

Javits, S. L. A. Marshall, Paul Ramsey, Elmo Roper, Donald C. Stone, Eustace Seligman and Henry P. Van Dusen.

Calling upon "responsible critics of the Vietnam war to dissociate themselves from wild charges," the statement listed a number of current objectionable "fantasies," one of which concerned military service and the moral discretion of the individual. As it appeared in the statement, the "fantasy" was presented briefly with little development or qualification: "*That military service in this country's armed forces is an option exercised solely at the discretion of the individual.*" Before this can be reasonably accepted or rejected as fantasy, the

statement itself needs development and elaboration. A number of people from different professional and political backgrounds were, therefore, asked by *worldview* to provide that development and state their own judgments.

These commentators do not agree on all of the major issues which they consider; they may even fail to convince a number of readers that the issues *are* major. But those who are open to persuasion — or who simply find their own beliefs here reiterated — will grant that the problem merits consideration by all citizens and particularly by those who bear most immediate responsibility for shaping the draft laws of our country. J. F.

in the magazines

Contributors to this issue of *worldview* examine one of five "fantasies" from which Freedom House urges responsible critics of the Vietnam war to dissociate themselves. All five points are reviewed by Hans Morgenthau in an article written for the *New Leader* (January 2). He notes "the document declares that failure by the responsible critics of our Vietnam policy 'to draw the line between their positions and the views expressed by irresponsible extremists could encourage our Communist adversaries to postpone serious negotiations, raising the cost in lives and delaying the peace we earnestly seek.' In other words, the blood of our men who must die in Vietnam is in the hands of the 'irresponsible' opponents. This charge," Morgenthau states, "derives from the assumption that the policies of our Vietnamese adversaries are determined by what some Americans may or may not say about the policies of their government. This is an extraordinary view of the policy-making processes of any government, past or present. I would have thought . . . that a government engaged in war will be influenced in its attitude toward peace by its estimate of the military situation and

of the peace terms it thinks it can obtain. As long as it thinks it can win, or can get better peace terms by continuing the war, it will go on fighting; when it thinks it is likely to lose, or has nothing to gain from continuing the war, it will stop fighting."

And further: "The Freedom House document, in spite of a ritualistic bow to free speech, effectively limits free speech. It distinguishes between the arguments against our policies in Vietnam that are legitimate and those that are not. . . ."

"The Freedom House document is trying to establish a political orthodoxy with regard to our policies in Vietnam. It tells us that we are morally entitled to criticize the government, but not with regard to the fundamental issues it enumerates. . . ."

"The document condemns the holders of certain opinions as being responsible for the continuation of the war in Vietnam. I hold these opinions. . . ."

In replying to Dr. Morgenthau (issue of January 16), the chairman of the executive committee of Freedom House, Leo Cherne, notes that the document's

aim was "to make dissent more meaningful"; that the "wild charges" Freedom House had scored were those which "convey the assurance that every fault and failure, every evil purpose is the exclusive burden of Washington; every virtue, all the heroic and sublime attributes properly describe Vietnamese Communist actions and aspirations." Then, turning to Morgenthau's *New Leader* article, Cherne states: "He makes a criticism of American policies which I can only label untrue, unjust and patently extremist. Then he not only claims the right of free speech to make such charges (which I do not dispute), but also claims immunity under the same right from any counter-dissent that his charges are irresponsible."

Cherne is "tempted to conclude," however, "that what really stung Morgenthau was not any threat the statement posed to his opportunities to criticize, but its reminder that his criticisms — when they take the extreme forms quoted above — may be helping to prolong the war. As he himself remarks about the enemy, 'As long as it thinks it can win or get better peace terms by continuing the war, it will go on fighting.' What he finds 'extraordinary' is the Freedom House judgment that those expectations are heavily influenced by the way Communist conflict managers read the state of American public opinion.

"What is truly extraordinary is Morgenthau's casual dismissal of that judgment; his reiteration of his long-held 'realist' argument that national leaders everywhere are guided solely by narrow, raw power considerations, and not by what 'some Americans may or may not say about the policies of their government.' Not only is this to dismiss what a substantial body of his fellow specialists of all shades of opinion on the war hold, but it is also to disregard what Communist 'liberation warfare' managers, from Mao Tse-tung to Vo Nguyen Giap, have repeatedly told us."

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"For eleven months in 1945-46 the Nuremberg courthouse had commanded major headlines in a shocked world press; for a few years after that, lawyers and journalists (myself included) had published appraisals of what took place there," Victor H. Bernstein recalls in The January 23 issue of *The Nation*. "After that came a period of forgetting — a forgetting so complete that an American President could go before a crowd of roaring Germans and say, apparently quite without reservation or inhibition, *Ich bin ein Berliner*. Only in the last year has the word Nuremberg begun to reappear in the American vocabulary; specifically, in the speech of civil liberties attorneys, who cite the Nuremberg judgment in defense of boys who refuse to fight in Vietnam."

En route to a November meeting in Warsaw of former Nuremberg trial correspondents planned by the Polish Journalists Association, the former *Nation* managing editor stopped at that city "to see whether

Nuremberg's memory was any better than ours in America." He recounts that "from tourist pamphlets picked up in our hotel lobby I learned that Nuremberg is 900 years old; that during World War II Allied bombers destroyed 45.6 per cent of all homes and heavily damaged another 14.8 per cent; that the people of Nuremberg had rebuilt these structures and added more; and that parts of the old town had been rebuilt with exact fidelity to the originals. But of Julius Streicher and the Party Days, the Nuremberg Laws and the trial — nothing." Conversations with local inhabitants revealed to Bernstein the same desire to bury this portion of the city's past. He cites a young journalist who admitted "'We don't like to be reminded of our guilt,'" and a middle-aged German who remarked, "'Oh, yes, I remember the trial of the war criminals . . . Look how many wars there have been since! And have there been any more Nuremberg trials? Why did everybody pick on us?'"

In Warsaw on the other hand, Bernstein relates, there was revealed "the burning fear of a revival of the German right. This became clear not only at the conference table (where every Slav repeatedly used the word 'genocide,' treating it not as a historic phenomenon but as a living threat), but also on Warsaw's streets. . . . For the Pole, the remembrance of things past is ordained as national policy. Polish school children are routinely taken on tours of Warsaw and shown the plaques, the ghetto memorial and other monuments to Nazi savagery."

Of the value of the Warsaw reunion Bernstein writes: "For some of us . . . the conference served a useful purpose: it made us see today's Germany through the eyes of Eastern Europe. The meetings could, of course, have tried — and with the utmost relevance — to do much more. The purpose of the international trial at Nuremberg was not only to punish aggressors but to lay down the law against aggression; not only to dispense justice to war criminals but to stop war crimes and crimes against peace. Many speakers took cognizance of this broader context, but none directly assayed the implications. Perhaps it is just as well. Had the Russians brought up Vietnam, one or more of us from the West would surely have brought up Stalin's concentration camps, or Krushchev's tanks in Budapest, East Berlin and Warsaw. And, in turn, we would have had to fight the battle of the Bay of Pigs, and of the Dominican Republic, all over again.

"I think, instinctively, we recognized that there are priorities in villainies as in everything else; after all, it had been neither the Russians nor ourselves who had turned Europe into an *abattoir* a little more than twenty years ago. So we stuck to our chosen priority. The only thing is, I thought as I gathered up my notes, East Europe needs no education on this particular subject. We should have held our conference not in Warsaw but in Nuremberg."

PAMPHILUS