time of the Six-Day War, in contrast, Israel was surrounded by enemy standing armies and, given its economy and military organization, risking destruction even had the Arabs never crossed Israel's borders. A delay then could have led to the disintegration of Israel.

The argument is also made that an air attack at a later date might have caused Baghdad to be subjected to radioactive fallout. This argument strikes me as unpersuasive: Had an attack still proved necessary, there was sufficient time to avoid this danger before the reactor became active.

The careful reader will note that I do not claim the attack as such to be wrong. Israel should have waited, should have attempted to convince the new French government of the dangers of its policy. Had those initiatives failed, there appears little else but to have attacked. Thus the conclusion of the argument goes against Israel, but by only a narrow margin.

If states take any actions they call justifiable, what happens to the notion that it is possible to reach agreement on useful moral principles in international affairs? There are a number of those who make the assumption that people of good will, once having agreed upon the moral principles that are relevant to the case, will also agree upon how to apply them. This view assumes the principles are self-explanatory. In fact they are not. Moral principles are embedded in particular historical contexts and gain their significance from these contexts. Outside of a common context, disagreement over the application of moral principles is inevitable. What then becomes critical is the understanding of those contexts that give particular moral principles their significance. Frankly, I find grounds for optimism in the fact that Israel and some of its critics have not abandoned the language of morality. A major ground for pessimism is the lack of an announcement by the Western nations that they will insist on tighter controls over the transfer of nuclear technology. Ironically, the Russians have a better record here than does the West.

To me the critical issue in this dispute is not the moral principles invoked to justify or condemn, but the transfer of nuclear technology. If this issue is not joined, we will see other preventive actions by still other states whose hostile neighbors have acquired Western nuclear technology. Surely it is time for Western nations to devise a system of controls when they choose to transfer this kind of technology, and to commit themselves to it. The problem has been addressed in the past, but there is nothing like a consensus among Western nations about how to rectify it. Should such a consensus develop now, we can say that although Israel acted wrongly some good has come of it.

Stephen E. Lammers is a member of the Religion Department at Lafayette College.

EXCURSUS 2

Stephen Rousseas on ELECTIONS IN GREECE

Post civil war politics in Greece really begin with Constantine Karamanlis, sworn in as prime minister on October 6, 1955, handpicked by King Paul and his powerful queen, Frederika. Karamanlis's National Radical Union (ERE) government lasted until 1963, a remarkably lengthy tenure by Greek standards. With the murder of the Greek deputy Gregoris Lambrakis and the suspected complicity of Queen Frederika in that now famous Salonika event, the Karamanlis government came to a bitter end—largely engineered by the queen herself. An interim and then a caretaker government quickly followed in preparation for the elections of 1963, which George Papandreou of the Center Union party (EK) barely won on November 3. Karamanlis left in a huff for Paris, where he would spend eleven years in self-imposed exile.

Charges were rife of electoral irregularities and intimidation of voters in the villages, and Papandreou called for new elections. Another caretaker government followed, with Papandreou sweeping the 1964 elections by an unprecedented majority. On July 15, 1965, the young King Constantine dumped the Center Union government unceremoniously and replaced it with a series of puppet governments. As Karamanlis settled in Paris, Panayiotis Kanellopoulos succeeded him to the leadership of ERE and was to do battle with Papandreou in the elections set for May 28, 1967. Papandreou was certain of victory, but then came the military coup of April 21.

From 1955 to the coup, a span of twelve years, there were four elected governments, one interim government, and four caretaker governments. With the exception of Karamanlis's eight-year reign, the period was hardly notable for its stability. The military dictatorship, with the strong support of the United States, lasted seven years, unraveling ignominiously when it tried to instigate another coup in Cyprus but succeeded only in triggering the Turkish invasion of the island and its partition into two camps. Karamanlis flew back from Paris in President Giscard d'Estaing's personal jet to pick up the pieces. His triumph in the elections of 1974 confirmed him as savior. Last year, at an advanced age, he announced himself president of Greece and designated George Rallis to replace him as prime minister. This is where things stand at the time of this writing.

