the church will make known its current will on religious liberty. With millions of Roman Catholics living in lands where freedom is denied, and with the rest of the world eagerly awaiting the official Catholic view of the free conscience, it is difficult to imagine the council’s postponing its decision on this subject beyond the third session. Meanwhile, Protestants should pray for the coming of that day in which the whole Christian family proclaims the right of every individual to the free exercise of his religion.

As I noted at the outset of this report, there occurs in the vast and complex life of the Roman Catholic Church an unofficial as well as an official reform. When the Ecumenical Council is seen at close range there appears a very definite sense in which Vatican II records rather than initiates reform. Just as a state periodically adjusts its laws to society’s changed mores, so the church slowly brings its canons abreast of fermenting moods and ideas in its widespread parishes. All developing tempers and thoughts cannot be honored by the church since some of them are mutually contradictory and some would be considered heretical. But the church in council cannot lightly dismiss the massive, informal messages which come to Rome from major blocs in the widespread ecclesiastical empire.

The unofficial reform of the church is demonstrated also by the popularity of the religious liberty theme in this council, and particularly by the fact that the theme has been promoted by bishops and council experts from the Western democracies. (The prolonged applause given Bishop DeSmedt’s introductory remarks on religious liberty was not aroused merely by the fact that he presented a welcome subject; it owed as much to the adroitness with which he shaped his presentation to the demands of “continuity and development.”) Behind DeSmedt’s oratory many American observers and council experts could see the pen of Father John Courtney Murray, S.J., professor at Woodstock College in Woodstock, Maryland, who has for years made religious liberty his field of special interest. In a press interview Father Murray was asked, “It is rumored that you wrote much of Bishop DeSmedt’s ratio; is that true?” To this pointed question Father Murray replied with a warm, disarming and wholly evasive “That’s really news.” Whether or not Father Murray contributed to DeSmedt’s ratio, his country and the other Western democracies—and Protestants in large measure—helped draft the chapter on religious liberty. Whether we Protestants know it or want to admit it, some of our dearest hopes for mankind have been entrusted to the Second Vatican Council. And for the good that has come and will come from the council we can give thanks and rejoice in the fact that we have been a part of the church’s unofficial reform.

---

**Books**

**Castro’s Cuba, A Tragedy of Escalation**

*Christianity and Revolution: The Lesson of Cuba* by Leslie Dewart. Herder & Herder, 320 pages. $5.50.

by Alan Geyer

Just five years ago this month, Fidel Castro came to power in Cuba. The extraordinary person of Dr. Castro himself, together with the political phenomena associated with his revolution, has called forth a shelf of volumes which seek to unfold the “real” story of the establishment of a Communist regime in Latin America. Fidelismologists (original word here!) differ radically in their interpretations. Some have imagined that Castro was a Communist from the beginning who concealed his true identity for tactical reasons. Others have concluded that he was duped by the Communists and remains their captive. It is said by a third school that United States policy drove Castro into the arms of the Communists. Yet another group claims that he made an eyes-open choice of a most pragmatic kind: he found after the revolution that he needed Communists for his own purposes.

Leslie Dewart’s *Christianity and Revolution: The Lesson of Cuba*, while building its case partly on the latter two theses and emphatically rejecting the former two, provides a new perspective of spe-
cial interest to Christians. As his title suggests, the author assigns primary responsibility for the Communist conversion of Castro to the follies of the Catholic Church of Cuba and, more particularly, to lay intellectuals within the Church. Dewart is a Canadian Catholic philosopher who was born in Spain and received primary and secondary schooling in Cuba; he is now on the faculty of St. Michael’s College in the University of Toronto. His passion for social justice and for the Cuban people is the motive power behind his pen. There is a larger scenario: the Cuban case is presented as a microcosm of the universal struggle between Christianity and communism.

Writing from a viewpoint which he describes as “Christian, empirical, and existentialist,” Dewart narrates the political events of the Castro revolution as a tragedy of escalation, both domestically and internationally. Both the United States and Cuba remained too confident too long: too confident in the justice of their respective cases and too confident in their ability to make their positions prevail. In their mounting hostility and mutual reprisals, both governments manifested more pique than prudence. Castro himself, with little active support prior to his ascendancy, increasingly turned the revolution into a class struggle of workers and peasants to gain a mass following. Anti-Americanism and anti-clericalism, inflamed by the blunders of Uncle Sam and the Spanish clergy in Cuba, became convenient tools of mass manipulation. American and Catholic opposition to land reform, the most legitimate plank in the revolutionary platform, abandoned the political field to the Communists.

