show Singapore as a clearly independent country. But they remain important for what they tell us about the C.I.A. and its relation to official, declared policies of our government.

Any country—certainly one as powerful as the United States—can readily admit and absorb the damage inflicted by several such disclosures. But a series of them does damage that may not easily be repaired. Future denials of U.S. intervention in the affairs of any particular state will carry less weight not only in the other countries but here at home. Statements from our State Department will be received with a degree of skepticism. The real accomplishments of our intelligence agencies will be offset by the equally real harm that is done to our management of foreign affairs. And the existent worry that the C.I.A. not only carries out policy directives but does on occasion suggest and make policy will increase.

These are legitimate concerns for every citizen. If there is a danger that naive and uninformed citizens would attempt to put a precipitate and premature halt to some activities of the C.I.A., there is another danger that informed and sophisticated observers may too readily accept the widespread engagement of intelligence agents in affairs of policy as the price we must pay to maintain our national interests. This is an area where the instinctive hesitation of the average citizen to accept clandestine behavior and his repugnance for some of the less attractive aspects of covert activities should not readily be dismissed. If the gap between the goals we profess to seek and means we use to seek them grows too wide, it will weaken the citizens' trust in their own government, and without such trust even a strong state cannot well survive the crises that it must inevitably face.

J. F.
Mr. Acheson has always been an extremely unrealistic Realpolitiker," notes the author, and he cites a number of the former Secretary of State's "errors" of judgment and policy.

"One of the reasons for the rejection of morality in international affairs is a sort of devil-worship," Goldbloom contends. "The argument runs approximately thus: the Communists use immoral means, the Communists are successful, therefore immoral means bring success and we on our side must not hesitate to use them." He adds that "this attitude is not peculiar to the present administration; it has influenced American policy for a number of years past. John Foster Dulles regarded V. M. Molotov as the greatest diplomat of modern times, and his own diplomacy frequently showed the influence of that master, with unhappy results. The Bay of Pigs adventure was a product of the same sort of thinking, although after that disaster the Kennedy Administration appears to have become much more skeptical of the thesis."

"What is wrong with the argument, of course, is that what success the Communists have had has been due primarily to the appeal of the ideas and programs they have had to offer, and to the deficiencies of their enemies," Goldbloom maintains. "They have, indeed, had a notable capacity for ruthlessness, dishonesty and disregard of international law. But on the whole these things have been sources of weakness, not strength. Hungary left the Soviet position weaker, not stronger; it seems scarcely questionable that the activities of Soviet spies in the United States did both the Soviet Union and the American Communist party a great deal more harm than good. But only the techniques of communism are visible to people who are incapable of recognizing the force of ideas per se, or at least of ideas which they do not share, and who often cannot see the weaknesses which have toppled regimes such as Chiang Kai-shek's, because they partake of those weaknesses themselves."

Mr. Goldbloom, a former foreign-service officer, concludes that "if we are to persuade the rest of the world that we, and not the Communists, deserve its support, we must offer a better and not merely a more powerful alternative. Morality without power may end in frustration, but power which disregards morality is monstrous—and usually ends by destroying its own basis."

The Administration's view of recent policy decisions in one critical area is provided by G. Mennen Williams in Africa Report (August). In "U.S. Objectives in the Congo, 1960-65," the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs takes a look at "some of the basic realities in the Congo and how United States policy relates to them."

A special issue of The Catholic Worker on "War and Peace at the Vatican Council" addresses the Catholic Bishops who will soon debate the controversial Schema XIII of Article 25 at the final session of Vatican II. The editorial in the July-August issue sees "no pressures from the side of nuclear nationalism" which "should move the Council Fathers to see the nuclear deterrent, and the 'balance of terror' that it has brought upon the world, as anything but an eroder of the Christian concept of the infinite dignity of man, inhabited by the spirit of God and made in His image." It asks: "How could such a threat of mass annihilation of God's human and material creation help preserve peace or stability? How can societies vowed to the defense of the rights of the human person preserve those rights by constant, coldly calculated threats to the bodily integrity of millions of innocent human beings?"

"There are those," the editorial continues, "who suggest that a way out of the armament trap, which, by heaping overkill on overkill, is impoverishing mankind, would be unilateral steps toward disarmament. Those who are aghast at such proposals might remember that all morality is unilateral. We cannot wait for the other person to perform a moral act before we perform it or before we veer from a sinful to a moral course. They need perhaps to be reminded that the armament race, especially the nuclear build-up of the United States, was a unilateral action."

A signed editorial in Concern, publication of the General Board of Christian Social Concerns of The Methodist Church (August 1-15, 1965) calls attention to recent developments in U.S. policy in Vietnam which may be looked upon as attempts to "move closer to what may become the basis of negotiations at some future date: the Geneva agreements of 1954."

To Herman Will, a contributing editor of Concern, this is a signal that "those who believe churchmen should remain silent or should support the Administration's policy in Vietnam on the ground that the President and his advisors know best, fail to take into account the dynamics of policy making in government today. There are many differences in view," he writes, "even among the 'experts.' There are many forces, both inside and outside the government, that seek to influence policy decisions in one direction or another for a variety of reasons. One need not question the motives of those who are so engaged in order to conclude that concerned citizens and church bodies ought to seek the essential facts and then express judgments informed by Christian insights into the nature and destiny of man."