

THE VARIETIES OF DIPLOMACY

They Provide a Means of Adjusting Disputes Among Nations

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In the world of the mid-twentieth century, dictation by any one power is impossible and wholesale agreement to federate is utopian. We must therefore look for any possible agreement only on a retail basis, and this is a task for diplomatists. The choice is not whether to engage in diplomacy but how best to do so; that is, what tools to use in what combination. And how to make these tools as sharp and as precise as possible.

In the adjustment of disputes between state members of a multiple sovereignty system (that is, between states which cannot ordinarily coerce each other except at the risk of war), there are several broad avenues through which in theory at least the difficulty may be adjusted. The first method is one which is not ordinarily mentioned, at least in the guides to diplomatic practice or the treatises on international law. This is the method of letting time work for you. It is the method of obsolescence. Although the Anglo-American fisheries dispute was finally settled by arbitration after it had dragged on for more than a century, it probably could not have been arbitrated in the first decades of the country's existence when it was a major source of conflict between the two countries. The Wars of Religion were never fought to a settlement. Rather, they petered out and only time could allow the lesson of inevitable coexistence to be learned.

Perhaps in this era of reciprocal, almost absolute mistrust between the governments of the two superpowers, it is hopeless to try to negotiate away the mistrust. This is not to say that a new climate of confidence cannot be created. It is only to say that it would be difficult today to list the specific acts which either the Soviet Union or the United States would have to perform for the government of the other country to agree that the era of the Cold War was over. On the other hand, a judicious combination of firmness on essentials and conciliation on everything else ought over the years to undermine any belief that a third World War is inevitable. For a consistent firmness should demonstrate that there would be small profit from such a war and persisting conciliation would lessen the danger that such a

war would be deliberately thrust upon our chief competitor.

The method of obsolescence, of letting time work for you, may not require much negotiation, but it requires a great deal of effort just the same. Sound judgments as to when to postpone issues demand just as careful and just as concentrated a diplomatic effort as do decisions to go ahead and press for a solution via active negotiations.

The second method of reacting to a conflict situation, to rely on the country's strength, does not require much active negotiation either. Standing firm and letting one's power back up the decision to stand firm is not a decision to be taken casually. I once heard a very wise government official say that the "function of diplomacy is to find a firm basis for agreement or disagreement, as the case may be." War under modern conditions is such a terrible thing that it is irresponsible in the highest degree to adopt a position of intransigence, with its implied willingness to accept war if the other side continues to press, unless the basis of the disagreement has been made crystal clear by the most painstaking diplomatic effort. Similarly, it may be irresponsible to pile up armaments which bear no relation to the asserted goals of foreign policy. An organization of United States strategic air power which appeared to the world to be more efficient for a preventive-war first strike than for a retaliatory second strike would seem to give the lie to repeated assertions that ours was a strategy of deterrence.

There is a time for firmness and there are circumstances that call for high-level defense mobilization even in peacetime. More than at any time in previous American history, during the period since the second World War the armed forces of the United States have been essential tools of a diplomacy whose main objective was to contain an aggressive and expansionist opponent.

A third way in which interstate disputes may be adjusted is the method of negotiation. Here it is not delay or firmness but the discovery of a mutually acceptable basis for terminating the dispute which provides the solution. I have already described the function of diplomacy as being the search for a firm

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basis for agreement or disagreement, whichever the case may be. Where it finds a firm basis for agreement a satisfactory solution need not depend entirely on the superior strength or the greater firmness of one's own side, but on a genuine consensus.

Sometimes there can be agreement about the legal norms which are to be applied even though there may be disagreement as to how to apply these norms. In such cases, particularly when a government wishes to "get itself off the hook" at least before domestic public opinion, arbitration and judicial settlement look particularly attractive. This use of a third party to define a basis for settlement which the two parties are unable to discover for themselves is a fourth method of adjusting interstate disputes.

