate wins at least 36 per cent of the vote, Congress selects the president from the top two candidates. A similar stipulation in Bolivia's constitution allowed its Congress to stop presidential candidate Hernán Siles Zuazo, the top vote-getter in the 1979 elections. This was a significant detour on Bolivia's blocked "road back to

democracy." Many Peruvians were aware of opinion polls that indicated Belaúnde was the only candidate with a good chance to win the crucial 36 per cent and so they voted for him even if he was not their first choice. A prominent Belaúnde slogan had shrewdly capitalized on this: "El voto que no se pierde" (a vote for Belaúnde is a vote that won't be wasted).

Peruvians were also sensitive to the problems of a democratic government when the executive does not enjoy a majority in the Congress. Many Peruvians blamed the shortcomings of Belaúnde's administration in the 1960s upon an uncooperative opposition. Now, after forging an alliance with Luis Bedoya's Popular Christian party (PPC), which finished third in the elections with slightly less than 10 per cent of the vote, Belaúnde and his Popular Action party (AP) enjoy solid positions in both houses of Congress: 108 deputies in the 180-member House and at least 30 senators in the 60-member Senate.

Although internal political dynamics are the most important factor in Peru's successful start on the road back to democracy, the role of the U.S. should not be discounted. President Carter deserves to count Peru as one of the successes of his "human rights" policy. Again, Peruvians had an eye on the Bolivian experience; they knew that the United States would apply sanctions against a coup. On election night, as it became clear that the voting had been orderly and honest, U.S. Ambassador Harry W. Shlaudeman appeared on Peruvian television to read a congratulatory letter from President Carter, indicating that the United States viewed the Peruvian process "with sympathy." In the three months since the elections the United States has agreed to provide at least \$12 million in new loans, and the World Bank \$1 billion.

Rather than criticize the United States for its political nudges, most Peruvians welcomed U.S. support as a curb against military officers who might have last-minute doubts about relinquishing power. Belaúnde was the candidate who had not only the best antimilitary credentials but also the strongest U.S. connections. Belaúnde lived in the U.S. for much of his decade in exile and spent his last years in the States at George Washington University in Washington, D.C. His campaign had the most "American" touch and, presumably, the greatest number of dollars.

Still, a successful return to democracy in Peru will require more than the fervent hope of Peruvians and the support of the United States. Belaúnde the magnificent campaigner is not the proven executive. Belaúnde won because more voters saw him as the "least bad" than as "the best." This perception was especially strong among Peru's leftist voters, who in the 1978 constituent assembly elections accounted for over 33 per cent of the votes, a much higher percentage than in the 1960s. Many leftists voted for Belaúnde only because they believed he would be less repressive than his major rival, APRA's Armando Villanueva. Some who voted for the Left in 1978 deserted ranks in anger at its constant squabbling and inability to unite behind any fewer than ten candidates. Also, the Cuban exodus, well publicized in Peru because of the role of its embassy, badly tarnished the image of Peru's Left. At approximately 17 per cent, the Left vote in 1980 was only half that of 1978.

A Belaúnde presidency symbolizes a "return to normalcy" for various reasons. Now sixty-seven, Belaúnde had been the most important rising political star of the '50s and '60s. Further, his campaign promised a modification of the main Velasco reforms that had withstood the Morales Bermúdez years: Many state enterprises would be returned to private hands and agrarian cooperatives would be permitted to divide their lands into private par-

cells. In other respects Belaúnde's platform echoed his 1963 platform in its emphasis upon specific projects, especially roads and irrigation for the agricultural area between the mountains and the jungle, and its tenor was populist. One slogan proclaimed: "A President for Everyone."

Of course the 1980s are not the 1950s, yet I believe Belaúnde will be the first Peruvian president in thirty-five years to complete an elected term. An architect of modest demeanor and vision, he was perhaps the wrong president for Peru in 1973, when great change was needed, but he could be the right president for 1980. Moreover, over the last decade Belaúnde seems to have learned important lessons in the art of political negotiation and conciliation. Peru's cyclical economy is on the upswing now and should be boosted by foreign aid and investment, including investment in oil exploration. Finally, after years of serving as the scapegoat for all Peru's problems, the military is demoralized; hard-line elements were too weak to seize power during the severe labor unrest of 1977-79, and they must be weaker now after the successful completion of the electoral process.

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EXCURSUS 3

Alfons Heck on WEST GERMANY'S GYPSIES: JUSTICE DENIED?

The Association of German Gypsies recently staged a mass meeting in Bergen-Belsen, the former Nazi concentration camp, with the intention of sending an emphatic message to the West German Government: Gypsy persecution did not end with the Nazi regime. Unlike many victims of the Holocaust, who received substantial compensation for their suffering, most surviving gypsies are still waiting for a fair settlement. By their estimates it should total about \$365 million, part of which is earmarked for a gypsy cultural center in Paris. Although Chancellor Schmidt is sympathetic to their demands, there is virtually no chance that Bonn will recognize the validity of all these claims, since West Germany's Federal Supreme Court ruled in 1956 that until May of 1943 most deportations of gypsies were carried out for "military" or "crime-preventing" reasons, not on racial grounds. Most gypsies, if one accepts this logic, were gassed, shot, and starved to death as "asocial, criminal elements." Anyone so classified is not a "genuine" political victim of Nazism and is not entitled to restitution, except for a token five deutschmarks—about \$3.00—for each day spent in a death camp.

Although the gypsies did not suffer losses comparable to the Jews', an estimated 500,000 died, among them nearly all their leaders. At the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials, U.S. prosecutor James E. Heath asked the accused S.S. General Otto Ohlendorf of the Gestapo Security Office why so many gypsies had been killed. The general blandly asserted that "they took part in spy activities during the war." So far not a single gypsy spy ring has been discovered.

Most of Europe's present six million gypsies grew up