

TOWARD A TEST-BAN TREATY

Is Nothing Better than On-site Inspection?

Paul Ramsey

When *Izvestia* published in full President Kennedy's speech at American University, and it was announced that three-power negotiations would soon open in Moscow on a test-ban treaty, there was hope that a breakthrough to an agreement might still be found. These hopes were dampened when Khrushchev withdrew the concession Russia seemed to have made in agreeing at Geneva to three on-site inspections a year. In the context of the President's declaration that the United States will not be the first to resume atmospheric testing, this is going to continue to put pressure on our demand for live inspection.

At Geneva, the Russians intimated that they may be willing to accept two or three on-site inspections a year under an agreement to ban nuclear testing. The U.S. said eight—or at least seven—are necessary. If the two sides were seriously negotiating, one might have predicted their convergence on five. This prospect has already given voice to the opposition in Congress, whose cries are: "this is give-away, not negotiation" and "unilateral nuclear self-mutilation."

Whereupon our negotiators assert they are yielding not to Russian obduracy but to advancements in the science of detection. They go into session to draft a new proposal which, while sticking to "three, or two" live inspections a year, circumscribes far more severely than ever before the area of a nation's territory that must be opened to inspection. We tried to get the 18-nation test-ban negotiations off the question of the number of inspections, by discussing technical arrangements first. This the Russians refused to do.

Meantime, the evidence grows that "national" inspection systems (on which we now rely for determining the nature *and the military potential* of explosions in the atmosphere) may be quite sufficient to verify the occurrence of nuclear explosions underground. One or two such tests might be disguised, but it is extremely unlikely that a militarily significant series of underground tests could escape determination. Couple that with unmanned inspection stations equipped with tamper-proof devices which record seismic signals (the "little-black-box" proposal) and

you have a solution to the "decoupling" problem. Or so it seems technically.

Far more important than any technical arrangements for conducting inspections, however, are the political and juridical arrangements to be made.

The Political Breakthrough

Politically, there seems little chance that *any* of these proposals would be approved by the U.S. Senate. Yet the administration has continued to negotiate in this vein without a massive effort to educate the American public in new directions, and without pressing the negotiations on to the political agreements by which a test-ban agreement might be an occasion to make a significant advance in international law. From this, one might conclude that we want an agreement no more than do the Russians; and that there will be no test ban agreement so long as both sides have reason to believe (as they now do) that there are enormous military advantages to be gained from continuing to test (by, for example, discovering ways to alter radically the relation of weight to firepower in nuclear warheads). I am persuaded that this administration does want an agreement; and that, if there is fault on our side, it consists of a failure to see that a test ban agreement is not primarily a technical problem but a juridical one. The political arrangements and institutions which any agreement will require ought to be the thing we discuss, in and out of the cold war seasons.

The test ban negotiations are stalemated because the proposals and counter-proposals have all been along one line. We demand on-site inspections, which may be described as a trans-political solution of the military encounter between an open and a closed society. Then, when we are forced to ask, "Is anything as good as live inspections?" the answer that comes is a sub-political one: advances in the science of detection by national systems, and maybe little black boxes. On-site inspection and a world-wide system of "dead" inspectors are both abstract technical solutions to the problem, which vainly attempt to repress or by-pass more important political ingredients of the struggle and agreement between nations. They both divert attention from the relevant political institutions that must be devised, and from significant advances in international law that

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might be made if only we attended to these. Instead we seem to be willing to settle for on-site inspection, or something mechanically equivalent to this.

