

only easy but logical to enlarge our oppressions in the form of international nuclear threats. I submit that the two phenomena, segregation and the arms race, are very much connected and that the vicious seeds of one can help promote the other. . . ."

Not everyone will agree with this proposition nor with the larger argument of which it is a part. The full argument does, however, apparently persuade many people who are vitally concerned about the entire political effort in which our country is engaged and with the effect that effort has upon the health of our society. Others who do not accept the theoretical relations which this argument attempts to establish are quick to point out some of the practical relations. It is not, they point out, that the production of nuclear arms and the limited war in Vietnam drain off monies that could be spent improving the lot of the disenfranchised, the poor and dispossessed; the U.S. is wealthy enough to do both if it has the will

and the talent. It is that crises in other parts of the world inevitably turn our attention from the crisis we must struggle with at home. Consider, for example, what would have happened if the Selma march and the murder of James Reeb had occurred simultaneously with an explosive, particularly threatening act in Vietnam. Would the nation, and the world, have turned its eyes on Selma? Would President Johnson have been moved to give the vigorous speech he did? Would we now have for enactment the Civil Rights Bill that we do? The negative answer is all too obvious.

It should be evident that there is not one but a variety of reasons for relating civil rights to Vietnam. It is inevitable that those who are most moved by one reason will be inclined to find that primary and to dismiss or slight the rest. And this is a danger open to those who support the civil rights movement, including SNCC, as well as those who would undermine it. J. F.

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## ***in the magazines***

"The conduct of diplomacy can be no better than the institutional framework which supports it," writes Nathaniel McKitterick in *The New Republic* (March 27). And yet, "the United States is the only great power today which has persistently refused to accord to professional diplomacy both continuity and high status in the formulation and conduct of policy. All recent Presidents and Secretaries of State have paid a high price for this refusal. All have been unnecessarily surprised by the actions and reactions of other governments, simply because the State Department has not been allowed to organize its professional bureaucracy to provide constant, timely and professional guidance to the Secretary of State. As a result of this critical shortcoming, State has gradually forfeited to others, the Pentagon usually, or the Central Intelligence Agency, or even at times agencies like the Peace Corps, its legitimate role in the formulation of policy in key areas."

"President Kennedy," McKitterick says, "learned of State's crippling ailment early in his term." In his opinion "the still, small voice of indecision which characterized State's briefing of President Kennedy in advance of the Bay of Pigs disaster—a briefing which masked strong views held by some professional officers experienced in Latin American affairs

—permanently poisoned relations between the Kennedy White House and the Kennedy State Department. State's role in Vietnam during the Kennedy years became one of playing the dinghy, dragged on behind the Pentagon's yawl. Even the most brilliant diplomatic success of the Kennedy years, the Cuban missile crisis, must be credited to the Secretary of Defense and his staff, not to the Secretary of State and his staff."

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Richard Falk writes that he welcomes the translation into English of the opinion of the District Court of Tokyo in the case of *Shimoda and Others v. Japan* handed down in December 1963 (*The Nation*, February 15). This decision, which involves "claims against the state brought by injured survivors of the atomic attack on Hiroshima and Nagasaki" suggests to Falk "that the time is ripe also for a moral reckoning in the United States."

He reports that in reaching its decision "the court was careful to refrain from making extravagant claims about the relevance of international law to the conditions of atomic attack and to avoid 'legislating' on the delicate matters before it. At the same time, it reached the clear and momentous conclu-

sion that the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were illegal."

"But it is not for its contribution to international law that the *Shimoda* case is most important," Falk says. "It is rather that the specific context of the claim, with the vividness supplied by the details of the injuries, has produced a text for the study of the whole relationship between nuclear weapons and human destiny. . . . The magnitude of the horrors caused at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, though at a level far below the destructive potential of current bombs, deprives us of the numbing abstractions about national security, credible deterrents and the like."

This case "may also supplement existing attempts to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons in international conflict," the author contends. For example, he says, "in my judgment, a tradition of no-first use [of nuclear weapons], if seriously supported by the official proclamation of principal governments, would considerably improve the prospects for avoiding nuclear war. . . . We refrained from using poison gas against the Japanese, despite its relevance to the successful conduct of island and jungle warfare. We refrained more because the weapon was illegitimate than because we feared retaliation. If nuclear weapons could be banned by common tradition, then our defense planning would have to be changed so that security interests could be satisfied without reliance upon them. However, such a tradition will lack its true moral foundation until Hiroshima and Nagasaki are reconsidered and responsibility accepted for the wrongs done there."

In what an editorial note calls "one of the rare original articles in *Survival*," publication of The Institute for Strategic Studies in London, Leonard Beaton surveys the background of the October 16 Chinese atomic bomb explosion and speculates about the further development of the Chinese nuclear capacity (January-February 1965). Mr. Beaton, a Senior Research Associate at the Institute, states that "militarily and diplomatically, a nuclear weapons industry in its present state of development may have the opposite effect to what is generally anticipated and make China exceedingly docile in her relations with the United States. With very poor air defenses, the gaseous diffusion plant, in particular, becomes a prime target for conventional retaliatory strikes in the event of any major incident or conflict. Seldom can so much potential power have been obviously exposed to attack by a hostile rival. The knowledge in Peking that it presents so tempting a target may impose standards of behavior which could make a sharp contrast, for some years at least, with Chinese professions of revolutionary purity."

John W. Kalas, a minister who is a member of the

philosophy department at Lake Forest College, offers a new concept in military planning which allegedly insures "peace with justice to war strategists," but which risks none of the lethal consequences of the present arms race. His plan, as sketched in the February 19 issue of *Reconstructionist*, publication of the Jewish Reconstructionist Foundation, "is to extend the commonly used notion of 'war games' to an international scale, with actual antagonists playing for real stakes." The opposing players would be "two nations at odds with one another, say the U.S. and the USSR. Let them each marshal their best military minds," he says, "to work out a strategy based upon desired ends and present effectiveness of military devices. The 'interaction of wills' on each side is to be encouraged. Research into weapons technology may continue undiminished, and new developments will be added to the portfolio of a nation when the weapon is operative." However, "neither side will need to build or stockpile the weapons" (although, he adds, "if necessary a mockup can be built without a warhead"). "After the respective strategists have wrung the possibilities dry, the computers will go to work to assess the probable results of the various strategies" and all manner of attempts will be made to "discover what the other has up its sleeve."

Then, "at a predetermined date 'war' will commence. The war will consist in a summit meeting between the heads of the warring states. The head of each state will attack by laying open for inspection his portfolio containing a military strategy and a statistically projected outcome. . . . Weapons capacity and effectiveness will need to be checked, and, if necessary, challenged. . . ."

"At the end of this period it should be possible to decide who has won the war and who has lost it," Kalas maintains. "In rare cases an arbitrator may be needed to decide victory or defeat. The antagonists will have agreed upon the arbitrator ahead of time from among a list of heads of neutral nations."

Although it is possible that "the arms race will continue," it will now do so "in non-lethal form. Weapons technology will increase," for example, and "the armament race will be more competitive than ever, but the purpose of the armaments race will be to introduce devastation *only* as the computer predicts it. . . . It will be possible to have all the advantages of knowing whether we are ahead or behind the arms race without the debilitating fear of annihilation."

In other magazines:

"New Directions in United States Foreign Policy," *Social Action*, April.

"Ghana and the Liberal Mind," by Keith Kyle, *Spectator*, April 16.

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