New elections are scheduled for October 18. The two main protagonists are Prime Minister George Rallis, who is also president of the New Democracy party, and Andreas Papandreou, son of George Papandreou, now head of the Pan Hellenic Socialist party (PASOK). Papandreou fils is poised in 1981 for a major victory, as Papandreou père was in 1967. Not surprisingly, talk of another coup is in the air. And the government is not above fostering fears among the Greek electorate (as evidenced by its recent announcement that it had nipped a military plot in the bud, though no arrests were made). Papandreou fils—Andreas as he is popularly known—is a highly controversial figure. Bitter old-line politicians and members of the Greek establishment hold him responsible for the 1967 coup, which, in their opinion, was caused by his irresponsible demagoguery. Even his father blamed him for sabotaging the arrangement he, George, had made with Kanellopoulos for the 1967 elections, thus making the coup inevitable.

Andreas, an American-educated economist who had a successful academic career in the U.S., returned to Greece in 1964 after a long absence, entering Greek politics as a Center Union member of parliament in his father's government. Deeply resented as a carpetbagger riding his father's coattails, he was at the time of the coup alternate minister of coordination, a powerful ministerial post. The junta beat him and jailed him, but he was released a year later under pressure from President Lyndon Johnson, who had been pressured by U.S. economists to intervene. Andreas situated himself in Sweden and then in Canada and became one of the principal leaders-in-exile fighting the junta.
Now that Andreas is poised for a major personal triumph in the upcoming elections, what can be said about him? He opposed Greece’s entry into the Common Market and promised, if elected, a referendum on the issue. He has now muted his position and generally avoids the subject. Andreas opposed Greece’s reintegration into NATO but now talks only of annual renegotiation of the American bases in Greece. He has also mended his fences carefully with the military, praising their patriotism at every opportunity. In short, he seems to have learned his lesson well.

Despite some irresponsible talk, it is doubtful that the October elections will be aborted by another coup—although anything is possible in Greece. In mid-September an agreement was reached whereby the Rallis government replaced the minister of the interior, the minister of justice and public order, and the under secretary of press and information with people acceptable to PASOK. The elections will therefore be relatively honest, with a minimum of tampering and intimidation. Even with the election of Andreas, the real power will remain in the hands of Karamanlis as president. This fact alone should act as a major deterrent to another coup. But Karamanlis is an old man; with his death, anything might happen.

No doubt Andreas will pattern himself after Francois Mitterrand, but he will have to tread carefully in setting out policies for a socialist Greece. And there is no doubt of Andreas’s great intelligence or that his ideas for reform are desperately needed in a country whose economic life, largely corrupt, is in the hands of a few powerful people. Whether he will bring it off is another matter. Though largely supported by young people and students, Andreas has alienated most of the intellectual community in Athens—people who strongly supported him during his exile and shortly after his return to Greece in 1974. The hope was that Andreas would introduce into Greek politics a new and modern form of party structure. To all evidence he has degenerated into the traditional Greek party boss who uses his charisma to stifle discussion and dissent within his own party.

Yet the fact remains that Andreas is Greece’s best hope for lasting reform and regeneration—the first man with such potential in the entire postwar period. It will be fascinating to see how things turn out if, as expected, he is elected. And one awaits with interest the reaction of President Reagan, his secretary of state, and the CIA to the new leader of the Greek government. Andreas, Socialist, is an outspoken critic of U.S. interference in internal Greek matters. Greece is not France, however, and the temptation for the U.S. to meddle in Greece will be greater, and misguided. Greece could well become the Chile of the Mediterranean in short order after Karamanlis passes from the scene.

Stephen Rousseas, Professor of Economics at Vassar, is author of The Death of a Democracy: Greece and the American Conscience.

EXCURSUS 3

Thomas Land on HIGHWAYS FOR AFRICA

A string of agricultural and mining settlements is being planned along a modern, all-weather highway across the Sahara desert following the ancient salt-and-silk route that made the medieval West African kingdoms of Songhali and Mali rich.

Advancing southward across inhospitable terrain, the road has reached Tamanrasset, the administrative capital of Algeria’s Saharan provinces, and may shortly cross the frontier of Niger. The projected 3,500-kilometer Trans-Sahara Highway, which has already opened up Algeria’s “deep south” for economic development, will link the North African ports of the Mediterranean with the West African ports of the Gulf of Guinea. Its effects on trade,