This is "one dimensional" analysis, negotiation, and public debate. Of course there are issues here that are important. The U.S. ought not to accept anything less reliable or "more trusting" of the Communists. It is easier to think of provisions of a test ban treaty that would themselves breed disputes than to think of provisions that would build security and prove to be pillars of an emerging international order. The ordinary man on the street is not altogether wrong in feeling that fewer and fewer inspections, or technical devices that may fail or are subject to jamming, may be too risky even for "calculated risks." He wants to be told not that the nuclear age is risky, but how these risks are going to be governed. He does not need to be urged to rely on nuclear mysteries to control other nuclear mysteries, but to be informed how juridical concepts and understandings can be clarified and international regulation be obtained and strengthened. He is waiting for something *better* than on-site inspection, or better than its technical equivalent.

This requires analysis, negotiation and public debate along another line than the one we have followed in recent years. It requires that the main attention be now turned to the political context of any test ban agreement.

The Policed Inspection

Even the language we have used in recent years has been entirely misleading, and we ourselves have been the most misled. We demanded a "controlled test ban agreement." Then we were misled to think that live inspection would give us such "control." This is as if we imagine we have control of the illegitimate birth of children if only they are all detected, verified, and registered with county clerks all over the country!

We demanded a "policed" test ban. Then we were misled into believing that inspectors on the site would be like policemen. Yet everyone knows that a policeman not only *detects* crime, and not only *verifies* that there is sufficient evidence that a crime was committed. He also arrests; and behind him stand the courts to render judgment upon the accused, and penal institutions to punish or restrain him. All this is required to enforce the law, and to "police" anything.

It has been the U.S. position that verification of underground explosions must include not only detection but identification as well. Identification, as distinct from detection, requires on-site inspection or its equivalent. The arguments for this cannot be gainsaid. However, the whole problem of verification will be seen in a different light if the identifica-

tion of a violation is distinguished with equal care from the enforcement that would have to follow such a determination of fact. Then the questions to be asked are: Do not the uncertainties of any available political means of enforcement suggest a serious re-examination of our insistence upon identification by an international inspectorate? In the absence of international political enforcement, are on-site inspections as unavoidably necessary as has been supposed? And if a greater degree of international sanction could be achieved, is there nothing as good as or better than *proven* violation? "Presumptive violation," for example, if clear juridical status could be obtained for this?

If all the nations of the world, including Communist China, agreed to a test ban treaty, this would in no way mean that they had ceased to be nations with potentially opposed particular interests and some degree of cold war among them. Such a treaty would have to be largely *self-enforcing*. It would rest on the common interest of the nations in maintaining it. Even supposing the existence of an international system of inspection to determine when and where a violation of the treaty has occurred, one still has to ask: what *punishment* can be meted out to the country that breaks the agreement? What *sanctions* are there to enforce adherence to such a treaty? Unless one proposes that nuclear war itself shall be used, unilaterally or collectively, to compel adherence and punish violation, then one has to conclude that any such agreement must necessarily be largely self-enforcing; that it will endure as long as the nations have overriding interest in maintaining it; and that it will fail to be observed whenever, if ever, particular interests seem to require a nation to value something else more than it values the safety derived from the cautious togetherness negotiated by such a treaty.

Under these circumstances, it is deeply to be regretted that almost all the discussion of the possible use of unmanned seismic boxes has been about whether these would really be as good as on-site inspection to prove violation. Here was an opportunity to turn the Geneva negotiations into another channel. These boxes would be delivered to neutral stations once a week, where their findings would be evaluated by a panel of scientists to determine if any suspicious event had been recorded. A determination of a suspicious event would be presumptive evidence of a violation, unless the accused nation chose to invite on-site inspection to establish the fact that there had been no clandestine nuclear explosion. There might even be international supervision of national detection systems, but without inspectors going, except on invitation, upon the territory of any nation.

This inspection proposal rests in part upon the neutral nations' test ban plan, which qualified reli-

ance on national systems by the *possibility* but not the *right* of on-site inspections under international authority. The principle of on-site inspection upon invitation would be written into the treaty, along with the juridical concept of "presumptive violator." A politically acceptable panel of experts, an instrument of the U.N., would have to be agreed to, and confidence reposed in it. A breakthrough might be made in these negotiations if we would parlay about the broader political issue instead of remaining with the technical question of identification.

