

and that the alternative to it is never the Kingdom of God. In China, as an example, the choice was and is between rule by Chiang Kai-shek and rule by Mao Tse-tung. One wonders what liberties the ordinary Chinese have had under either of these rulers which were greater than those they had under the other. Mr. Quade is probably aware that, aside from the question of liberty, under one of these rulers the common people have had universal education and that under the other they have not; that under the one they have had medical care and under the other they have not; that under the one they have had decent clothing and adequate food and under the other they have frequently had rags and the starvation of millions. Under the one they have taken pride in their progress and under the other they have been without hope of progress. Mr. Quade may make his own decision as to which of the rulers it was who showed concern for the people in each of the above instances while the other did not.

One can only suggest that Mr. Quade, instead of telling God whose side He is on, might do well to make sure he is on God's side before he starts the killing. Mr. Quade would probably be amazed at the suggestion that God sent the rod of his anger against His people in order to have them return to following His ways of justice and mercy rather than for them to kill Assyrians or others whom He loved. It would probably absolutely astound him to learn that should His people have returned to following His ways, the

Prince of Peace might have been able to handle the situation without calling on human killers for help.

KURT W. KRAUSE

The Author Replies

Milwaukee, Wis.

Dear Sir: The letter of Mr. Kurt W. Krause commenting on my "Wars of National Liberation" article is quite intriguing. I did not attempt "to bring the Prince of Peace into a partnership . . ." with myself. Rather, I asked what the Prince of Peace told me to do about, e.g., Vietnam, and I concluded that He told me to work it out, recognizing that I might work it out wrongly. In other words, the argument is precisely over whether or not the Christian as Christian has an *a priori* key to correct policy. What I take to be the gist of Mr. Krause's first paragraph suggests that at least on Vietnam there is such a key. My "blasphemy," therefore, results from my failure to perceive the key.

The second paragraph, however, does not seem to fit the above categories. For in this, Mr. Krause seems to be arguing on prudential grounds, i.e., at least relatively speaking, the threat of communism is not as dastardly as I portrayed it, the alternative may be no better, and so forth. These points are in fact the very issues which I said must be appraised en route to wise decision, and in raising them Mr. Krause seems to be saying my appraisal is in error. This I take to be progress, for I would rather be erroneous than blasphemous. QUENTIN L. QUADE

Church and State: Is the Conflict Profound?

Peter and Caesar: Political Authority and the Catholic Church, by E. A. Goerner, Herder and Herder. \$5.95.

by Bernard Murchland

Peter and Caesar have never gotten on very well together. Like a marriage of convenience their relationship has always lacked the air of authenticity. Each lives in more or less constant fear that

Father Bernard Murchland has written widely on questions which have related religion to the social and political order.

the other will run off with a different partner. Whatever practical arrangements they have been able to agree on—and in the long stretch of history there have been many—seem to have been ineluctably vitiated by doubt and suspicion. Most of the history of Christianity has been circumscribed by this paradox. Indeed, it can be convincingly argued that this is a major reason for its present major predicament and ineffectiveness. Roman Catholicism, in particular, has long been obsessed with the notion of reality of power. One has only to recall the re-

cent deliberations of Vatican II to realize that the problem is still very much with us.

The intrusion of God into history through the Incarnation established two orders of life for the Christian—the supernatural and the natural. Professor Goerner characterizes the problem as "the confrontation between ends that transcend history and ends within history, between an order of being that is absolute and eternal and an order of being that is relative, that belongs to time and therefore suffers change." His book, and an able one it is, is an

effort to get the whole complex issue of church-state relationships into focus. Professor Goerner's own constructive suggestions benefit by a sound historical grasp of the problem as well as the new freedom of expression ushered in by Vatican II. Let me say too, before we get on to more substantial matters, that he writes gracefully and with a delightful sense of irony and wit that is rare in theoretical considerations of this sort.

Goerner begins with a historical sampling of typical positions: the radical papalism of Giles of Rome, the radical laicism of Marsilius of Padua and two moderate positions of John of Paris and St. Robert Bellarmine. Giles of Rome, a member of the Order of Hermits of St. Augustine, was firmly convinced of the absurdity of life in his time which he described as "a deluge of waters and violent winds." On the basis of this dark vision he elaborated a doctrine of absolute papal supremacy. Giles admitted the traditional "two swords" theory, but argued that the pope had both of them. As one follows the structure of his argument, which is often strangely contorted, a note of hysteria becomes evident. In the final analysis Giles of Rome is simply not interested in the political problem but rather in finding a refuge from the terrible evils he saw about him. He was not interested in analyzing the realities of civic life and did so with bad logic and even worse taste. As Goerner shrewdly observes: "It is not at all unusual for a whole life to be marked by fear and flight. And one of the peculiar modes in which that fear and flight express themselves is an attempt at a magical suppression of some aspect of reality which induced the fear. . . . For Catholics, there is a temptation to use the ecclesiastical hierarchy in such a way." Which is another way of saying that Giles of Rome furnished a highly unrealistic, and therefore ineffective, solu-

tion to the problem of church-state relations. It is nonetheless a typical position that enjoyed wide acceptance in the Middle Ages.

