value be slighted. But they are not sufficient. The weaknesses of any school of political theorists are likely to be more evident as that school gains the ascendency. There are weaknesses in this school and they were clearly evident in Dean Acheson’s own candid, direct address.

After positing as the admirable and generally accepted goal of our policy—"to preserve and foster an environment in which free societies may exist and flourish"—Dean Acheson said that we should then adopt a “strategic approach” to the means by which we achieve that goal. Moral considerations are largely irrelevant here, he said, as they were in making decisions about the Cuban crisis of 1962, in deciding to manufacture the bomb, in Lincoln’s attitude to slavery relative to the Union. He could readily have multiplied the examples but his point was clear: in foreign policy the means are largely exempt from moral considerations.

Yet the mind rests uneasily on this hard premise and Mr. Acheson sought to soften it: “in foreign affairs, only the end can justify the means; this is not to say that the end justifies any means, or that some ends can justify anything.” But we know the end, the goal of our foreign policy. What means can that end not justify? Once we admit that some means are not justified then all means come under moral scrutiny in order that we may distinguish in ethical terms the acceptable from the non-acceptable, the undesirable from the even less desirable. Since people make different prudential assessments, judgments here will inevitably differ, but they will be made. This does not mean that the discussion concerning proper measures will be couched in moral terms. If moral awareness is absent at the time of decision it is not likely then to be provided. These assertions run directly counter, of course, to a major intent of Acheson’s statement.

The fact that a person of Mr. Acheson’s experience, knowledge and acuity has not led us out of the political wilderness, has not totally dissipated the confusion, is less a criticism of him than it is a proof of the complexity of the discussion and a sign that it should not die. For those who differ with Mr. Acheson never said that it was easy to show the relevance of ethics to foreign policy; they said that it was necessary and must, therefore, be made possible. As Jacques Maritain once wrote, in exactly this context, the means are, “so to speak, the end itself in its very process of coming to existence.”

J. F.

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**In the magazines**

One view of relations between the “third world” and the West is provided by Brian Crozier in a review of several books recently published in England (Spectator, December 4). He reports that “an academic friend . . . wrote not long ago to suggest that it was my clear duty to write a book on how the West might rub along with the underdeveloped countries.” But Crozier believes that the first order of business is for “someone to write a book telling the people of the underdeveloped countries how to rub along with the West.” He suggests that “whatever it might begin with a harsh reality: they need ‘us’ more than ‘we’ need ‘them.’ Or, as Orwell . . . might have put it: all countries are interdependent but some are more interdependent than others.”

What should inform the relationship between the two areas? Crozier contends that it is “in the enlightened self-interest of the richer countries that the poverty of the poorer ones should be reduced, just as it was in the enlightened self-interest of American capitalism that the workers should be given purchasing power; if world poverty is not reduced as quickly as possible, the outcome can only be a deepening revolutionary chaos which, to the extent that it does anybody any good, will only help the West’s enemies.” And since development is also “an inescapable reality in countries that are overcrowded, as well as undernourished, such as India and China . . . in most cases . . . it is in the interest of poor countries, too, that they should grow richer; and in this, their interest coincides with ours. The principal sources of capital and know-how, however, are in the West.”

It will then be “in the enlightened self-interest of the ‘emerging’ countries to stop attacking what they call neo-colonialism and welcome it with open arms,” Crozier goes on to say. Certainly “the West could . . . make a bigger and saner contribution to third-world development than it now does . . . But it would be so much easier to move in the direction of sanity if our underdeveloped friends stopped crying ‘neo-colonialism’ and we stopped crediting the third
world with qualities" of cohesiveness and strength "it manifestly lacks."

David Halberstam characterizes the relationship between the American diplomatic-military mission and the American press in Saigon as "quite different from that which existed anywhere in the world." Halberstam, former Vietnam correspondent for the New York Times, reports in the January issue of Commentary that "in most underdeveloped countries the relationship between the American embassy and the American reporter is fairly simply and generally straightforward. A reporter arriving in, say, a country in Africa will go to see officials of the American mission almost immediately. From them he can count on hearing the local American position, but he can also count on getting a relatively detached, if limited, view of the local government, its relations with the U.S., with the Eastern bloc, and with its neighbors." Halberstam adds that "if anything, reporters—and New York Times reporters in particular—may be treated too well. The reporter constantly has to remind himself that he is an ambassador in a small country where there is no immediate crisis may regard him as the best way to break through State Department channels. . . ."

In Vietnam, however, there were problems of communication between the two groups that existed nowhere else, Halberstam contends. He notes that "some were later to claim that the difficulties which arose between the press and the American mission were the result of poor handling or inept news management. But in fact the conflict went much deeper. The job of reporters in Vietnam was to report the news, whether or not the news was good for America. To the ambassadors and generals, on the other hand, it was crucial that the news be good, and they regarded any other interpretation as defeatist and irresponsible."

Walter Lippmann foresees a period during which there will be "a general movement towards the settlement of the second world war"—a movement that the prolonged postwar period of 20 years has not permitted. "The hard core of the settlement," he wrote in the New York Herald Tribune of February 2, "will be the inevitable return to normal after the convulsions which the world war produced. Thus, in Europe, the collapse of Hitler's Nazi empire brought the Russians to the Elbe River in the middle of Europe. The Soviet tide will have to recede. In fact, it has quite visibly begun to recede. In East Asia, the collapse of the Japanese empire brought the United States to the Asian mainland and to some of the islands off its shores. This is an extension of our political power beyond its normal and natural limits, and like the Russians in Europe, the American tide will have to recede.

"It is as abnormal for the United States to be in Seoul, in Okinawa, in Quemoy and Matsu and Formosa, in Saigon and Hue," Lippmann contends, "as it is abnormal for the Russians to be in Berlin, Warsaw, Prague, Budapest, Bucharest and Sofia. The settlement of the world war, which must come some day, is certain to mean correction of the great displacements of power—of the Russian power into the heart of Europe and of American power onto the mainland of Asia."

. . . the time has come to say unequivocally of Latin-American studies in the United States that the princeling—he is hardly an emperor—has no clothes on," writes a Yale historian and former director of the Institute of Caribbean Studies at the University of Puerto Rico. Richard M. Morse suggests in the issue of The Annals dealing with "The Non-Western World in Higher Education" (November 1964) "that the defects of Latin-American studies in the United States are largely attributable to a fundamental alienation between the two Americas"; a "subconscious hostility" between "two cultures whose historic spiritual trajectories are not merely different . . . but diametrically opposed."

While Americans who conduct most area studies "can count on the relative innocence of their audience, on the student's willingness to suspend judgment and to clamber, however gracelessly, into a new cultural universe," those in the United States who deal with the Hispanic world run into "deep spiritual entanglements," with a resulting decline in the quality of scholarship.

One reason for this state of affairs, says Morse, is "that our country was founded in revolt against Catholicism, against the layered and corporative society, against casuistical justice, against toleration of sin in the human community, against individual eccentricity and affective release—against the whole late-medieval world . . . which is still largely a reality for Hispanic peoples. Seventeenth-century Ibero-America stood for everything which Anglo-America had set itself heroically against. History is not so capricious that this situation has radically changed. Our present doctrinal diversity and toleration obscure for us the fact that we are integrally a Protestant nation, insensitive and vaguely hostile to the sociological and psychological foundations of a Catholic society. We assume that Calvin and Locke are a point of departure for 'American studies'—while would-be Orientalists, I gather, must sweat over Buddha, Confucious, and Lao-tse. Yet how seriously have any of us dared require a steeping in St. Thomas, Dante, and Suarez for those who would understand Latin America?"