

RUSSIA AND THE WEST

Notes of Discord and Hope

Philip E. Mosely

The Soviet Union is a powerful military state today and it is continually growing stronger. Estimates vary widely as to whether it is one year, two years or five years ahead of the West in the development of the intercontinental missile, but there is almost general agreement that it is substantially ahead of us in a timetable in which the development from one stage to the next depends upon first achieving certain scientific and engineering break-throughs and then advancing from those. In other words, this is not the kind of developmental time lag which can be made up easily, if at all.

The Soviet government maintains a very large conventional force, with which it could, under certain conditions, overrun adjacent areas if it chose to. It is developing at the same time a very powerful deterrent. While it probably has fewer modern aircraft than we do, by attacking first it might place us in a position of serious, even fatal, inferiority in the field of manned aircraft. And it has a clear advantage over the West as we move into the age of the intercontinental ballistic missile.

The Soviet leadership is very conscious of this military advantage. In the past year and a half it has repeatedly threatened a large number of nations around the world by blunt reminders that they are vulnerable to attack by its guided missiles. The fact that it now feels free to use the atomic threat, even before it has a large number of missiles in operational status, shows how very confident it is, in fact, how arrogant it has become with the growth of this new type of power. At the present time, it is not safe to assume that there is a mutual deterrent. It is possible that the balance of deterrents will pass to the Soviet side in this struggle. We must consider the implications of this, both for ourselves and for our allies.

If a war should develop, it would be waged directly against the United States, and its purpose would be to destroy our retaliatory power as quickly as possible in order to protect the Soviet Union

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against retaliation and to remove the decisive bargaining factor of the threat of retaliation. I am reluctant to write this but, frankly, I do not know of any moral or political factor which would inhibit the Soviet leadership from engaging in a preventive war if it felt it could do so to its own advantage and with relative impunity. I wish it were not so. It is not pleasant to have to say this even about the Soviet leaders, but I think from all we can see and examine in their attitudes that this is a factor we must keep in mind. We must remember that the Soviet leaders do not have any constitutional, moral, political or religious inhibitions that would prevent them from attacking. Their only question is: "Would it work?" If they answer "Yes" they would be confident of ruling the world afterwards, of rewriting history and dictating their own version of it for future generations to read.

- After Stalin died, his successors discarded a number of annoying, useless and even counter-productive attitudes and policies which they had not been able to change as long as Stalin was alive. They agreed to evacuate Austria. They gave up their territorial claims against Turkey. They came to a kind of settlement with Tito. They withdrew from their base in Finland. They came to a settlement with Iran and agreed on the frontiers with Iran and Afghanistan.

In addition, the new Soviet leaders speeded removal of some annoyances which, as I said, were counter-productive. They made an armistice in Korea and came to a compromise in Indo-China, accepting much less than the Communist bloc had hoped to achieve there. They joined in the Geneva Summit Conference in 1955, but—and this is rather typical of the difficulties we have—as soon as the Conference was over, they hastened to make an arms agreement with Egypt. Khrushchev, indeed, opened a new area of acute conflict in the Middle East at the very time he was talking at the Summit about peace and relaxation.

And this is because, when Khrushchev says that the close of the twentieth century will see the triumph of Communism throughout the world, he really means it. The Manifesto that was issued last November at the fortieth anniversary of the Soviet revolution, and which the Yugoslav government refused to sign, again stated Khrushchev's belief in the inevitable triumph of the Communist system, particularly the Soviet version of it, throughout the world.

Khrushchev's speech of February 1956, restating the Soviet doctrine in world politics, has been mistakenly accepted in the West as an abandonment of Stalinist dogma. At this time he put forward three

statements, or restatements, of doctrine, and these were widely hailed as representing a new era. But if we look more closely, they are seen to be standard Soviet dogma, dressed up more attractively.

Khrushchev's first dogma was that peaceful co-existence is possible. Now, when the Soviet leaders say "co-existence" of different social and political systems, they are merely stating the fact that different systems *do* exist in the world, and are not involved in conflict at all times and places. At times conflict may be carried on by peaceful means, by means short of war; at other times it may be by warlike means. Whenever the Soviet leaders wish to reestablish a basis for negotiations with countries not of the Communist persuasion, they at once call for "co-existence," as in 1921, and repeatedly since that time. But when they say "peaceful co-existence," for domestic purposes they add "at a given stage of history." In other words, at this stage of history "co-existence" suits Soviet interests and is what they propagate; at another stage, they may return to the doctrine of the "final struggle." Whichever they choose at a given time depends on how they view it in relation to their own interests and strength. Thus Khrushchev's proclamation of peaceful co-existence is no different from what Stalin proclaimed in October 1952.

A second statement of dogma by Khrushchev has been that "war is not inevitable." This he interprets as follows: Because one-third of mankind is now in "the camp of peace and democracy," and because this camp is very strong, and because there are divisions in the rest of the world, war is not inevitable. He does not say war is not inevitable because different countries can agree to work out their differences peacefully and within international organization. He asserts that the balance of power has shifted so far to the Soviet side that the leaders of the opposing bloc, which he calls the "imperialist bloc," will be deterred from embarking on a war. (Khrushchev also says that war is possible as long as capitalism survives. He holds the view that the origins of war are found in capitalism, not in any Soviet policies, and that as long as capitalism survives the danger of war persists.)

