

National Security and Nuclear Weapons

Deterrence and Defense by Glenn H. Snyder. Princeton University Press. 289 pp. \$6.50. *Strategy and Arms Control* by Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin. The Twentieth Century Fund. 143 pp. \$2.50 cloth, \$1.25 paper.

by Robert A. Gessert

These two books make different, but supplementary, contributions to the growing literature on national security policy. The first is by an author not previously well-known and arises out of several years of individual reflection and analysis at the Center of International Studies at Princeton University. In the second, Thomas Schelling, familiar to anyone who has followed recent literature on strategy and arms control, is joined by a younger colleague at Harvard University's Center for International Affairs in presenting many insights emerging from the 1960 Summer Study on Arms Control sponsored by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

Glenn H. Snyder undertakes a comprehensive and systematic analysis of deterrence and defense, terms very much in the foreground of discussions of national security. Frequently they are used to designate alternative policy goals: one aimed at the enemy's will, the other at his power. A deterrence policy is seen as one which seeks to dissuade the opponent from unwanted courses of action by threatening to punish him by inflicting costs which would be greater than his anticipated gains. A defense policy seeks to provide a capacity to diminish the enemy's power should war occur; rather than merely raising the potential cost

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of gains, it tries to deny the enemy the possibility of achieving them.

In its most simple form, deterrence represents a peacetime or Cold War activity aimed at the prevention of hot war. In its pure conception, defense indicates the conduct of war in such a way as to terminate it with the least unfavorable results. Hence the preparedness and declaratory policies, as well as the action policies, associated with deterrence may differ markedly from those associated with defense. Deterrence depends upon threat and the enemy's belief that there is a chance the threat will be carried out. It may be most successful to threaten an irrational response which would increase the damage to both sides. Defense rests, instead, upon relating military power to strategic purpose in ways which are rationally calculated to deplete the enemy's capacity to accomplish his war objectives.

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Concepts of "balance" and "stability" take on different meanings in relation to deterrence and defense. A "deterrent balance" is a balance of terror. A "defense balance" would be the traditional balance of power in which the sides have roughly equivalent total military power. A balance of terror does not require equal power; the balance may be said to be stable insofar as neither side can remove the other's capacity for retaliation. A relatively small number of nuclear weapons deliverable by long-range missiles which are protected by concealment, hardening, or mobility may suffice to deter surprise attack. On the other hand, the increasing possibility that it will take two or more missiles to destroy one target missile in carrying out a "defense" strategy means that neither side may be able to "balance" the other's power. Modern weapons

technology and a missile race may stabilize the balance of terror while making the idea of a balance of power somewhat dubious.

The divergence between deterrence and defense can be overstated but it is easy to see why one can speak of a "gap" existing between them and their associated policies. Debates on national security policy can become conflicts between partisans of deterrence and partisans of defense. Although Snyder does not discuss this, moralists and other concerned citizens sometimes confuse the debate by prematurely choosing sides. Deterrence has the appeal of an attempt to prevent war, though it does so by the dubious procedure of threatening to increase the destructiveness of war should one occur. Defense has the appeal of seeking to minimize the damage of war, though perhaps at the risk of making war more likely. The dilemma of security policy formulation is to combine in a total military establishment and posture the right proportions of capacities, commitments, and plans for both deterring and defending.

Illustrative discussions of security policy dilemmas, as well as advocacies of particular policies, too frequently over-simplify. The sizes of American and Soviet forces alone are estimated and used in the calculations instead of figures for the alliances on each side. Deterrence is considered principally as an issue of preventing direct attack on the territory of the United States and ways of "extending" the deterrence to cover other territories and of "graduating" it to deal with other aggressive moves are placed in this context. Preemption, escalation and "nth nuclear country mischief" are assumed to be major dangers that could quickly lead to all-out nuclear war. Swift response with nuclear weapons at the first signs

of major war is frequently regarded as almost inevitable. Professor Snyder is not satisfied to accept these assumptions and simplifications without critical examination.

One of Snyder's most illuminating and original discussions is his analysis of a strategy of "limited retaliation" which may be appropriate for some forms of a war in Europe. Such a strategy has been relatively neglected in the general literature though it would clearly combine the goals of deterrence and defense. The response to aggression would be nuclear but carefully limited in order not to trigger the aggressor's full retaliatory capacity. It would be retaliatory in aiming to punish rather than to diminish the enemy's forward military capacity. While undertaken to terminate war with minimum cost, it seeks to do so by threatening incremental costs which would exceed the incremental strategic and political gains which the aggressor expects to achieve. Though the comparison may disturb some moral sensibilities, the strategy of limited retaliation has the aspects of a bargaining process.

