

In the August 14 issue of *The Listener*, which publishes the texts of talks broadcast by the BBC, there appears a Third Programme discussion of "The Idea of the Just War" by Gerald Draper. Mr. Draper, a Lecturer in Law in King's College, limits his ground to a legal and historical exposition of the just war theory, tracing its development from the Romans, through the various contributions of Augustine, Aquinas, and Grotius, up to the Hague Peace Conferences, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and the United Nations Charter. The main point that emerges from this survey is that the law of war which regulates the conduct as well as the conditions of the just war has been only recently established.

With the Romans, a war was "just and pious" that was favored by the gods, and was usually carried out to avenge a wrong done Rome. This made Roman warfare of Republican times a matter of less brutality than under the Empire when such religious and moral motives declined. Savagery and brutality in war persisted into the Middle Ages and, for some of the early Church fathers who speculated on the compatibility of soldiering and Christianity, "the Roman idea of the just and pious war shorn of its pagan and ceremonial associations was ready to hand." It remained for Aquinas to formulate the famous three conditions of the just war, one of which—the just cause—led to the sanction by which soldiers became "the flail of God who by permission make wars upon sinners . . . in this world as the devils of hell do in the next." Like famine and pestilence, wars were seen by the legal medieval mind as God's judgment of death against the guilty, and so medieval warfare continued "unspeakably cruel and barbarous."

In the modern era, when war became "the instrument, not of God for the punishment of the wicked, but of the national policy," just causes were no longer legally relevant: all wars were just. But, as Mr. Draper points out, it was at the time when the concept of the just war was practically abandoned that most progress was made toward establishing a code of war governing the conduct of hostilities, the treatment of prisoners, wounded, civilian populations, etc. The Kellogg-Briand Pact, and the UN Charter after it, placed further restrictions upon cause, so that in effect the idea of the just war is now reinstated. But the danger of violation remains: "As long as [the doctrine] keeps within its proper sphere it can advance international order, but unchecked it can present us with either a return to the medieval predicament that in a just war everything was lawful or to the nineteenth-century one in which all wars were lawful."

A restatement of the legal principles of the just

war is the first of four recommendations made in the latest issue of *Cross Currents* by Rear Admiral Sir Anthony Buzzard, former Director of British Naval Intelligence. Admiral Buzzard's proposals would, he feels, help to close the gap between moral considerations and Western defense policy. Apart from redefining the just war, he insists that the West make a distinction between limited atomic war and total war: "Until that distinction has been made it is impossible to relax the race in total war weapons." To this end, "we should openly accept the global balance of power in terms of total war weapons . . . and unilaterally renounce our intention of ever fighting a total global war through to a finish." Thirdly, we should attempt to restore the local balance of power by concentrating on limited atomic weapons and by persuading the world that that "limited atomic war can be limited, that it need not spread to total war." Fourthly, we should avoid having to use total war weapons in the event of Communist aggression in Germany by building up local forces in that area.

Admiral Buzzard sees these proposals as only the beginning, for "nothing more ambitious than these will be accepted at the moment. I maintain that nothing less will meet the present urgent situation, where time is not on our side."

Changes within the Soviet system, and how we interpret them, are fundamental to speculation about our foreign policy. Marshall D. Shulman, writing in the current issue of *World Politics*, surveys the impressions of Soviet conduct drawn by such observers as George Kennan, Isaac Deutscher, and Henry Roberts, and indicates several directions the future is likely to take. Professor Shulman quite dashes any liberal hopes for a "normalization" of Russian affairs. Despite the imponderables which the situation holds, it is equally possible that the Soviet Union may emerge a "more highly differentiated and stabilized state, perhaps less totalitarian . . . but still collectivized, authoritarian and heavily centralized, under the direction of a single party, which encompasses within itself the pluralist interests of a complex industrial order."

One certainty that follows from this assumption is that we shall have to accept the Soviet system as "an alternative form of the organization of society in the age of industrialism." The two powers will then confront each other in the broadest terms of national purpose, as measured by the most effective utilization of human and material resources. Whether the democratic process will be equal to this challenge, and to the evolutions it implies, is, as Professor Shulman puts it, "the central dilemma." "The full measure of political genius of the American people will be needed for the task."

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