Among the most significant aspects of Senator Fulbright's March address, The Minority of One notes in a lead editorial in the May issue, was the timing of its delivery. Since it is "utterly unthinkable that so important a speech by the Administration's chief Congressional spokesman on foreign affairs should not have been coordinated with the White House," it now seems "that President Johnson and his aids are quite willing to turn foreign policy matters into issues of the Presidential election."

Although responsibility for the content of the speech can be easily disclaimed by the Administration—such is often the case with "trial balloons"—the editorial writer find it "nonetheless extremely significant that instead of waiting until after the November elections, a process of reevaluation of foreign policy has been launched as a part of the Presidential campaign." The debate which could very well take place in the months ahead "would constitute a massive national course in foreign relations and it would make the choice among the Presidential candidates more meaningful than it has been since the end of World War II."

Louis J. Halle, writing from Geneva about the "World Challenge to Mr. Johnson," (The New York Times Magazine, April 5), does not foresee any significant foreign policy debate within the next few months. He states that, at least until after the November Presidential election, "we must expect the United States to remain frozen in attitudes that represent the idiosyncracies and sometimes the backwardness of American public opinion, or of influential elements in that opinion."

Halle attributes this situation, one in which foreign policy "seems to be dictated less by reason than by the passion of an unsophisticated public opinion in our country," to the Constitutional doctrine of the separation of powers prescribed for both domestic and foreign affairs. The "built-in conflict between the President and the Congress," which results from this system of government, "makes the President dependent on broad public support as the chief instrument for bending Congress to his will," the writer contends. As seen from abroad, the United States "is never able to move in the foreign field except after an exhausting process of negotiation" with the legislature. And "it sometimes appears that the Presidential Administration has one foreign policy, the Congress another."

What is more, few Chief Executives have been altogether successful in enlisting public support of their policies in the foreign arena, and some "have . . . bowed to a public opinion that they despaired of changing, adjusting their own public thinking on the principle that where one cannot lead one had better follow."

In such a system, which "tends to paralysis," only "the occupation of the White House by a strong and courageous President who is able, at the crucial moments, to mobilize public opinion in support of his own policies," can effect the necessary changes. "This," in Halle's view, "is the challenge that President Johnson now faces."

In "The Myth of Communist Solidarity," Victor C. Ferkiss of Georgetown University has surveyed the assumptions which underlie the U.S. policy of flexibility toward "Communist regimes of differing national interests and policies," and has given evidence for the assertion that this policy has been instrumental in weakening the monolithic structure of Eastern Europe (The Catholic World, June).

But if this policy has been "on the whole successful," Professor Ferkiss asks, "why then does it meet with so much public criticism?" He suggests that refusal to accept the government's position of flexibility "stems not so much from ideological conviction about the nature of communism as from a lack of faith not only in the performance but in the possibilities of American diplomacy. Americans, it is assumed, are somehow less clever than Communists when it comes to foreign policy maneuvering."

While miscalculations can and do occur, errors are not the property of any one side, Ferkiss writes, and "when the United States feels it can gain by refusal to accept the government's position of flexibility toward 'Communist regimes of differing national interests and policies,' and has given evidence for the assertion that this policy has been instrumental in weakening the monolithic structure of Eastern Europe (The Catholic World, June)."

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