A fifth way of diplomacy is the method of international organization, to set up new norms of state behavior. Of course, no general international organization today has any real legislative power. On the other hand, debates in such places as the General Assembly of the United Nations permit appeals to world public opinion and contribute to fashioning the norms of socially acceptable state behavior.

I should emphasize that these various methods of adjusting interstate relations—whether by appeals to time, to strength, to the free bargaining process, to legal norms, or to the conscience of the world—are only logically but not practically separate ways of conducting foreign relations. Timing is critical to the success of any method; there has to be negotiation to discover the basis for throwing down the gauntlet; there has to be negotiation to discover the basis for arbitration; United Nations debate may, by letting off steam, allow a dispute to become obsolete. It is wrong to view any of these methods of adjustment as ends in themselves, not the building up of armed strength and not even the expansion of general international organization. It requires diplomatic judgment of the highest order to know how to combine the various lines of action open to a government. It requires a similar quality of judgment to know when and how far and how to rely on such specifically national instruments for promoting foreign policy objectives—tools of diplomacy in the narrow sense—as armed strength, economic and technical aid, and psychological strategy.

If the stakes of peace are higher and the tasks of diplomacy more complex, the United States has at any rate cast off a number of self-imposed limitations on its own government's freedom to negotiate. The myth which has prevailed since at least the time of Oliver Cromwell that a nation of patriots would instantaneously and automatically arise in the time of crisis to defend their country, thus making a peacetime standing army largely unnecessary, is no longer so strong. The dogma of no prior commit-

ment no longer stands in the way of a strategy of deterrence based on a combination of defensive alliance, military aid and high level peacetime mobilization.

This dogma of no prior commitment has previously operated to prevent a prospective European aggressor from discovering he would have to reckon with American opposition. We could not develop a strategy of deterrence before the second World War because this dogma prevented the country from being able to discover in advance its own intentions in the event of such a war. When Secretary Hull said to the Italian ambassador in July 1937 that the United States, "while taking every precaution to keep aloof from political and military involvements abroad, strongly feels that each civilized country right now has the unshirkable responsibility of making a real contribution to promote peace," what the world took note of was the reference to America's continued aloofness from political and military involvement. Similarly, as late as June 1940, Secretary Hull was still having to tell the British ambassador that "short of a serious risk of actual military hostilities" everything possible was being done to keep the Japanese situation stabilized. Here again the plain implication was that if the Japanese were prepared to fight about the matter at issue, the United States could not say in advance how it would behave.

By contrast, in 1959 a strategy of deterrence can be based not only on the firm alliance of the North Atlantic Pact and the high level defense mobilization of the last fifteen years, but also on a military assistance program which has provided the basis for continuing peacetime coalition military planning in detail. Incidentally, the number of professional military men serving abroad in quasi-diplomatic capacities as members of MAAG (Military Assistance Advisory Groups) missions is almost as great as the number of professional Foreign Service officers.

One may contrast also the shift in the climate of American opinion regarding a membership in the world court and the United Nations. Thus in 1935 after every President of the United States and every Secretary of State had been advocating U. S. membership in the world court for a decade, Father Charles E. Coughlin was able to extol—when the Senate finally failed to ratify the treaty which would bring about American membership in the Permanent Court of International Justice—"the aroused people of the United States who, by more than two hundred thousand telegrams containing at least one million names, demanded that the principles established by Washington and Jefferson shall keep us clear from foreign entanglements and European hatreds."

It is inevitable that, in a decade when security is so much at the center of our concern, military policy should seem to be so integrally related to foreign policy. The broad strategy of deterrence perhaps

requires very little active negotiating effort *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union or Red China, but it may require a very real diplomatic effort to deepen and broaden the coalition. It is a strategy designed to give time and obsolescence a chance to operate in the main crisis of total mistrust, while diplomacy and capacity to stand firm against the prospect of limited aggressions reduce the backlog of specific disputes.