Clearly, "presumptive violation" is as good as proven violation; and—when one remembers the problem of enforcement that must follow anyway—it would be better, if juridical status could be achieved for this concept in international understanding. So important would judgments of presumptive violation be in the development of world law and order that one may well hope that national inspection systems are *not* so clearly competent in detecting underground explosions that the nations will be under no pressure to form policy in this direction. For one can hardly hope that otherwise the nations will simply agree to place their national systems under international supervision with the same right going to an international body to determine suspicious events and presumptive violation. At the present moment, reliance on our own determination and analysis of atmospheric explosions is simply a reliance on something that is, so far, a part of the arms race. To rely on the international supervision of explosions in any environment, without the *power* of on-site inspection but *with* the determination that a violation has taken place unless inspection is invited to prove the contrary, would be to place reliance on an instrumentality that could introduce a measure of control into the arms race.

A "suspected violator" will, of course, yield the right to conduct an inspection whenever *it wishes*, to prove to the world that no violation has taken place, and when *it wishes* the agreement to continue to be maintained. If anyone imagines that such an agreement would obviously endure once it is obtained, he ought to reflect again upon how hard it is going to be even to get one, and why! To negotiate a test-ban treaty requires the willingness of nations to eliminate certain events from suspicion. To maintain such a treaty after it is signed will require the same willingness.

Nevertheless, if we saw more clearly that *enforcement* must follow any *verification* of a violation, we might be able to agree to something *other* (not something *less*) than certain verification, in view of the fact that the only available sanctions will be the pressures, threats and force usually employed by states, which are always less than certainly effective responses. The uncertainties of any political means of enforcement should cause us to re-examine the

requirements we place on identification. Particularly, if there can be added to the normal sanctions available to states an instrumentality through which condemnation from the public opinion of the world can be expressed and brought to bear, and a nation be bound to consider how serious a step it would be for it to withdraw from the rule of this quite precise law it once agreed to. Of course, on the scale of degrees of verification of fact, the West ought not to accept less and less certainty. But there is another determination that will do as well, namely clear determination, by an international body, of the judicial *status* of violator, or presumptive violator, of the agreement.

This is the possibility that has now emerged as the kind of treaty that might be made. We ought not to neglect it because we imagined that a test-ban treaty built on certain findings of the fact of violation would provide the nations with any other recourse than those presently available for enforcing any agreement. Once a determination has been made that a nation is presumed to have violated the treaty and refuses to clear itself, the other nations will be in the same situation as they would be if live inspectors went by right onto the accused nation's territory and verified that a nuclear explosion had taken place. Nations that wish the agreement kept will still have to consider what unilateral or collective measures to take; and these can only involve the economic and political sanctions presently available to states, the resumption of testing, or, in the last resort, the use of armed force.

The Resumption of Testing

The penultimate sanction would be the resumption of testing. In the future as in the past, with or without a test-ban agreement, in response to violation or to testing begun by an enemy nation, there are some circumstances under which the objections to our again resuming nuclear testing might have to give way. It is a mark of our political immaturity that so many people in this country seem to regard testing, and not the just ordering of the life of mankind and the preservation of the independence of nations, as the supreme issue of our time. A conscientious statesman in the future will say (as did President Kennedy in his address to the nation on March 2, 1962), "I feel it deeply regrettable that . . . even one additional individual's health may be risked in the foreseeable future" by atmospheric tests; and "however remote and infinitesimal" the hazards, "I still exceedingly regret the necessity of balancing these hazards against the hazards to hundreds of millions of lives which would be created by any relative decline in our nuclear strength." *But balance them he will*; and, given certain *findings of fact* (which may, of course, be mistaken) as to the security position of the nation and the free world, or given

a finding of presumptive violation, he might decide that testing will produce less evil effects than not testing.