While ruthless and single-minded as revolutionaries are apt to be, Castro is portrayed as a thoroughly Cuban character who tragically exaggerated both the best and the worst of the Cuban psyche: unpunctual, garrulous, oversensitive, proud, vain, volatile—and courageous and resolute. His tactical turn to communism was reinforced by his sincere adoption of Marxist-Leninist philosophy; Castro remains somewhat contemptuous of old guard Communists and rejects their dogmas in such realms as art. (“My enemies are capitalism and imperialism, not abstract art.”)

Those concerned with the ethical dimensions of world politics can be grateful to Dr. Dewart for the humane and tragic sense which he brings to the Cuban affair and for the degree to which he takes religious influence seriously. There is a treasury of source material on the public dialogue between the Church and Castro, some of it consisting of original translations. There is a critique of United States policy which cannot be lightly turned aside. This reviewer must record some emphatic “however,” however, which add up to the judgment that Christianity and Revolution is as much a source of confusion as of clarity with regard to the Cuban case in particular and that it does not really break new ground with regard to the ethics of revolution in general.

Dewart cannot finally make up his own mind on the question of responsibility for Castro’s adoption of communism. This would not be an objection if he had recognized the limitations of our present phenomenologies of international politics—or if he had frankly contented himself with a grand, tragic view in which all the actors share the blame. But Dewart cannot resist the temptation to unload his moral indignation upon each principal actor (although least of all upon Castro himself) so that he is driven to some extremes and inconsistent judgments. Thus, it is said that “Castro adopted communism by his own free choice” (p. 71) and “American diplomacy did not force Castro into either ideology or policy” (p. 83)—but later that “American diplomacy brainwashed Castro into communism” (p. 84). And, intermittently, Dewart reverts to his original thesis that “the most decisive role was played by Catholic intellectuals” in Cuba (p. 287). It is difficult to reconcile these hyperbolic statements, although there may be elements of truth in all of them.

Dewart’s indictment of American policy in the last two years of the Eisenhower administration depicts a palace rivalry in which the sovereign himself plays only a minor role and in which duplicity is the rule. Eisenhower is bewildered by developments as Nixon, the CIA, and the State Department struggle for the scepter over Cuban affairs. The CIA protests that Castro is not a Communist a month after incendiary raids are launched against Cuba from Florida bases—raids which the Department of State claims the government is powerless to prevent, or which are explained away as only “leaflet raids” by unarmed commercial planes. Yet it is “general knowledge” that Guantanamo was being used to introduce CIA personnel into Cuba and to help illegally to remove counter-revolutionaries from the island. American deception in Cuba is characterized by Dewart as “the Eisenhower government’s dress rehearsal for the soon-to-come U-2 affair.” Eisenhower’s turning over the direction of the counter-revolutionary movement to Allen Dulles in March 1960 represented the triumph of Nixon’s belligerent views; it was the final decision in a policy which was captive to sugar and oil interests, opposed to genuine independence and neutralism, and blinded by its own “self-fulfilling horoscope.”

The indictment of Cuban Catholicism reads: “The Cuban Church was one of the parties responsible for having helped bring communism to Cuba—rather more so, perhaps, than any other single
cause." While Dewart attaches special blame to the laity, he presents a more impressive case for the evils of the Spanish clergy whose hearts belonged to Franco and whose hands were tied by the largesse of the Cuban aristocracy, notably of Batista's second wife. The stagnation of a church preoccupied with stability rather than with land reform, with anti-communism rather than revolution, was bluntly manifested in topical Masses held in the summer of 1960 to commemorate "the anniversary of Franco's victory over international communism." In all fairness, however, it must be said that Dewart's survey of Cuban Catholic periodicals, ostensibly to demonstrate the moral blindness and political cowardice of intellectuals, revealed a degree of Christian courage and compassion of which I had been previously unaware.

Another difficulty is Dewart's disposition to consider the Cuban case in a geopolitical vacuum as an essentially domestic arena into which the United States has intruded. If it is true that hysterical anti-communism can blind us to the legitimacy of social revolution, it is no less true that the legitimacy of such revolution can disguise a regime which is prepared to exploit the balance of fear in nuclear politics and to export subversion and terror to other countries. At this very writing, one of the most humane and progressive governments in Latin America, that of Venezuela, has barely survived the most cruel attempts of Castro-supported terrorists to destroy its constitutional transition. Industrial sabotage, indiscriminate sniping and kidnaping, bombings of candidates, assassination of voters queuing at the very polls—no nation which values either political freedom or social progress can be complacent about such tactics in any other nation. One does not have to revert to the myths of the Monroe Doctrine to emphasize the obligations of American power to help safeguard the integrity of political processes and social revolutions in other countries than Cuba. One may hope that time and chastened policies will avail to tame Castro's hostilities, but Castro's victims abroad cannot willfully be sacrificed upon the altar of such a hope.