One of the ironies of the present domestic political situation is that the President of the United States, with a professional military background, is describing some of the Democratic Congressmen as "wild spenders" when some of these same Congressmen are pressing for increased expenditures on national defense. Although one now hears less frequently any reference to "massive retaliation", there are still many who would like to see our strategic air power, and our guided missile power as it emerges, used both for deterrence and for massive retaliation.

The alternative view is that in the era of the balance of terror one needs to have enough capability for local and limited war to dictate to the other side that it can't have certain things, such as South Korea or West Berlin, unless it accepts the risk of the big war. This objective is to be achieved partly by military assistance and partly by developing a flexible and mobile American military power and, of course, partly by stationing American forces abroad. Thus it calls for two kinds of American defense effort, the effort to deter the big war and the effort to prevent the local aggression. Two kinds of defense are obviously more expensive than one. (Whether those who favor the cheaper mode of defense, the one involving relatively greater reliance on strategic air power, are more pacific than the others I will leave for the reader to determine.)

In the era in which direct diplomatic negotiations with the Soviet Union and members of the Soviet bloc have proved so frustrating, there has been a much greater scope for diplomacy in our relations with our partners in the free world alliance and with the neutrals. Particularly toward our NATO partners has there been the opportunity and indeed the necessity to put flesh on the bones of the North Atlantic Pact by the most detailed military planning and collaborative build-up of defense forces.

The Czech coup and Berlin airlift of 1948, the achievement by the Soviet Union of its first nuclear explosion in 1949, and the Korean aggression of 1950 provided the series of shocks which both gave an opportunity and created a necessity. As was true of the military staff conversations between France and England in the decade before 1914, detailed military planning seems, if anything, to have outrun diplomatic and political planning. Stated another way, it is one measure of NATO's success that immediate apprehension has in recent years declined to the point at which the members of NATO have

talked more and more about expanding its functions as would be permitted by Article II. This would mean giving NATO some non-military functions.

One cannot, alas, report any success in America's relations with the unaligned powers of Africa and Asia corresponding to the success which it has had in NATO and perhaps also in Latin America and parts of East Asia. In this era of inverted imperialism, when the ex-colonial powers are being wooed from both Washington and Moscow, the United States ought not to be surpassed in economic and technical aid. Here, if anywhere, our great industrial potential ought to be made to work. Toward the Soviet Union our diplomacy has, of course, still the function of finding a firm basis for disagreement so long as it cannot find a firm basis for agreement. It cannot, certainly, fail to persist in its quest for the latter.

As for the International Court of Justice and various other arbitral tribunals, there is not much evidence that they are yet able to bear the load of settling disputes which, without the court or the tribunal, would have been settled by war. In the more optimistic era when men of good will believed in the growth of democracy and international understanding through more widespread education and cultural contacts, it was expected that there would remain only a small number of disputes, all of which could be taken to court for judicial or arbitral settlement. Thus international courts and arbitral tribunals seemed to be the logical capstone to the whole structure of international peace. Focussing on international arbitration and judicial settlement had the further advantage of directing attention away from a hidden fissure in the solidarity of the peace movement. Those who would achieve national security by perfecting collective security arrangements and those who saw war itself as the real enemy were likely to be divided as a war crisis approached. Prior to the crisis they could, however, find common ground in their devotion to arbitration and judicial settlement.

The United Nations has been, if anything, oversold. It is a mechanism, not an organism. It is a specialized instrument, not a maid of all work. Through it, appeals to world opinion are possible which cannot otherwise be made. Unfortunately, world opinion does not at the moment include Iron Curtain public opinion. If one contrasts the effect on Soviet public opinion of the debates in the UN at the time of the Hungarian crisis with the effects on Britain and France of the debates during the same weeks on the Suez crisis, the point is, I think, clearly established. This is what I call the forum-function of the United Nations. It is a function which is capable of abuse as well as of use. There is not much use in simply engaging in a fishwife exchange of

epithets with one's leading opponents within the precincts of the United Nations. If it is necessary to say highly unpleasant things about these opponents, they can sometimes be as well said on a variety of other platforms.