There is an ancient formula which states that, while the effect or end does not justify any means, one effect of an act not bad in itself can be justified by another of its effects. Where there is more than one consequence to an action, a decision-maker should balance the good effect against the evil one, or the lesser evil against the greater. The President's words prove that this rule of "double effect," as it is called, is a nice summary of political prudence (which is a virtue), and not an abstract and alien principle imposed by morality upon political decision. The President's decision was a tragic one, like most crucial decisions; it may have been mistaken; but it was not, as Linus Pauling said with sweeping indiscriminatio, an immoral one.

Thus, a test-ban treaty might be achieved if the U.S. gave up insisting on live on-site inspection, accepting instead international determination of presumptive guilt in the matter of explosions underground; and if the U.S.S.R. accepted such inspection in principle at the option of the nation on whose territory has occurred an event that is declared suspicious by an international supervisory body of experts. The West has already indicated its willingness to ban atmospheric tests with no other recourse for enforcement, in case a violation is detected, than ordinary political measures, including our own resumption of testing. It would seem to be as safe for us to rely on the same sanctions in a case of presumptive violation of the proscription of tests underground.

Secrecy and "Bad Faith"

The U.S. fixation on on-site inspection requires explanation; and if we better understood this fixation it might help us to take some fresh and creative steps in negotiation. We have been obsessed with on-site inspection not only as a technical requirement (which is, so far, justified). Our insistence on this has rather been informed by a desire to exorcise an ultimate fear—the fear of fear itself in the nuclear age—by exorcising secrecy from the military preparations of nations. And it has been informed by an ultimate hope—the hope of using a test-ban treaty as a means of changing closed societies into open ones. More progress might have been made if there had been fewer other-worldly expectations.

If a new departure is to be made toward a test-ban treaty based on "presumptive violation," the penultimate possibility of a resumption of testing must remain among the sanctions available to the nations. This means that preparations to test will have to be maintained. The very thing we have hoped to exorcise—preparations to test, and secrecy

—must be understood to be a part of the environs of a treaty by which the nations agree to put a stop to testing, and essential to the enforcement of such an agreement in a multi-national world. An analysis of the false connection we have made between "secret preparations" and "bad faith" will help us to admit how and why our negotiating positions have been confused in the past. It will help us to renounce that connection in the future, and to understand better this one among the actions the powers must hold in reserve as they seek to secure an agreement that can be maintained.

The people of the U.S. go a lot of mileage out of charging the Russians with "bad faith" for secretly preparing for tests while negotiating to ban them. Moral mileage, that is, and a hardening of our political posture. We need to traverse some of the ground of these negotiations again, in order to see how, and for what wrong reasons, the United States increased its demands—if not in the actual negotiation, then in the public forum—following the Russian resumption. *Both* sides drew away from each other. It is important that this be understood because the reason given for the need of additional precaution on the part of the West was Russia's *secret preparations* to test before they broke off the negotiations.

The very thing which, in the public mind throughout 1962, prevented agreement (preparations to test, which we also wanted verified, and not only testing itself) has now become a chief cornerstone and sanction of the agreement that, it seems, may emerge. Both sides, it is suggested, should continuously maintain preparations for testing, so as not to be caught off guard if the other side violates the treaty, or is declared to be a presumptive violator and fails to invite on-site inspection to disprove it. The only available sanction or penalty, short of war itself, to enforce and sustain the treaty will be that the other side may resume testing, for which it ought to be prepared.

After the Soviets, by their scientific and terror testing, broke the test moratorium which had been in effect since 1958, the United States sought to gain an intangible, propaganda victory by stressing the "bad faith" of the Russians in *preparing for* tests while negotiating. We took a high moral tone toward such "trickery." With what result? With the result that President Kennedy added yet another requirement to the treaty we are willing to sign. He now asked that we be protected "against the repetition of prolonged secret preparations for a sudden series of major tests," since, as the President said, "we would certainly have to have some assurances against a repetition [of secret preparations] . . . before we would feel a treaty is a satisfactory one." Following this press conference, White House spokesmen assured the nation that the word "assur-

ances" was too soft a one for what the President meant. He meant, they said, freedom of movement for international inspectors checking on clandestine preparations, and not only on actual testing.