Marsilius of Padua seems a calmer spirit. He had a keen eye for the facts of political life and his extremism, advocating as it did a radical change in the structure of the Church, could at least claim a certain harmony with reality. Goerner describes his *Defensor Pacis* as "the most extreme and brilliant counter to the papalist position." Extreme it certainly is for it subjects the Church to total political control. The papacy is reduced to a merely human construct, at most purely executive in authority and unnecessary for the unity of the faith. It is easy enough to see Marsilius as a forerunner of a Machiavelli or a Hobbes for his position points rather directly to the irrelevancy of religion for political life. But in the historical context it must be seen primarily as an effort "to secure civil peace against the ever-present clerical interference of the Catholic Church." And that is why, Goerner adds, "he is profoundly important as a first representative of the depths of the disaster that papalist views helped to produce in the West." This is some indication of the complexity of the problem. In effect, the medieval Church was engaged in a struggle for power and thereby engendered a hopeless dialectic: clerical domination of all domains, on the one hand, and anticlericalism on the other. From an intellectual point of view it is an exciting dilemma. But in view of Christianity's initial claims and commitments it can only appear pathetic. Nonetheless, whatever historical reasons might be advanced to explain the *de facto* situation, the problem falls squarely within the dialectic mentioned above, a dialectic that in the nature of the case seems doomed to sterility. As Professor Goerner puts it: "The very power and extremism of the papalists inaugurated the series of reac-

tions from which the Church, as can be seen from Vatican II, is still trying to extricate herself."

St. Robert Bellarmine has articulated the classic case for a middle way. But by the very fact we can speak of a middle way is proof that the premises of the extremist positions are at least implicitly acknowledged. The proposition Bellarmine sets out to defend is the following: "The pontiff, as such, does not have any direct and immediate temporal power, but only spiritual power; yet by reason of his spiritual power, he has at least indirectly a certain power, and that the highest in temporal affairs." One can readily discern here the thorny underbrush of the old dilemma and there is *prima facie* reason for wondering if this position is anything other than thinly disguised papalism. Consider, for example, one of Bellarmine's central arguments for the pope's temporal power: namely, his right to depose kings and annul laws (history furnishes abundant examples of this) when such is necessary for the spiritual good that is the Church's divinely commissioned duty to pursue. Shades of Giles of Rome! Part of the difficulty here, of course, is the homogeneity of medieval society. There is no question of two societies but rather of the powers in a single society. Religious pluralism had not yet impressed the Catholic mentality. The ideal was *respublica Christiana*, a single social body. Within this context, the argument has a fairly simple outline: since the spiritual power pursues a higher goal of that social body, the temporal power must bend to it.

But this is not the only difficulty. Goerner writes that Bellarmine's position "is fundamentally inadequate on a number of major points: the argument concerning the hierarchy of ends and the relationship of nature to grace, the problems of pluralism, and the question as to what the Christian can hope for in this world." The

author displays a fine theological sensitivity in analyzing these weaknesses. He rightly detects a radical confusion of religion and politics at the heart of this whole problem. If I read him correctly, Goerner is saying that the medieval attempts to handle church-state relationships failed because of a lack of theological depth. Somehow the right questions were not put and such important theological issues as a theology of the laity, the royal priesthood of all the faithful, the intrinsic worth of terrestrial values, and the necessity and validity of pluralism—all issues vitally relevant to the church-state problem—were not adequately worked out.

I do not propose to discuss Goerner's treatment of the American canonists Fenton, Shea, Connell et al. He makes rather short shrift of them and, as he puts it: "The American canonists are simply boring." But his dialogue with John Courtney Murray is interesting. Murray is, of course, a giant by comparison with the canonists. But Goerner faults him on two counts. In the first place, Murray argues historically that "the American constitutional system, as a structure, still reveals the essential lines of a Christian structure of politics." It is, furthermore, rooted in the politico-religious unity of the Middle Ages. Goerner finds that this "historical approach" begs a number of questions. He refers to it as a "noble, Platonic tale" which is effective in showing the canonists that they are out of line and aberrant in their thinking and also in demonstrating to the democratists that they are cut off from those historical forces which created democracy. But it doesn't answer an important question: what, precisely, in the medieval heritage is still present in the American system? How is this historical continuity to be proven?