Midway in his book, Dewart more or less abandons the Cuban case and embarks upon an itinerary through such topics as cultural lag, the American character, the American presidency, Platonic and Aristotelian political philosophy, ecclesiology, just war theory, and nuclear pacifism. These worthy subjects are not very successfully related to each other or to "the lesson of Cuba"; they are virtually independent essays which transgress the limits customarily imposed upon a case study. This would not occasion further comment were it not for the impression that the author indulges himself rather lavishly in gratuitous generalizations on serious topics.

It is not at all to trade on the universal sorrow at the Kennedy assassination (nor the linking of the alleged assassin with a pro-Castro group) to protest that Dewart seems not to have made a very careful study of the Kennedy presidency and its critics. His interpretation of Kennedy is highly colored by the Bay of Pigs invasion—which Kennedy himself was first to recognize as a "fiasco" and for which he openly assumed the blame. Dewart most unconvincingly portrays Kennedy as the neo-isolationist archetype of Americans' "chronic, intense, generalized, inexplicable, and frustrating disappointment with the international situation." As such, Kennedy is assumed to be ethnocentric, to lack "empathic ability" with regard to other peoples, to represent "the ascendency of moralizing cynicism," to be "committed to a permanent arms race," to be afflicted with "the American view" that the struggle against communism is that of "God against the Devil" and that "neutrality is immoral." Dewart views American ethnocentrism as tending toward a rigid dogmatism greater than that of the Russians and therefore more dangerous to world peace. This uniformly negative evaluation, in this reviewer’s eyes, is a drastic distortion of the record. It is curiously out of touch with the most conspicuous traits of Kennedy diplomacy, including toning down of the "crusade" against communism; the restraint in the Cuban missile crisis; the concern to communicate with Asians and Africans and to legitimate genuine neutralism; the quest for a test-ban treaty and other curbs upon the arms race; the attempt to educate the American public to a new poise and patience in the face of a "long twilight struggle" of heavy burdens and multiple frustrations.

"We have become one world," Dewart concludes, and it is "the political vocation of Christianity to recognize this truth and to act upon it." Few readers of the world-view will want to reject that principle or Dewart's judgment that Christians and Americans have failed to face fully the ethical and political challenges of the world's contemporary revolutions.

Cuba's revolution took place after the division of the world into Russian and American poles. This had an essential bearing on the policies and positions of the Cuban Church. The same reasons that have made Cuba a crucial battlefield of the cold war have also made it especially significant in the struggle of Christianity and communism. To guide our conduct wisely in that struggle we must learn the lessons of Cuba.

—from Christianity and Revolution: The Lesson of Cuba by Leslie Dewart.
Five African States: Responses to Diversity
Gwendolen M. Carter, ed. Cornell. 643 pp. $10.00

Working from a common outline to afford an opportunity for comparison between the countries considered—the Congo, Dahomey, Cameroun Federal Republic, the Rhodias and Nyasaland, and South Africa—the authors have described and analyzed the problems of historic, ethnic or regional divisiveness which beset the individual states and their responses to these problems.

The Military Establishment
John M. Swomley, Jr. Beacon. 266 pp. $6.00

The author, a member of the St. Paul School of Theology faculty, has studied the "growth of military influence over civilian American government" and the effect upon the economy, education and the making of foreign policy. He considers this influence to be unchallenged by significant opposition in either the lay or governmental communities.

West and Non-West: New Perspectives
Vere Micles Dean and Harry D. Harootunian, eds. 536 pp. $5.95

This anthology was developed as an introductory text for the study of non-Western civilization and attempts to provide the student with some understanding of the evolution of his own culture before he examines the forces which have shaped the "non-West" and the problems raised by the meeting of the two. The style and approach of selections vary widely, as from Chekhov to W. W. Rostow.

Weapons Management In World Politics
J. David Singer, ed. Center for Research on Conflict Resolution and Institute for Arms Control and Peace Research. 476 pp. $5.00

In actuality a joint issue of the "Journal of Conflict Resolution" and "Journal of Arms Control," this volume contains the speeches and technical papers delivered a year ago at the International Arms Control Symposium held under the auspices of the University of Michigan and the Bendix Corporation.

Africa and the Communist World
Zbigniew Brzezinski, ed. Stanford. 272 pp. $5.00

Contributors to this volume—Alexander Dallin, Alexander Erlich and Christian R. Sonne, Robert and Elizabeth Bass, William E. Griffith, Richard Lowenthal, and the editor—have investigated the strategy and tactics employed by Communist nations in their relations with sub-Saharan African states.

Israel: Years of Challenge
David Ben-Gurion. Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 240 pp. $5.00

Following a short history of Zionism and the establishment of the Jewish state, its former Premier Minister turns to the Sinai Campaign and the recurrent problems of border defense. He concludes with his vision of extensive desert reclamation and cooperation with the developing nations of Asia and Africa.