Even the *New York Times* editorialized that the test-control issue had "become even more complex as a result of Soviet trickery last year in making long preparations for new tests while pretending to talk about a test-ban treaty. This duplicity has rightly prompted President Kennedy to demand inspection and control not only of actual tests, but also of preparations for them to avert new surprises," (Feb. 9, 1962). The only exception I know to this universal condemnation of the Soviets for acting like a nation should was a letter to the *Times* (Feb. 20, 1962) written by David R. Inglis, physicist at Argonne National Laboratory, who pointed out that provision against secret preparations "seems technically impossible without making the U.S.S.R. a completely open society. . . . We should take the chip off our shoulder and recognize that the Soviets broke no international agreement in testing." Thus, to solve the urgent current problem of international relations, our statesmen and people alike took their departure into some other world than the one in which the problems exist to be solved.

Still, we need to ask why we painted ourselves into such a corner, why we so readily adopted a requirement foredoomed to be rejected (if one knows nations, much less the Soviets or Red China). Was this not because of a "soft utopianism" that always supposes that good faith negotiations for peace are bound to succeed? Russian "bad faith" could only have been exhibited by *testing* (if this could have been kept secret) while still negotiating *under the moratorium*, not by *preparing* to test if negotiations failed. Indeed, a nation should prepare for the worse while trying to do better.

When Russia publicly resumed testing, the moratorium was no longer in force. This may have entailed bad judgment but not "bad faith." Yet no American spokesman or leader of public opinion declared it to have been a dereliction of political duty on the part of the President or the Atomic Energy Commission that too few preparations were in process to back-stop our diplomats if negotiations failed. Only Edward Teller charged, a month before the recent U.S. test series ended, that the series had not been as fruitful of scientific information as it might have been because scientists had been prevented from making adequate preparations during the negotiations. While Teller may hold only inflexible opinions on the subject of testing, who can say that this time he may not have been right? In any case it is a strange rule of diplomacy to negotiate as if one is bound to succeed, and no preparations need be made of any other eventuality.

Thus, because of a non-political understanding of

international relations we become locked into making non-political requirements of a treaty, and ones impossible of acceptance. This was the impulse behind our continued insistence upon inspection for atmospheric explosions. The reason we came so slowly to accept reliance on our own ability to identify tests *above* ground without on-site inspection was because we wanted guarantees against even preparations to test.

Yet our "national system" of detecting actual tests in the atmosphere was reliable enough for this to provide our government with detailed information concerning the advance in weaponry the Russians made by their tests (as the President explained to the nation in ordering our own resumption of tests in the air). We, and the cause of peace making, were the victims of our own non-political propaganda victory over the asserted Russian "bad faith" and "trickery." There might be more hope now of increasing the agreement among nations if it had occurred to no one to charge the Russians with impropriety simply because they made their preparations. Of course, they did this in secret. There is nothing dishonest in this, as Aquinas noted long ago, so long as a nation does not pretend it has no secrets.

It needs to be assumed on all sides that the business of a nation is to keep itself in as much readiness as possible to maintain or improve its security position if it must. Instead we sought by propaganda to deprive Russia of the power, right, and duty proper to states, which the U.S. could not have seriously meant to renounce.

This has been one root of the stalemate at Geneva: during most of 1962 we still insisted on on-site inspection for atmospheric tests, because we hoped obliquely to gain an agreement that would help to identify and forestall preparations to test.

