

in the magazines

"The practical application of international law is only distantly related to the theory of international law," states Raymond Aron in an article appearing in *The New Republic* for December 1. Thus, while some legal justification may be found within the United Nations Charter for the American quarantine of Cuba, the real basis of this action "rests on (the) traditional and cynical prerogative of the major powers to impose limits on the action of the lesser powers." Here, as well as in the case of Suez and the Hungarian uprising, "no great power will show any tolerance whatsoever toward a nation within the zone the former considers vital to its security, even if the latter has been officially recognized as a sovereign nation." What emerges is a double standard of international law, Aron contends, which "may grant lesser nations the right to choose their own form of government . . . but (which) cannot grant these nations the right to acquire missile bases and to modify the balance of terror."

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What are the effects of the "technological and more particularly the nuclear revolutions" upon the relation between the governing and the governed, Hans Morgenthau asks in the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (December 1962). Among the effects he finds is the "dislocation of political power within the democratic state" brought about by "the technological complexity of the issues involved." Not only is this dislocation apparent in the "abdication on the part of the people as a whole vis-à-vis the government," but there is a noticeable "shift of power within the government from the democratically responsible authority to technological elites which are not subject to democratic control." Indeed, Morgenthau states, "the technological expert does not know more than the man in the street or the politically responsible official" where the large questions of political policy are concerned. "But he is made to pretend to have a monopoly of the answers because of the abdication of judgment on the part of the latter." The "politically relevant secrets of the nuclear age" should become public property once again.

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In "Jewish Resistance to the Nazis," Oscar Handlin presents an account of the posture of Eastern and Western European Jews when faced with Hitler's "final solution" (*Commentary*, November 1962). His article is proffered in part as a disputation of some recent expressions that "the victims themselves were at fault and contributed to their own destruction."

Handlin's examination of the facts leads him to the opposing point of view: "the Jews were not destroyed because they failed to resist . . . The attitude of the Jew had no effect on the extent of the catastrophe. Rather it was the intensity and character of the German occupation that determined how many would be sent to their doom." In the variety of their actions and attitudes toward the Nazi threat of extermination, Handlin says, the Jews were reflecting the diversity of their numbers; they "were not so homogeneous as their former enemies or their present critics believed." Of the number accused of being "sheeplike in their passivity" toward their own destruction, he states: "Life was a great good, worth fighting for . . . (but) the tradition recognized that there were moments in history when the individual was helpless . . . It insisted rather upon establishing by the faith of martyrdom the glory of the divine scheme that events seemed to deny." The lessons to be learned from a study of the Nazi monolith and its final destruction are many, the author concludes, "but nothing is learned from blaming the catastrophe on its victims."

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"The Cuban Crisis in Retrospect" (*The New Leader*, December 10, 1962) provides a number of lessons for the conduct of American foreign policy and for the more accurate evaluation of the nature of Soviet opposition, writes Reinhold Niebuhr. In Niebuhr's opinion, "while the Communists are dangerous and tough opponents," Khrushchev proved by pulling back that "they are also calculating and shrewd, and quite different from the impetuous madness of a Hitler." Indeed, he adds, "any close analogy between Nazism and Communism is really misleading.

"The fact that both are dictatorships obscures an important difference between them. Of the two, Communism is infinitely more dangerous. It is not a mad aberration, but a frightful simplification of the Messianic dreams which have haunted Western civilization for ages, sometimes with beneficent results, but sometimes with the frightful results of the Jacobin terror in 18th century France and 20th century Communist Russia." Niebuhr urges that the United States prepare itself to "live for a long time with the Communist menace, hoping that time and the realities will gradually rob Communism of its virulent fanaticism." The most useful tool for this battle of time, perhaps the most difficult for Americans to acquire, is "patience."

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