"The Christian and Nuclear Pacifism" is discussed by James E. Dougherty in the March issue of The Catholic World. The author asserts that "there is no single Christian response" to the present arms situation and so urges both "realists" and pacifists to show tolerance for the views the other has elected by conscience to follow. He exhorts the Christian pacifists, however, to refrain from what appears to be the tendency "to impose their own analysis of the arms problem upon the Church Universal as a doctrine more Christian than the traditional one," and by so doing "question the purity of the Church's teaching, which dates from the Patristic age, concerning the legitimate use of force in defense of the juridical order."

The essential "difference between the Christian pacifist and the Christian citizen who supports the defense policy of his government," Dougherty writes, "springs from the divergent interpretations of the significance of Christ's example of self-abnegation for the political order. The former makes of Calvary a luminous guide for the action of citizens in States when confronted with the problems of annihilative physical power. The latter believes that Calvary pertains to a transcendent spiritual mission that cannot serve as an appropriate model to political communities, subject as they are to natural rather than supernatural modes of conduct."

It is the author's own belief that "the Fathers and Doctors of the Church for the most part never doubted that the individual Christian seeking perfection should turn the other cheek when his own rights were violated. . . . But the organized political community, charged with safeguarding a human common good which has its primary meaning within the historical order, cannot seek its perfection in the same way as the person can; it cannot turn the other cheek. Having no destiny hereafter, the State must strive to protect its own order of justice here and now, so that members can be what they wish in their hearts to be."

And so, Dougherty asserts "the individual Christian, although he may abjure reliance on force where his own welfare is concerned and may decide that he himself will follow no vocation requiring him to wield the implements of force, cannot deny the obligation of the State to protect the common good by the threat or use of force when necessary."

Drew Middleton contends that the French preoccupation with maintaining and developing a national force de frappe threatens to become an "obsession"—one that may have dangerous repercussions for France and her allies, as that nation's recent history makes only too clear (The Spectator, January 31).

He writes that France's emphasis upon the strategic importance of her own nuclear force "encourages a well-established attraction in this country to superficially simple solutions, by theory or material, to the international problem arising from the fact that France is no longer the great nation of Louis XIV, but one of a number of European States, equal in strength and, collectively, very powerful, but still overshadowed by the power of America and Russia."

He asks us to consider "what similar tendencies in the French military mind" have wrought, first in the championing of a spurious tactical theory during World War I, and again in the almost total reliance upon the offensive capacities of the Maginot Line just two decades later.

Middleton warns that "the other members of the Atlantic Alliance must ask themselves whether the present national attitude toward the independent nuclear force could lead to comparable reverses."

Philip Green has examined "the conceptual foundations of deterrence theory" as they have been treated in studies by "the academic strategists," among whom he numbers such writers as Morton Kaplan, Herman Kahn, Klaus Knorr, Thomas C. Schelling, Glenn Snyder, and others. In his article "Social Scientists and Nuclear Deterrence" (Dissent, Winter 1964), Green finds grounds for charging that these men have perpetrated a "pseudo-science" which masks what are essentially "partisan policies." Such "oracular statements" as these "experts" are prone to make may have the effect, he contends, of limiting democratic debate on arms policy in this country.

At the heart of Green's criticism of this type of "academic literature" is what he considers the "rationality assumption of deterrence theory" which actually requires "that most decision-makers most of the time, in all the major nuclear powers, act rationally toward the specific ends of a deterrence policy and no other ends, and be effectively knowledgeable specifically in the ways that will serve a working deterrence policy, and no other."

He finds disturbing "the tacit acceptance by virtually all deterrence theorists of the 'rationality' (and thus morality?) of total war," and states that "a social science which subjects the most problematical questions of values to raison d'état, and thinks that this is a sufficient treatment of the matter, is no science at all—it is merely an ingenuous form of propaganda. The question of values is the primal question of deterrence theory and must continually be confronted; to sweep it under the rug so casually is to do society a major disservice."

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