Underground Tests

The same non-political expectation was also added to the technical reasons we had for wanting on-site checks before agreeing to ban underground tests. There might be two reasons for worrying less about live inspection of explosions underground: because a significant series of such tests can be verified from abroad or because underground tests are of negligible military importance. During 1962, press reports of the conclusions of our scientists and weapons experts have indicated more and more doubt about the military value and at the same time greater certainty of detecting underground explosions. Why, then, was there no change in our insistence on on-site inspection?

This was because we still hoped to gain far more than an effective test-ban treaty. At his news conference on March 29, 1962, the President was specifically asked whether it was any longer necessary to inspect for underground tests. His answer cited still

some value to be gained by such tests and he pointed out that we were asking only a very modest number of on-site inspections of seismic events. But chiefly he *linked* this with our concern to verify and forestall any *preparation* for tests in the atmosphere: "They could carry on their underground tests," he said, "and then suddenly begin, as they did, their atmospheric tests in breach of the treaty. . . ."

If we were as a nation more sober and realistic in the formation of political policy, we could turn negotiation in the direction of establishing the category of "presumptive violator" without on-site inspection, and yet put underground explosions under prohibition as enforceable as the present moratorium on atmospheric tests can be.

The crux of any agreement is going to be (1) the feasibility of keeping constantly prepared to test and (2) the desirability of doing so, as (among other political means) the enforcement available to nations in our multi-national world. In President Kennedy's address to the nation explaining our decision to resume, he stated that the option of preparing to test, but not yet doing so, was seriously considered, and rejected because such readiness was judged impossible for a free society to maintain for long. If this is correct, the next stage of negotiation on this question may as well not open. In a cause so urgent it would seem to be worth remembering that scientists may be required to take their turn "in the service" if young men do; and there may in fact be measures short of a draft that can bring this nation's scientific resources to bear on making the effective preparations the proposed system would require.

Facing the question of the permissibility and desirability of preparations to test within the context of banning tests, this nation will have to become more mature in political judgment. We have won a few too many verbal victories over the Russian "passion for secrecy" by forever challenging this on yet another front. We cry havoc where there is no havoc but only a legitimate military prudence—or at least where we unavoidably come upon the *fact* of closed Communist society with whose government we have to deal. Rather too much has even been made of the secrecy with which the Russians placed their missiles in Cuba, rather than upon the fact that placing them there at all represented such a grave challenge to the power-position of the West that it would have been met with brink-resolution even if done in broad daylight. In any case, the test-ban treaty that it may be possible to negotiate seems likely to assume that the great powers will make their preparations. These would be secret only in the sense that no one would suppose the nations are not taking their precautions. Preparations would have the sanction of the agreement which, in turn, preparations sanction (among other political responses held in reserve). It cannot be too much

stressed that this is the posture we have already indicated our willingness to assume in regard to atmospheric testing. We certainly did not base that proposed agreement upon the fact that we trust the Communists.

The Choice Before Us

Most of the public statements of church leaders and from various "peace" groups in the West during the height of the Cuban crisis showed that when the great doctrine of "reconciliation" is cut into the salami slices of specific policy proposals, these seem remarkably like one or another of the salami slices the Russians hope to take. The political realism of this nation's policies ought not to be abandoned, including realism about a test-ban agreement. Therefore, it is something better, not something weaker, than on-site inspection that should be accepted, if it can be devised.

Our basic motivation in negotiation has been, however, an effort to transform this multi-national world of ours by effecting a fundamental transformation in Communist society, by opening that society. We have wanted to put into effect a system of inspection that would be a first step toward, and the pattern for, a disarmament agreement. We have wanted to begin to establish international controls over national arms systems. While one-worlders are often critical of our government's inflexibility on the point of inspection, they want the same end—to which this government has shown the only way.

The trouble is it takes two to make that sort of agreement. A good case can be made, in the choice before which we now stand, for keeping up the pressure for some live on-site inspection. Even in the face of the naive opinion of representatives of the neutral nations, perhaps we should continue to press for this; and wait for Russian recklessness and world-wide Communist aggression, to awaken neutralists more fully from their slumbers, and for the "shared intimidation" of the nuclear age, at long last, to convince the Russians.