Khrushchev's third dogma, again a restatement of Stalin's last views, is that there can be a peaceful transition to "socialism"—by which he means the Communist system—by different paths. At different times both Khrushchev and Stalin have cited the coup in Czechoslovakia, in February 1948, as a shining example of the advent of Communism through peaceful transition and the "parliamentary path."

This is not an example that appeals to any freedom-loving country. As we all recall, the seizure of power in Czechoslovakia was accompanied by the arbitrary seizure of control of the police and the arrest, torture, exile or execution of the leaders of other parties, the immediate transformation of all newspapers into single-party Communist organs, and the coordination of all aspects of national life under Communist control by means of force. And when that was over, the Communists held an election and elected a bloc which then proceeded one-hundred percent to approve everything the Communist leadership had already done. This is what Khrushchev calls the "parliamentary path to socialism" because parliamentary forms were preserved while their entire substance was being destroyed by the Communist *Putsch*.

Khrushchev makes it clear that, even though this path is possible in some conditions, there will be other countries in which only an armed struggle will lead to the establishment of "socialism." There is thus no real difference between Stalin's and Khrushchev's attitudes, but there are differences in tactics. Since Stalin's death Khrushchev and his colleagues have attempted to appeal to non-Communist governments for negotiations, especially if they happen to be rather weak. Instead of appealing only to the broad masses to overthrow all non-Communist governments, they have been active in trying to align their policies to those of the "peace bloc," or third force of uncommitted countries, in order to build up a common front between the policies of the Soviet bloc and the policies of the bloc which we can identify in part at least with the leadership of India.

A parallel effort to appeal to the democratic socialists in the various Western countries has been an almost complete failure. The attempts to woo the British Labour Party, the French Socialists, the Norwegian Socialists, and others have backfired. But by making these efforts to bring about a realignment on some issues with the socialist parties in Europe, the Soviet leaders lend a greater plausibility to their efforts to build up a "popular front" or a "national front" in their dealings with the less experienced socialists in the Asian countries.

In its propaganda the Soviet leadership has made a strong appeal against all forms of security pacts except its own. It has never been heard to utter a word of criticism of the Sino-Soviet pact, one of the most powerful in the world. It has, however, offered to give up the Warsaw pact in return for the dissolution of NATO and the withdrawal of U. S., British, and Canadian forces from Western Europe and the abandonment of all overseas bases.

Now, of course, within the Warsaw bloc the Soviet government can exercise control through the Communist party leaderships of the East European countries. A treaty between governments is not needed to control the actions of a government like that of Czechoslovakia or Rumania. Soviet attacks on security pacts allow the Soviet leaders to propose, in effect, the dissolution of all opposing alliances while they would preserve their own bloc in the form of party agreements.

The Soviet leadership combines the threatening brandishing of its military power, its nuclear power and its missiles, with appeals for various types of limitations in the field of armaments. It is of course natural for any government to propose those types of limitations which are favorable on balance to its power, but the Soviet proposals on the whole have been perhaps even more blatant than others in striving to achieve the withdrawal and weakening of allied forces while maintaining their own intact.

A new and ominous aspect of Soviet policy has been the use of its obsolescent armaments to strengthen governments which are unfriendly toward the West, as in the case of Egypt or the United Arab Republic. This we cannot protest, of course, as long as we ourselves do the same thing. On the other hand, perhaps we can, over a period of time, try to arrive at some sort of agreement in this field, perhaps mutual abstention or mutual limitation, because arms payments can be ruinous to the economies of poor countries, as well as very dangerous to peace, not only in the local regions themselves, but in the world.

In a world in which these tremendous destructive powers are straining to get loose, we must try in every way to get a more truthful picture across to the Soviet people and to the other peoples in the Soviet bloc. We will have to review our policy toward

Communist China and see if we cannot work it out on a different basis, without giving up Formosa, but without assuming that we can in any way substantially affect the strength of Communist China by refusing to deal with it. One very great danger is that today, if a threat arises somewhere in the world, we will not have time to recognize the threat and time to make up our minds whether or not we ought to do something about it, and a matter of a few hours might be decisive. One of our great problems will be our psychological attitude toward this menacing foreshortening of time.

We have moved rapidly from the world of pre-1914 or pre-1939, in which we assumed we did not need much military power. We must give thought to our problem, consider the uses of power for deterrence, and protect the opportunity of the free world to develop its own system and its own way of life despite this overhanging menace. We must work harder than we have up to now at trying to make it clear around the world that over a period of time there may be opportunities for gradually working our way to a better international agreement.

We must always be in a position where we are willing to negotiate, when any negotiations are possible. There may be, over a period of time, ways in which we can achieve partial goals. By alleviating strains in limited areas, we may make openings into the psychological texture on the other side to bring about a better understanding of the free world.

I am hopeful that by pursuing a strong but reasonable policy we can reach through, not to change the Soviet system, but to soften its purposes. We cannot impose a relaxation on the Soviet leadership, but we can conduct our policies in such a way that the Soviet leaders will no longer be able to conceal from their own people the desire of the West to achieve genuine coexistence, based on the enduring acceptance of the right of each people to decide its own way of life.

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