a Europe which had ruined itself in two great wars, and the United States imposed a pattern on Western Europe—imposed peace, gave leadership, gave economic support. But America failed to pass beyond this limited and defensive role. It resisted in the mid-1950’s an attempt by Europeans to recast the postwar pattern; like Russia, America in 1955–1960 preferred to confirm the division of Europe and to resist the novel and disturbing impulses launched by the East European revolts and the disengagement debate. In the early 1960’s America again made a fateful choice, to support a particular form of West European unification that seemed not to threaten the essential postwar pattern. But this form was inadequate to the new Europe, and a version of European political self-assertion emerged that challenged the postwar division of Europe between American and Soviet zones of influence.

NATO might once have been transformed into a political union, had there been a generous American abdication of dominance, a willing acceptance of a place as (perhaps) first among equals, a genuine determination to accept the fact that European interests were not identical with American. This did not happen. The slogans of Atlantic union were professed, but in reality a series of different choices were made. America resisted change; it resisted not merely President de Gaulle but that wholly European conception of European interests of which Gaullist policy was a single expression. To have done so may indeed have been in the American national interest, but it was also to attempt to continue to dominate the course of events in Western Europe. And that was an effort which, in the long run, could only fail. Europe is another continent, its nations products of another history, its fate bound up in the relations of the European peoples—from the Atlantic to the Urals. Union with the United States might have been possible had the United States been able to accept its share of the European concern not merely to defend against the Soviets but to act within this continent. America did not, perhaps could not, perhaps should not have done so.

But Europe today has the power, and increasingly it has the will, to act upon those relationships and to define a Europe freed of its postwar political condition. Russians and Americans met at the Elbe in 1945 amidst the ruins of a Europe which had ravaged itself. But now the ruins are gone, and in both Eastern and Western Europe the two great non-European states which were drawn into the European convulsion of 1914–1945 now are being pressed to withdraw again. For better or for worse, Europe is reclaiming its autonomy.

other voices

PEACE WITHOUT PACIFISM?

In an article which appears in the February issue of Liberation magazine, Alex and Sue D. Gottfried have distinguished between two kinds of groups caught up in the burgeoning peace movement in America: those which adhere to what the authors call “traditional pacifism” and those “new” organizations which have risen to the challenge of nuclear war. Excerpts from that article follow.

Every cause, it goes without saying, must have its ethos, its moral motivation and aspirational character. The peace-cause in America has long had such an ethos; indeed, in the opinion of many critics, until recently it had little else. This ethos was provided by the stand of the traditional pacifist, and by the organized groups through which this stand was expressed. During the period of peace activity in the last half-decade, there have been three striking latter-day developments which are designed to provide other elements heretofore lacking to the peace-cause. These three developments are (1) electoral politics for peace; (2) the effort to join all the democratic peace forces under the single banner of Turn Toward Peace; and (3) the birth of what is called “peace research,” attracting men and women in varied areas of professional competence. Together with the passive-resistance and non-violent direct action techniques evolved by traditional pacifists, these developments—the effort to capture the ballot; the effort to build a mass movement which would have access to decision-makers; and the effort to develop theories and concrete proposals based upon a body of knowledge—substantially encompass the approaches, short of armed revolution, open to a minority cause in our society; and with these developments many hope that the American peace movement has come of age.

Disparate as these three developments may be in some respects, they are alike in that their architects and supporters view them as being addressed to the practical realities of achieving a world freed of war. This distinguishes them from traditional pacifism, which is fundamentally addressed to the moral issues of war.

It seems fair to say that if traditional pacifism provides the ethos for the “new” movement, it does so by default, because the emergent movement has no other moral base upon which to stand. The new movement has grown out of rational fear of man’s
capacity for evil; traditional pacifism, on the other hand, grows out of faith in man's capacity for good. While both propositions may be necessary to a balanced view, only the latter can be a source of moral and psychological strength. The former clearly cannot and is incapable of giving the peace-cause a positive character, regardless of how many "concrete," "realistic," "relevant" ideas it may have to offer. It seems reasonable to assume that many of the most promising of these ideas will not, after all, "work," or that their effects, too, may not be immediately discernible. As one after another "realistic" approach fails to yield observable results, the peace movement will need to be sustained by something more than the hopes pinned upon results. That "something else" is nothing less than the faith that what the peace movement seeks is right, regardless of how little general society appears to agree.

The "new" movement must be questioned on its own grounds of "relevance" and "practicality." In spite of its claim to these qualities, it must be admitted that we do not know, finally, what approach is going to carry the peace cause farthest, fastest. The history of other American cause groups will not reveal very much to us except our own temperament-al prejudices. Will capturing Congressmen, developing sensible blueprints for orderly change "work," or will direct action, civil disobedience "work"? The revolutions accomplished almost overnight through the latter methods, in the struggle for racial integration, or in the women's suffrage movement, suggest that such approaches are not without the power of attaining practical ends. These phenomena unfortunately do not assure us that the patient legal and educational efforts of the NAACP, or the fifty years of educational and legislative activities among the suffragettes were "irrelevant" to the outcome. On the contrary, the history of these movements caution us that progressives and radicals, alike, are ill-advised to look upon one another's efforts as mis-directed.

The demonstrator-approach is an embarrassment to the new movement on less immediate grounds as well. Like the nation-states themselves, the new movement is endeavoring to "negotiate from a position of strength." This is what the "outreach into mass organizations," the drive to gain political power, the concentration upon "decision-makers" and "opinion-leaders" is, in one important sense, all about. It is very difficult to create an impression of strength, however, while you are employing the methods of the numerically weak.

Traditional pacifists on the other hand, engage in direct action not only because, as a weak mi-

ority, they have few other avenues for expressing their concerns, but for more basic reasons as well. Traditional pacifism is fundamentally revolutionary; it does not look to personal improvement and social reform, but to individual regeneration and social transformation. Its appeal is not primarily to the existing power structure, but to the consciences of men. This being the case, it must more often than not by-pass the usual forms of influencing and communicating with the existing structure, in favor of a direct confrontation of human beings qua human beings. The Quaker witness, for example, as is sometimes not fully realized by those participating in its group manifestations, is not primarily a canny political tool; it is an expression of individual conscience, addressed to other individuals.

There is every reason, as the leaders of the "new" movement insist, that the stand of conscience should not stand alone, but should be accompanied by all the practical approaches the new movement has been so creative in formulating. Nevertheless, if it is true—as the peace-pragmatists themselves keep telling us, without seeming always to understand what they are saying—if it is true that nothing less than a revolution is required for the abolition of war, then we will need more than a few revolutionaries. And they will need to recruit more than a few ordinary human beings who are willing to make revolutionary changes in their own lives. These revolutionary personal changes may involve, at one end of the scale, only the courage to overcome the "doubt whether one may not be going to prove oneself a fool"—what Hawthorne saw as a formidable barrier to radical social action—and, at the other end of the scale, willingness to give one's life rather than to cooperate in taking the lives of others. Ultimately, this message is more "hard line" than any "hard line" thinking of the peace or war pragmatists.

The so-called "naive" assumptions and approaches of the traditional pacifists thus have a cornerstone importance to the peace movement. But the traditional pacifist has another peculiar use, which is, quite crudely, to keep the peace movement honest. In the effort to sell the message to opinion-leaders, decision-makers, power-holders, and the masses, there is always the understandable temptation to tone the message down to what these are ready to buy, while the necessities of compromise involved in backing "winners" for public office, or in being a winner, are too well-known to need elaboration here. Only the conscientious scruples of the purists can be counted upon to keep reminding us of what the message really is—to keep the power of the idea, so to speak, until its time comes.