A second main function of the United Nations is its conciliating function. This it seems to have performed better among the members of the free world than it has across the main chasm of Soviet-American dispute. While Ambassador Jessup and Chief Soviet Delegate Malik did engage in conversations in the UN which had the effect of bringing an end to the earlier crisis of West Berlin, it was in a sense an accident that these conversations occurred in New York rather than in Washington or Moscow. In Israel and Indonesia, the existence of the organization probably brought forth a solution of the dispute between the former parts of the fragmenting empires and the metropolitan countries to which they had formerly owed allegiance—a solution different from that which would have occurred in the absence of the UN.

The conciliating function of the UN is distinct. Here the object is not to win a case before the bar of world opinion by indicting the opponent as the representative of all that is evil. It is rather by timely action to prevent violence or to halt it if it has begun, and then by the patient investigation of facts and opposing claims to narrow the dispute to its minimum and put forward some basis for settlement. It is perhaps in regulating the relations between the new sovereignties carved out of the old empires and the metropolitan empires themselves that this function has been most successfully performed. The point should be made, however, that the UN has been more successful in cementing the cracks on our side of the Iron Curtain than it has been in narrowing the great breach which separates the opposing power blocs in today's world politics.

It is with respect to the UN's third function that the UN differs most from the League at the same time that it resembles it the most. A variety of provisions in the UN Charter were meant to make the United Nations an efficient instrument for the enforcement of peace and security. Each member was to make an agreement with the Security Council regarding its contributions to sanctions. Military sanctions could be ordered from the very first, once an aggression had been certified as having occurred. Immediately available national air contingents would presumably permit the prompt imposition of severe sanctions. In fact, what Chapter Seven gave, the veto and the bipolar power pattern of the postwar world took away. It is true that there is a veto in the Charter, but it is also true that there is another kind of veto in the prevailing power pattern. It is an irony that in the era before 1914 there were eight great powers, seven of them collectively capable of coerc-

ing the eighth. Today there are two first-ranking powers. Two is too few to collect.

In spite of the apparent exception at the beginning of the Korean War when the Soviet representative in the Security Council was careless enough to stay away from a critical vote, one cannot say that the UN is fulfilling in any significant degree the expectations of the Spring of 1945—at least those expectations held by educated Americans of good will who believed the United States had erred in failing to join the League of Nations.

Whatever pattern is chosen for adjusting a given interstate dispute in this multiple-sovereignty world—whether it is via organization, negotiation, dictation, or attempts to put the dispute on ice—the diplomatist needs to be backed up by a variety of resources which one can properly describe as tools for achieving national policy objectives. The most obvious is the armed force of the state. In the postwar period, foreign aid, psychological strategy, coalition military planning and, most recently, scientific prestige have been widely publicized as effective additional tools. I should point out, however, that while I have been writing about many things I have said practically nothing about policy objectives.

Neither massed power nor adroit diplomacy can be used except in conjunction with each other. More important, the two cannot be used together except when they are efficiently related to some specific set of foreign policy objectives. The American people would, for example, today hardly be willing to sacrifice roughly one-tenth of the gross national product to build up the nation's military power, unless the stated foreign policy objectives requiring that military build-up commanded extremely wide support. Furthermore, the nation's foreign policy objectives need to command the support of a very wide coalition. These objectives need to be stated with considerable precision and delicacy if our allies of today are not to come to think that there is greater danger in being protected by us than in being unaligned. Some diplomatists abroad, for example, may recall the example of Florence in the era of Machiavelli. The great powers had been summoned from across the Alps, invited to intervene in Italian affairs. It was impossible to get them to go home.

The objectives also have to be stated carefully if we are to have the non-aligned powers of the world, countries like Sweden, Switzerland and India, remain benevolently neutral. What I am saying is that it "pays", because it is the best psychological strategy, to have good foreign policy objectives. This is no doubt the world's poorest reason for having good objectives, but we ought not to forget that there are some special penalties connected with having bad ones.