

The American's perennial search for his identity is as much a feature of our socio-political commentary as of our literature. Who we are and why we are failing the challenge of the times is the subject of two perceptive, but otherwise wholly disparate, articles among the current crop. Both David S. McLellan in the *Yale Review* and Dwight Macdonald in *Dissent* locate our failure in a lack of "style," but beyond this their articles differ widely in orientation, temper, and objective.

Mr. McLellan, who teaches political science at the University of California, surveys "Style and Substance in American Foreign Policy" and finds that what passes for "policy" is largely based on cultural dispositions and certain intractable elements in our social structure. For example, we deal, or refuse to deal, instinctually, with personalities (Adenauer, Nehru, Chiang Kai-shek, Nasser, Magsaysay, King Saud, etc.) rather than conceptually, with the political dynamics of a given society. "The desire for quick and easy solutions," the author writes, "and the business community's virtual incapacity to project foreign policy other than in narrow economic terms, reinforce a cultural tendency to stress individual relations rather than objective economic and political considerations." Reviewing the record of crises and diplomatic blunders, Mr. McLellan concludes that we are weak because we are unwilling to "enter fully into the political process . . . We are intellectually lazy and politically uneducated . . . The material wealth and broad ideological consensus that exists within our society has lessened our need for political wisdom and insight vital to the effective understanding and leadership of others."

The "broad ideological consensus" (known also as "the American way of life") that is here indicted is subjected to further attack by Dwight Macdonald. In "America! America!" Mr. Macdonald, lately returned from Europe, contributes a series of bitter and wrathful pronouncements upon the state of American affairs. He rakes the whole field: the manners, the crime rate, the brutalized landscape, the corruption of any moral or spiritual continuity, the cult of youth, the giddy course of foreign and domestic relations, the slackening of vigilance beneath the weight of facile "Progress," the economy glutted by "outré refinements"; and when he is finished, so, in effect, are we. His assessment of the U. S. as a world power reveals, perhaps, our frailty at its most perilous: "Americans appear to other nations to be somehow at once gross and sentimental, immature and tough, uncultivated and hypocritical, shrewd about small things and stupid about big things. In these antinomies fatally appears our lack of style."

In the Autumn number of *The American Scholar*, A. A. Berle, Jr. advances the thesis that the world struggle of the past fifty years "has not been, and is not now, a formless chaos of anarchic conflict. I believe it is, in essence, a vast, somewhat confused, but yet traceable struggle toward order and toward life." As factors in the "new world crisis," Mr. Berle lists the economic interdependence of all nations, the rise in populations, the uses of technology, and the universal demand of all peoples to share in the profits of productivity and distribution.

Mr. Berle sees these evolutions as pointing to some breakthrough in the political stalemates of Mid-Europe, the Near and Far East. "The time has come," he writes, "when . . . both the West and the East are likely to consider seriously reasonable global plans. This is not because of a sudden conversion to internationalist faith. It is, quite simply, because the forces with which we all work, whether in economics or in international ballistics missiles, are themselves world-wide—and no other solutions make sense."

"What we call the United Nations today is not what the United Nations started out to be," writes Hans J. Morgenthau in the November *Commentary*. The complex structure of the UN, as it was conceived and as it is set in operation by the "realities of political practice," is appraised with an eye to what we can logically expect the organization to accomplish. In an illuminating study, Professor Morgenthau examines the bi-polarization of power within the Security Council that has caused the transformation of the General Assembly into the dominant political agency on the UN; the historic changes effected in the composition of the General Assembly by the admission of twenty new members in 1955-56; the resultant shift in function of the Secretary General; and the development of "a new UN diplomacy" derived from the voting procedures of the Assembly.

To what extent Chiang Kai-shek's hopes of revolution on the China mainland are grounded in fact has been a subject of increasing curiosity and speculation in this country. A pertinent report in the November 2 issue of the *New York Times Magazine* by Richard Huges, British correspondent and veteran observer of the Asian scene, reveals that, for reasons as various and complicated as Chinese society itself, there is little chance that Mao will be toppled, and even less chance that Chiang will be hailed.

PAMPHILUS