

A two-year study of how to best finance United Nations operations has resulted in the suggestion that the world organization look to the possibility of increasing its revenues by claiming title to oil reserves in international waters. "With its own income," John G. Stoessinger has written in the June issue of *War/Peace Report*, "the U.N. could afford peace-keeping operations without fear of bankruptcy, and it could move massively into the areas of economic and social development."

The author and a team of experts, working on a grant from the Brookings Institution, arrived at this recommendation after examining the current formulas of financing the United Nations and after discarding a variety of sources of independent income, among them service charges for such international activities as the mails, shipping and travel, the establishment of a distinct U.N. tax in various member countries, and exploitation of unowned mineral resources in Antarctica.

"The impression must be avoided," Stoessinger states, "that the U.N. would 'enter the oil business.' This would not be the case; the U.N. would merely receive title to a piece of real estate in the ocean and would benefit by sharing its exploitation. Hence, the question of 'U.N. oil' would not arise. Private companies would continue to pay tariffs and taxes, but would pay a portion of the profits to the world organization."

"Five lessons about crisis management seem to emerge with some clarity from the talk-filled room where the makers of [foreign] policy foregather and our destiny is shaped," writes Harlan Cleveland in the July *Foreign Affairs*. Among the lessons taught by "crisis diplomacy," our tutor states, is the necessity of establishing at the outset a limited objective, for not only has history taught the validity of the saying that 'politics is the art of the possible,' but today the price of overreaching is higher than ever before. Next, it is up to the policy makers to decide "how far down the road to the use of force" they "would be willing to travel if things go from bad to worse," and having decided this, they must "select first the gentlest form of force that has a good chance of being effective."

A fourth lesson noted by Cleveland is the desirability of widening "the community of the concerned—to obtain sanction for the necessary 'next step' from the broadest practicable segment of the international community." And as a final lesson, we are presented with the injunction: "watch carefully the precedents you set. You will have to live with the institutions you create. The law you make," cau-

tions Cleveland, "may be your own."

An interesting "study of successful deterrence," based on the 140 years of "cold war" between the Roman Empire and Persia, appears in *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* (vol. vii, no. 1). The author of the article, Vern L. Bullough, recounts the factors which contributed to the "uneasy peace" between "the two great powers of western Eurasia" from 363 to 502 A.D. The situation is strikingly familiar.

"Throughout most of this period," Bullough reports, the Roman Empire and Persia "represented antagonistic ideologies, with each seeing the other's emissaries as ideological subversives whose propaganda and actions threatened internal peace and security. Each would have destroyed the other if possible, yet early in their rivalry they realized that a decisive victory of one over the other was highly unlikely. . . . Each had other enemies . . . which helped stabilize peaceful relationships between them because it led them to believe that peace with each other was important . . . to their continued survival."

A significant contribution to the understanding of international military force is made by the Spring issue of *International Affairs*, journal of the World Peace Foundation. Articles for this symposium were written by Herbert Nicholas, Brian E. Urquhart, Edward H. Bowman and James E. Fanning, Lincoln Bloomfield, Hans J. Morgenthau, Stanley Hoffman, Henry V. Dicks, and Thomas C. Schelling, and range in subject matter from problems of logistics to the qualifications of an international soldier.

Hans Morgenthau has questioned the feasibility of such a force by examining the requirements of an effective internal police system and then testing these requirements against the realities of the international scene. The basic conditions which he sets forth for a national police are "reliability" and "effectiveness," qualities taken for granted of the policeman on the beat but unlikely attributes, Morgenthau concludes, of an international force due to "the peculiar character of international society." Lacking would be an "automatic commitment to a particular legal order and status quo," and the force itself would reflect the "differences of power within the various societies" contributing to its membership. Because the force would be "international rather than national or supranational," Professor Morgenthau finds, it "cannot be more reliable and efficient than the political interests and military capabilities of the nations supporting it allow it to be."

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