We should most certainly hold out for on-site inspection in any test-ban treaty *if* this is going to be the model for an agreement to reduce the arms now in being. There seems no way to place the reduction of armaments under international supervision without some form of on-site inspection. No responsible power today can disarm without real checks and control going to an international authority.

If, however, we were not so sure that the Communists will one day sign a disarmament agreement based on the opening up of their societies, we might not be so determined to secure the pattern for this in the precedent of on-site inspection in a test-ban agreement. More than two years of futile jawing on this subject have already passed. And after the Russians there are the Chinese Communists—who

soon will have nuclear power and armaments.

Instead of disarmament requiring a deep penetration of national by international authority, perhaps we should concentrate on the control of existing armaments and *the prevention of surprise attack*. Then we will find that this can be accomplished by technical means under international supervision; and that the test-ban agreement we have been discussing is a good model for this. Such an agreement on testing may be the first step toward the control of armaments and the prevention of surprise attack. Some ground for this has actually been laid in the effective forms of supervision and inspection that have actually been yielded in the Cuban crisis (as distinct from those voiced but never yielded). Control and supervision by international authority has better chance of acceptance when this is exercised *from a distance*. We should find out whether or not this can be made effective both in banning tests and in preventing surprise attack.

The U.S. now has several Samos satellites in polar orbits passing over a large part of Russian territory. These satellites carry photographic and TV equipment capable of perceiving surface objects equivalent to what the human eye sees from 100 feet. In addition to these "spies in the sky," we have Midas satellites which are capable of registering rays emitted by the bases that accompany rocket *launchings*. These satellites will therefore give us information of an attack earlier than that provided by our DEW-line radar system, which registers the *approach* of missiles and bombers. This means that a Samos-Midas system affords us the technical means for a control system that will forestall surprise attack *without live inspectors* going upon the territory of any nation.

Moreover, by means of this "national system" the U.S. has unilaterally made the first permanent use of outer space for military purposes. This can prove as disastrous for the security of the world and of every nation in it as was our unilateral inauguration of the use of the A-bomb against open cities. Meantime, we still negotiate for an over-all treaty de-

militarizing outer space: law is never made in such sweeping fashion, but bit by bit, on specific issues, such as on the use of outer space, internationalizing the Samos-Midas system. We ought immediately to propose to place the entire Samos-Midas system under international authority for the detection and control of surprise attack, while at the same time moving to establish approximately the same sort of supervision of a test-ban agreement.

Both agreements rest upon a recognition of the nature and responsibilities of nations in a multi-national world. Both seek to provide proximate solutions to the problem of coexistence with closed societies, with no more of the lure of transforming them in the extreme. Finally, both agreements will require that the American people, and their leaders in all their utterances, show a sounder appreciation of the conditions of reconciliation among men and nations. This does not mean salami-slice concessions.

It does require, however, that we cease to talk as if *we* are the only ones that have to be reassured of our nation's safety. We should cease to talk as if a test-ban agreement or an agreement for the prevention of surprise attack is for the purpose of assuring ourselves against the untrustworthy Russians or the Chinese. We should stand at a distance also from the question of who can be the most trusted! For the fact is that *we* have as much interest in ourselves knowing *that the enemy has been given assurances about us* as we have in knowing about him. Any test-ban agreement or agreement to prevent surprise attack would be principally for the purpose of giving mutual assurances. We both have to go to international authority in order to do that; and we should cease to speak as if resort to international supervision of national systems has only the purpose of reassuring ourselves that an enemy cannot do what he evilly intends to do. In part at least, he may intend to test or to attack because he cannot now know that we do not intend to do so. A test-ban agreement, and placing Samos-Midas under international supervision, would be something the nations do *together*. Else we shall all die separately.

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