in the magazines

*Foreign Affairs* has scored something of a coup by becoming the first American magazine to publish an article by the Premier of the Soviet Union. Mr. Khrushchev’s contribution, which appears in the October issue of *Foreign Affairs*, contains all of the major points and proposals which were extensively aired in public statements during his trip to this country. There is the assurance that the Soviet Union desires peace, the proposal of peaceful coexistence as the only alternative to war, the disavowal of intervention in the internal affairs of “capitalist” nations, the insistence on framing the issues of the Cold War as a struggle between two economic systems, with the suggestion that we “live and let live” while history proves the superiority of “socialism.”

Mr. Khrushchev, perhaps in anticipation of his United Nations address, does not mention his plans for disarmament here, but he devotes much space to his position on the Berlin question and to his program for establishing trade between the U. S. and the U.S.S.R. He warns against any talk of “rolling back” Communism, saying that such a policy “can only poison the international atmosphere, heighten the tension between states and work in favor of the Cold War.”

In its September issue, *Western World* publishes a debate on the question, “Scientists in World Politics, Asset or Liability?” Senator Kenneth B. Keating of New York takes the view that scientists can best serve their governments in an advisory capacity but that, in a democracy, they may not usurp the power of political office for taking decisions which reflect the will of the majority. Apart from the danger of concentrating power in the hands of specialists, which is to a great extent precluded by our democratic institutions, there is a vital distinction to be made between political and scientific thinking. Unlike the scientist, Senator Keating writes, “the political leader is called upon to take decisions in a field where there can be no certainty and no sure test until years afterward—the jungle of human relations in a semi-anarchical world. He must not only confront a unique situation, but within it discern the best long-term policy, decide how much of it is practical at the given moment, and then persuade his people to support it.”

Dr. Pascual Jordan, professor of theoretical physics at the University of Hamburg, argues that the scientist’s objectivity depends on “an atmosphere of intellectual freedom,” and that, therefore, scientists cannot divorce their work from “the effort to insure the continued existence of the democratic sphere of life.” Scientists, Dr. Jordan continues, should not remain aloof from the democratic community. But the increasing importance of the scientist’s knowledge to government decisions does not justify his assuming the role of policy-maker. “We cannot expect miracles from scientists; and the scientist would be misjudging his own position in the modern world if he were to regard himself as destined to be a political miracle-man. . . . The unfamiliar perils that alarm us today can be resisted and narrowed down only through the closest cooperation between our political institutions and the scientists.”

“Since 1945, the American government has devoted the better part of our national energies to preparations for wholesale human extermination. This curious enterprise has been disguised as a scientifically sound method of ensuring world peace and national security, but it has obviously failed at every point on both counts.” Lewis Mumford, writing in the October issue of *The Atlantic*, locates the beginning of our “one-sided, obsessive preoccupation with nuclear weapons” in our World War II adoption of the tactic called “oblation bombing.” “More than any other event that has taken place in modern times,” he writes, “this sudden radical change-over from war to collective extermination reversed the whole course of human history.”

Together with this change-over in military strategy, there occurred a “moral breakdown,” the total nature of which, Mr. Mumford declares, “can be gauged by a single fact: most Americans do not realize that this change has taken place or, worse, that it makes any difference. They have no consciousness of either the magnitude of their collective sin or the fact that, by their silence, they have individually condoned it.” Mr. Mumford believes that we might have rectified our adoption of atomic power in the years before Russia produced her own bomb by creating through the UN the necessary moral and political safeguards against its misuse. Instead, we used Russia’s persistent rejection of our proposals as an excuse for abandoning all further effort. Thus, writes Mr. Mumford, “the difficult became the impossible. . . . The fact that Russia now has equal or better weapons of extermination and has joined us in these same insane preparations doubles our danger but does not halve our original guilt. Neither does it nullify our willful stupidity in now clinging to an obsolete, discredited strategy, based on a negation of morality and a defiance of common sense.”

PAMPHILUS