other—in their programs of economic assistance to underdeveloped areas, in their exhibitions at the Brussels Fair, in their own economic systems—what is really at issue is a system of values—a world view. More than the fate of rival imperialisms may be decided by economics. What may be decided are the principles by which the world will live.

This is a fact which, somehow, has failed to be realized by many of the American people. But here, surely, is one area where ethics and foreign policy meet—unambiguously. Both the national security and moral concern demand, unequivocally, that this nation's programs of economic assistance to the underdeveloped areas of the world be strengthened. And yet, a number of Americans continue to insist that they should be cut.

Professor John C. Bennett has written: "Within human history we may not see the kingdoms of this world become the Kingdom of God, but we may see among them in many places and at many times . . . corporate acts of justice which truly embody the grace and power of that Kingdom."

Economic assistance to peoples struggling against poverty is one of these corporate acts. It is also a field on which the issues of the Cold War are being pressed most vigorously by the Soviet Union. The United States must here attend most carefully both to its own values and to its own defense.

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**in the magazines**

"To those who have any appreciation of the perils which surround us," writes Dean Acheson in the Summer issue of the *Yale Review*, "... a moralistic approach to foreign relations—and by this I mean one which attempts to apply the maxims or ideology of moral teaching—seems ill-adapted to the complexity of the task."

The Acheson article, entitled "Morality, Moralism and Diplomacy," indicates some of the issues which our moral principles (or prejudices) have tended to oversimplify, such as: colonialism and the "right of self-determination," the threat of Communist imperialism, the question of neutrality, the principle of "open covenants openly arrived at," the horror of nuclear warfare, and the use of force. Even if our sentiments on these subjects, as projected in our foreign policy, were more cleanly derived from ethical conviction, "one cannot find in ethics and aesthetics, alone, a complement of tools for dealing with the relations between states. Into these relationships enter factors governed by forces which operate in the physical rather than the metaphysical world. There also enters human conduct, which all too often is neither moral nor ethical nor controllable by exhortation."

Rather than invoke ideal principles to govern our acts, Mr. Acheson recommends that we adopt the moral attitude of Lincoln, which disclosed "what we might call a strategic, as against an ideologically approach to great and complicated problems" and which consisted of "stating principles in terms of their purpose and effect without characterizing them as moral or immoral." Mr. Acheson counsels us to improve the methods by which foreign relations are conducted—"here we can and should aim high"—for it is his belief that "ends of action are not, for the most part, determined by ideals, but the other way around. It has been said that 'Man . . . is born to act. To act is to affirm the worth of an end, and to persist in affirming the worth of an end is to make an ideal."

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In the *Review of Politics* for July, Paul Nitze discusses "The Role of the Learned Man in Government." By "learned man," Mr. Nitze means both the trained specialist exempted from political responsibility and the "man of general wisdom" who, if not exempt, may find the process of political responsibility a stimulating challenge or a burdensome frustration.

The learned man in government, Mr. Nitze shows, frequently finds himself—or places himself—in a position of limited contribution. "The learned man, or at least the man whose orientation is primarily analytical or academic, finds it difficult to act resolutely within the limits prescribed by the real situation with which, in the realm of government, he is always faced, and finding it difficult he tends to have a distaste for full political responsibility." Or, "not desiring to accept full political responsibility, he nevertheless strives for a free and controlling hand in the guidance of those matters on which his interest focuses. The result is a tendency toward separating responsibility from power, and power from responsibility." The power of decision rests ultimately with those, who are politically accountable. "But learning and wisdom are not the monopoly of those . . . exempted. The hope of the democratic system depends upon the opposite proposition—the proposition that men of general wisdom will in fact be selected to carry political responsibility and accountability." But the fate of "the learned man" in government today is a various one.