

High on Mr. Bulganin's list of items for negotiation, on the other hand, is his concern for "the reduction of foreign troops in Germany." And we must realize that, from the standpoint of their own security, this point for the Russians is also essential to any tolerable "settlement."

And here, in these two items, is a seemingly intractable power situation, one which cannot be resolved by a simple bravado or willingness to take "risks" by either side. If, as Mr. Khrushchev now clearly implies, the Soviet Union is determined to maintain the *status quo* in Eastern Europe, then we are forced to do the same in Western Europe. To weaken our military strength

there—in the hope that some great but necessarily nebulous political advantages will follow—would be for the West a folly for which history would offer no forgiveness.

Eastern Europe, Germany: these are issues about which we must negotiate, which we dare not leave to an undirected evolution that may end in disaster. But the chances for fruitful negotiations over such complexities at the Summit seem slim indeed. By attempting too much we may end with nothing. The workings of a more normal, less spectacular diplomacy should be restored by both East and West.



In the Magazines

We are, so the cliché goes, a nation of doers, not thinkers. Like all generalizations, this one contains a certain truth, not to be invalidated by claiming the eminence of theoreticians in our past (Peirce, Gibbs, James, Veblen) or by citing our current supremacy in the theoretical sciences. It is true that "there is much theory made in the United States," but—and here the cliché finds its firmest base—"there is no unifying theory of what human life is about; there is no consensus either as to the nature of reality or of the part we are to play in it; there is no theory of the good life and not much theory of the role of government in promoting it."

Robert Oppenheimer, writing in the January issue of *Foreign Affairs*, contributes a searching commentary on the state of our national culture, the function of government, the position of the specialist. Dr. Oppenheimer discerns three grave weaknesses in our society: "in our education, in our faltering view of the future, and in our difficulties in the formulation of policy." He locates the causes of these failings most persuasively in the pressures and crises of our history which have led us to codify, to simplify our view of the world and to limit our intellectual attack to what is merely operative—an efficiency of the will. But this efficiency of ours is no longer good enough. "I believe," writes Dr. Oppenheimer, "that we are now deeply injured by the simplifications of this time." Our need for intellectual talent is critical, but are we going to respond to that need in terms of its commensurate values—values for which our national experience has ill prepared us? For first we must achieve what Dr. Oppenheimer calls "the real thing": "a vastly greater intellectual vigor and discipline; a more habitual and widespread openmindedness; and a kind of indefatigability, which is not inconsistent with fatigue but is inconsistent with surrender."

posals in the UN between 1946 and 1953 so that it could catch up with the United States in the nuclear arms race, so we must "assume that the U.S. will neither propose nor accept any plan that might freeze the present imbalance of power." While the "catch-up" policy dominates the area of nuclear weapons, might we not attempt a settlement with the Soviet Union on the latest front of the technological Cold War—that of space?

This is the suggestion of Edward A. Conway, S.J. in his article "Outer Space and Peace" (*The Commonwealth*, January 10). "The United States could call upon the nations of the world to form another international agency, similar in structure and motivation to the atomic energy agency just organized in Vienna—this one dedicated to the joint exploration and exploitation of space for peaceful purposes." Father Conway, an expert on disarmament, outlines the basic steps such a project should take, and emphasizes twin necessities; all possible speed in administration and an official distinction between missiles and satellites.

William F. Buckley, Jr. has repudiated President Eisenhower. The reasons why should not surprise what the *National Review* is fond of calling "the forces of the Liberal left." In the January 18 issue of *NR*, Mr. Buckley contributes some highly decorative prose (he deplores the advent, among Republicans, of "ideological toothlessness") to the contention that the President has, in his own innocence, betrayed the finest ideals of the G.O.P.: "The Republican Party, under Mr. Eisenhower, is in danger of suffering the final humiliation: it is coming to resemble Mr. Eisenhower's own descriptions of his political philosophy: it is becoming, in a word, incoherent." Perhaps; but Mr. Buckley will have to learn to bite harder than that.

Just as the Russians resisted all disarmament pro-

PAMPHILUS