Snyder suggests, in his first and last chapters, a theoretical framework for his analysis. For this, he makes explicit use of game theory and bargaining theory. The reconciliation of deterrence and defense goals may be conceived of as a process of selecting security policies which try to minimize, with the resources available, the total expected cost from all possible types of enemy moves. There is some estimated loss and an estimated probability for each enemy move. The total expected cost would be the sum of the products of the probability times the estimated loss for each move. Such a formulation sharpens some of the incompatibilities between deterrence and defense: deterrence seeks to make the probabilities low but may make the losses for the same moves high; defense seeks to make the losses low but

may increase the probabilities for the corresponding moves. The mathematical scheme also suggests that security policy cannot simply elect to follow one goal or the other but must weigh both deterrence and defense for each kind of enemy move. The theoretical framework is intriguing and doubtless contributed to Snyder's insights. It may strengthen his discussion for those accustomed to thinking in symbolic terms, but it is not necessary for comprehending the discursive chapters in which the author is most helpful.

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Though his book contains many implications for arms control, Snyder does not deal with this subject directly. It is the central topic of the volume by Schelling and Halperin. The distinctive thesis of their discussion is that arms control is not something contrary to military planning and policy; it is not an alternative set over against defense and deterrence. This thesis is double-edged; it cuts through the notion, too popularly held, that somehow military planning for defense and deterrence is "uncontrolled"; it also cuts arms control loose from mere dreams for a better world. Military planning is always controlled, not alone by one's own limitations of resources or will or purpose, but also by one's knowledge of the opponent's capacity and intention, by one's estimates of his possible moves and his most likely ones. On the other hand, if the world is to be improved by explicit arms control measures, these will have to serve deterrence and defense goals.

Both the urgency and the hope for arms control lie partly in the character of modern weapons. The destructiveness of the weapons, the apparent advantages (not so apparent in Snyder's analysis) of striking first, and the swiftness of response are adduced as principal reasons for the urgency. The distinctive feature of arms control

is that it involves some form of "cooperation" with the enemy in order to reduce the likelihood of war's occurrence, limit its destructiveness should it take place, and lower the price of preparation for war. Arms control, thus, depends upon the existence of common interests among opponents. Modern weapons technology and military expectations have helped fashion a common interest in the avoidance of general war. Hence arms control is closely associated with deterrence, though the authors point out that one of the most neglected areas of study of arms control measures is their applicability in times of war.

In their book, Schelling and Halperin have employed their thesis to display a pattern of reasoning, rather than to develop a reasoning process. With cryptic, almost epigrammatic, insight they have arrayed the stakes and issues of arms control from identification of some of the mechanisms of inadvertent war, through bargaining and negotiation, to specifications of some of the requirements of inspection and regulation. Their most important and interesting contributions lie in some of the gaps in the general literature which they have sought to fill. In particular, their discussion of bargaining offers important insight into the ways in which tacit agreements may fill a presumed vacuum between unilateral military planning and formally negotiated arms control treaties.

The kind of hard reasoning in depth represented in Snyder's *Deterrence and Defense*, however, still needs to be applied to the wide range of issues in arms control so clearly laid out in Schelling and Halperin's *Strategy and Arms Control*. When this is done, it may be that arms control, more precisely defined and conceptually refined, will take its place in the discussions alongside of deterrence and defense as a third major ingredient of national security policy.

America's Quest for Peace

Dexter Perkins. Indiana University Press. 122 pp. \$3.

A noted American historian traces American participation in the world's efforts toward peace from the 19th century to the present, and examines the three main approaches that such efforts have taken: peace through law, through collective security, and through disarmament.

The Triumph of Integrity: A Portrait of Charles de Gaulle

Duncan Grinnell-Milne. Macmillan. 334 pp. \$5.

This eulogy of the French Premier provides a minutely detailed account of his role as leader of the Free French during the period 1940-46, but reserves only a postscript for his present-day policy in Algeria. Illustrated.

The Limits of Defense

Arthur I. Waskow. Doubleday. 119 pp. \$2.95.

The author rejects such predominating theories of defense as those based on counter-force, the balanced deterrent or arms control in favor of "disarmament-plus," by which total disarmament is enforced through total inspection.

The Integrating Mind: An Exploration of Western Thought

William F. Lynch, S.J. Sheed and Ward. 181 pp. \$3.95.

The author carries the idea of contrariety, which is at the center of the West's perception of reality, into a discussion of some areas of national culture where the threat of "totalism" is most profound.

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James Roosevelt, Ed. Doubleday Anchor. 354 pp. \$1.25.

The liberal philosophy of foreign policy is expressed in this group of essays by such prominent liberals as David Riesman, Michael Maccoby, James Warburg, Walter Millis, Arthur Waskow, Charles E. Osgood, Emile Benoit, Vera Micheles Dean, and others.

Check-off: Labor Bosses and Working Men

Jameson G. Campaigne. Regnery. 348 pp. \$4.95.

A report on union corruption and dictatorial practices, this extensively documented volume includes studies of Walter Reuther, James Hoffa, the McClellan investigating committee, and the Kohler strike. Illustrated.

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