In the March issue of *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Leo Szilard confronts the probability of a new arms race in “antimissile defenses” and discusses the necessity of reaching an agreement with the USSR to reduce present strategic striking forces before the new phase becomes a reality.

Szilard notes that “in the last few years, Russia has steadily proceeded with the building of submarines capable of launching rockets and with the hardening of her long-range rocket bases, located on Russian territory.” He considers it “clear, that, in time, Russia must reach the point where her ‘residual striking capacity’ would be large enough to demolish all of America’s sizable cities. At that point Russia will have achieved parity of saturation” and “will no longer have to fear a massive strike against her rocket bases of known location.”

When this “saturation parity” is reached, and if the United States maintains its current military posture, our country will be faced with a situation in which it is no longer possible “to continue to use our strategic striking forces as a deterrent the way we used them in the past.” Both nations will be confronted by the greater risk of escalation of small incidents into all-out atomic war. Eventually a “proliferation of atomic bombs” will take place in Western Europe which is becoming increasingly aware of its expendability in a conflict which the U.S. and USSR do not wish to extend to their own mainlands.

As an answer to both present dangers and future arms developments, Szilard suggests that a plan for a “minimal deterrent” is one which offers the promise of success, and acceptance by both parties. He defines this policy as a reduction of both American and Soviet “strategic striking forces, step by step, to a level just sufficient to inflict ‘unacceptable’ damage in a counterblow in case of a strategic strike directed against their territory.”

The increasing number of “people within the administration” who realize that our present policy of deterrence is short-lived “inevitably arrive in time at realizing that both America and Russia would gain, rather than lose, in security by reducing their strategic striking forces from the level of saturation parity to the level of the minimal deterrent,” the author contends. He is also of the opinion that Russia has indicated her willingness to consider (and even cooperate with) inspection arrangements involved in a disarmament plan such as this one which provides “a substantial increase in her security.”

To the question which introduces his column in the March issue of *Commentary*—“Peace in Our Time?”—Hans Morgenthau gives a negative reply. Despite “a rational wish shared by the overwhelming majority of people on both sides of the Iron Curtain,” he says, it is only “politically blind” emotion which sees in the current world order any indication of an end to antagonism. In the latest of what Morgenthau calls “euphoric intervals.” . . . Responsible people are even talking about ‘replacing’ the cold war with the war against poverty, as though the cold war had already come to an end.” The “modalities” of the conflict between East and West may have changed, he writes, but the “substance” of the competition—who shall inherit the earth?—has remained constant.

Moreover, the West’s “decent aspiration for peace” has proven to be “a source of weakness in judgment and action,” Morgenthau avers. Trade with Red China, for example, has been defended on economic grounds by certain Western leaders who ignore the consistent Communist view of trade as an expedient “to gain the political strength necessary to achieve the universal triumph of communism.” The Russians “terminated economic relations with China in the early 1960’s” because they recognized the fact that “an industrially developed China . . . would be the most powerful nation on earth” and therefore a threat to Russia’s own political future. Yet “Western governments and businessmen are rushing into the gap left by the Russian withdrawal. . . . But is China less hostile, and will she be less dangerous, to the West if and when she has become an advanced industrial nation, than she is, and will be, to the Soviet Union?”

It is obvious, Dr. Morgenthau concludes, that “while the Soviet Union knows its interest and acts upon it, the West does not know it and, insofar as it does, is unable to act upon it. Marx said that the capitalists would be their own grave-diggers. Western businessmen . . . seem bent upon proving that Marx was right.”

Salvador de Madariaga’s response to the question, “Why is the West Unable to Exploit the Enemy’s Weakness?” is contained in ACEN News, January-March 1964. In the review published by the Assembly of Captive European Nations he writes that “the leading nations of the West still see the conflict as one of power. They do not see it as what it is: a struggle for national and individual freedom between two irreconcilable systems, one which allows such freedom and the other which denies it. If this latter system wins, freedom will be wiped out from the face of the earth, and the deepest issues for mankind will be jeopardized or even finally settled in a deadly negative.”

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