

not entirely false. . . . This debunking of the commonly assumed superior knowledge of governments is vitally important to the effective functioning of democracy. Governments are mostly not worthy of so much respect for greater wisdom . . . ”

This does not imply, as Myrdal is careful to note, that there is an easily tapped source of wisdom in some sector of the public. Those citizens who wish to decide policy by hurling an ethical thunderbolt at what they regard as dangerous policies must pass the same harsh tests that are imposed on government officials. What

is implied is that a better foreign policy will be the result of a democracy in which citizens will have more control over foreign policy because those who are able care enough to demand the responsibility which is properly theirs. The foreign policy of a democratic nation should be a joint enterprise which those who actually make the decisions share with the citizens in whose name and for whose benefit the state acts. The further the foreign policy of the nation is from that goal, the more applicable to it is the Chancellor's statement.

J. F.

in the magazines

Which side are you on in Vietnam? Milton Kotler, a frequent contributor to *Liberation* magazine, says that for a number of reasons that decision is a difficult one for many Americans to make. “My generation,” he writes in the June-July issue, “had one good fortune. It escaped the afflictions of ideology which still possess our elders. When we reached consciousness in the fifties, we faced McCarthy and Stalin, and saw both as rotten; but Stalin as no more rotten than McCarthy. That's important,” Kotler notes, “to see just precisely how equal things were. Once that judgment of equality was made, then if our heart would at moments reach to Stalin, that judgment would also carry along McCarthy. McCarthy was no more rotten than Stalin. In both men there was equal truth and falsity, equal evil and good. In short, politics after twenty years gained the light of character. Men could be judged. Isms were transcended. Thereafter we have been able to carry that tender resource of humanism to our social judgment.

“We were fortunate in the fifties. Politics became more philosophical and less active than in the thirties. It had become a field of knowledge, in which affections could be spent and reflected. More true to life.” But “today we pay the price of that wiser politics.” For where there is no ideology, there are no parties of history and truth. In the equality of Stalin and McCarthy, there was no party to lead the way; nor any chance for the pleasures of heresy. Each of us had to fashion a politics, a view, a world

image. For most it was a worthless task, so few have done it.

“The fifties were an isolating decade. Events trained us never to take sides. We were always prepared to be a third force between McCarthy and the Communists. Between Israel and Egypt, America was a third force. In Greece, Lebanon, China, Guatemala, and elsewhere in the fifties, the nation played the third force. Acting for legitimacy, we were against the Communists, for self-determination. Our intervention was never for us, but for freedom and self-determination. As a policeman, our power leaped and bounded to staggering nuclear heights.”

And so how ill-prepared many are when “one morning we awake and see that we are no longer a third force, but a major party to conflict.” What side does one take in a “struggle” which “is not ideological but humanistic . . . a struggle between temperaments”? “What side do we take,” Kotler asks, “without destroying our spirit, our love, our past, and the rejoicing vision with which this nation began?”

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Editor Max Ascoli criticizes as immoral in at least one respect the view taken by “neo-isolationists” toward American military commitments in Vietnam (*The Reporter*, July 1). He identifies these “advocates of isolationism” as the people who “incessantly tell the government: be quiet, don't overreach yourself. If you find yourself mixed up in lands too far away, gently slip out. The less you look at the So-

viet-Chinese brawl, the more likely it will turn to our advantage. Be gentle to our enemies. In fact don't think of them as enemies; we have won a victory in the 'cold war' that will remain ours as long as we keep it secret."

Certainly "it is not because Vietnam and the whole of the former French Indo-China are in remote Asia that an expansion of the war is to be avoided," Mr. Ascoli goes on to say. "Unfortunately, we do not know about the will of the Communist rulers, and neither do the people under Communist rule. But lack of concern on our part for the people of Asia—or anti-globalism—is immoral, for the notion is immoral that the men and women of Asia are a separate breed, a sort of half-caste world, for whom a system of government and of values that Western civilization abhors is good enough."

Arthur J. Moore, a contributing editor to *Christianity and Crisis* (and himself editor of *World Outlook*), reviews "one of the most frustrating aspects of public consideration of United States foreign policy at the present time"—"finding out the facts." He writes in an editorial in the June 28 issue that "it is axiomatic in a democratic society that major questions of policy must be decided by the general public after the pertinent facts and viewpoints are presented to them and public debate takes place. It is true that in wartime much of this debate is suspended," Moore continues, "and much more information is withheld, but this is always regarded as extraordinary and dangerous for democracy."

But "we are at present involved in an anomalous situation—we are at war and not at war. Our stated aim in Vietnam (and in the Dominican Republic) is to withdraw on honorable terms, but our practical policy is to create a military situation where we can achieve honorable terms. The net effect of this is to involve us more and more while we simultaneously proclaim our desire to withdraw.

"In such a situation, ends and means can easily become disassociated to a dangerous degree," he asserts. "Pressures begin to build to defend our actions in light of our stated aims." And "not the least of these pressures is the mere fact of a President who is known to favor a broad consensus encompassing most points of view and who publicly extols discussion and criticism but is understood privately to be greatly irritated by such criticism," the author writes.

"Given this set of circumstances, it is only too easy to see where the tendency to soften the unpleasant, to put cosmetics on the ugly fact, begins to take over. The selected fact, the discreet omission, the diplomatic silence effectively forestall the moral repugnance of the lie and serve the purpose quite as effectively."

Of course "all of this is quite human and takes

place in many spheres besides that of the government," the author states further. "Leftists, romantic as always, may denounce 'the big lie,' but the true echo is more likely to come back whispering 'public relations.'" But "in end results . . . the difference is immaterial. If the public does not have candid answers to its questions, the well of public life is poisoned, and it does not matter too much whether it was poisoned by malice or miscalculation."

No final judgments "On the Morality of Chemical/Biological War," are offered by Richard J. Krickus in the June issue of *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*. He presents, instead, an "exercise in which the moral questions posed by the employment of CB weapons will be measured against those principles generally held today by the proponents of the just war doctrine." These principles, Krickus says, contrary to those espoused by the "pacifist or ethical absolutist," do not in effect close the door to the search for less extreme alternatives to modern weapons of mass destruction.

What the proponent of the just war argues, writes Krickus, is that while "the extreme alternatives—total war or total submission to an aggressor—are unacceptable . . . there are other alternatives (nuclear deterrence or conventional operations)" with which policy-makers can legitimately grapple. ". . . their doctrine is" thus "relevant to the statesman's predicament today. Namely, how can a limited war be waged in an era when the lines that distinguish the warrior from the noncombatant are obscured, when the weapons that the belligerents possess are difficult to control and when unrestricted use of these weapons will destroy those values and institutions which one is fighting to preserve in the first place?"

Mr. Krickus, a member of the Bendix Corporation's Washington Arms Control Project Office, reviews the problems encountered by the moralist and the military leader who consider chemical/biological weapons, and he takes a look at the practical limits of the restraint which international law and conventions can impose in times of war and peace.

He does note at one point that because those who criticize CB operations on moral grounds "have assumed a moral consensus in this country against CB agents and have terminated the debate at that point," "the arms control and disarmament aspects of CB have been neglected." And "although certain government agencies have been working on the control of CB, they have not been able to benefit from non-governmental research in this area, notably on political, social, and legal questions." Still, Krickus believes, "it seems prudent to assume that, in the near future, the proliferation of CB weapons will pose an 'nth-country problem' similar to the nuclear one that threatens the 'status quo' today."

PAMPHILUS