Goerner's second criticism bears on Murray's failure to elaborate a theory of regimes. "In order to ensure the Church her freedom,"

says the author, "in order to guarantee the Church against enfeeblement to any particular form of government, in order to prevent the emergence of a new thesis, he denies the possibility of a philosophical typology of regimes. The reason for this is 'the changing character of the state.'" One consequence of this position is that "it excludes the rational articulation of prophetic judgment on any regime." Another is that it introduces a tendency towards the demoralization of politics. A very crippling kind of relativism seems to overshadow Murray's very genuine insights and courageous effort to grapple with an extremely complex problem. Historicism, in Goerner's view, is not a very hopeful antidote. "The question here as well as in some other areas," he writes, "is whether the price of liberation from the dead hand of a sclerotic scholasticism is situationalism."

The foregoing is sufficient, I think, to indicate that Goerner has a first-rate critical mind. He is in full control of his sources as well. I am particularly impressed by his skill in relating the political problem to a theological framework. He makes such amazingly astute remarks as the following: "There is a sense in which the whole development [of church-state relations] may be viewed as a dispute about the nature of priestly power, rather than a dispute about the limits of priestly authority vis-à-vis political authority." "At the heart of all politics is a dramatic confrontation of men testing, in word, gesture, and action, the image of each for a revelation of the true mimetic standard of genuine, public human perfection." "Ultimately, the prophetic voice challenges the unities of the integrist as out of due season."

Goerner's positive suggestions presuppose that lost Christian energies can be re-couped. We presently live under the dispensation of alienation. What he calls the "shared sky" of a unified vision

has been lost and the old symbols are no longer meaningful. Any reform of ecclesiastical structure must begin with "due recognition of the inalienable responsibility of the baptized and confirmed for the sphere of human action." Goerner makes three concrete suggestions.

- The hierarchy should undertake no political initiative without the prior consent of the laity.

- All action that depends directly upon the power of orders, such as proclaiming the Gospel and administering the sacraments, should be free of lay control.

- Institutions through which lay assent is to be expressed must conform to the extra-ecclesiastical structure of the common life of the people concerned.

These are sound enough suggestions. But they are also a little simplistic. And, in the final analysis, I fear they will leave the problem more or less where it is. I do not mean that Goerner should have solved the problem. His express purpose in writing the book was to *clarify* the problem, which he has done admirably. His own reflections are admittedly "only by way of beginnings." The nub of the church-state issue is a dualism—part Platonic, part Augustinian and in any event fortified by a long tradition—which has proven to be well nigh invincible. Yet it must be broken down, for reality is one, as recent developments in philosophy, as well as other disciplines, have endeavored to show. The conflict between spiritual and temporal reality while very real is nonetheless basically artificial. My own suspicion is that the root of the matter is a faulty understanding of the supernatural. Therefore a renewed and deepened theology of the supernatural is needed. I submit that this is the crucible in which the old antagonisms will be melted down and a new unity forged. At any rate I am inspired to make this suggestion because of the magnificent perspectives Goerner's book opens out.

My Country—Right or Wrong?

Jack Lasley. Institute for International Studies. 127 pp. \$1.45 (paper).

"This book is designed to provide at nominal cost a discussion of those laws of mankind that deal with the use of armed force in world affairs," the preface notes. In the appendix are copies of "key international documents" to which the author refers in his discussion—among them the Kellogg-Briand Treaty, the charter and principles of the Nuremberg Tribunal, and provisions for the use of armed force in the U.N. Charter.

The Missile Crisis

Elie Abel. Lippincott. 222 pp. \$4.95.

NBC news correspondent Elie Abel, a former newspaper reporter in the Capitol and abroad, has reconstructed day by day, often hour by hour, the U.S.-Russian confrontation of October 1962 and the process of shaping the American response to the crisis.

The Three Lives of Charles de Gaulle

David Schoenbrun. Atheneum. 373 pp. \$6.95.

Mr. Schoenbrun, a reporter, broadcaster and author of *As France Goes*, pictures his subject as having "lived through three different lives": one as "soldier of the Third Republic," another as "savior of the Fourth Republic," and a present reincarnation as French

statesman and President. A section of the biography is devoted to each of these "lives" set against the background of "a constantly changing France."

International Peace Observation

David W. Wainhouse and Associates. Johns Hopkins. 662 pp. \$10.00.

Peace observation, as the authors define it, is the process by which "the organized international community initiates a third party intervention as early as possible in a threatening situation with a view to permitting calmer judgments to allay the potential or actual conflict." Some seventy cases, under such bodies as the League, U.N. and O.A.S., have been examined to provide a history and analysis of this method of facilitating peaceful settlement of disputes.

The Radical Papers

Irving Howe, ed. Doubleday. 378 pp. \$5.95.

Many of the critics of contemporary American society whose essays appear in this follow-up volume to *The Liberal Papers* and *The Conservative Papers*, are contributors to *Dissent*, the quarterly of democratic socialist opinion of which Mr. Howe is editor. The main stress in this collection is upon domestic affairs, but there are pieces on "American Intervention and the Cold War" and "The Breakup of the Soviet Camp."

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