

heavier A.B.M. and nuclear weapons system.

The concepts which support Mr. McNamara's position have been under consistent attack. One private organization that has much prestigious support, the American Security Council, has editorially stated that Mr. McNamara's judgment here is not shared by "professional military men or the technical-industrial community that has developed America's instruments of national defense," and that the thin A.B.M. line he proposes "would not provide a healthy margin of strategic superiority but could become an invitation to nuclear catastrophe."

In assessing the merits of each side of the argument it would be well to keep in mind some of the interesting reversals in the debate. As Jack Walker reminded us in the April, 1967 issue of *worldview*, not only the Air Force and the Navy but distinguished civilian intellectuals have markedly shifted the balance of their arguments in passing from the 50's to the 60's. There is, however, little doubt that most citizens will rally, as they always have, to the call for more arms. Many will readily agree with Senator John Pastore that

the question of an extended A.B.M. "is a matter of survival and not the trigger to constitute an arms race." It is possible that they may balk at the price of a heavy A.B.M. system—40 billion dollars against 5 billion for a thin A.B.M. And if that sum is added to the 26 billion dollars currently being spent on the war in Vietnam, the total burden may sound excessively high. The Secretary of Defense quite correctly disposed of this argument, however. The decision should rest not on the question of money, which is not the primary problem, but on the value of the proposed A.B.M. shield. But how, in such an area, can the ordinary citizen decide? Where, if he has political weight, should he bring it to bear?

The basic positions are relatively simple. Those whose opinions will not flow from an intimate grasp of the technical issues will rest their judgments on the trust they place in the leading spokesmen for each position and on their own assessment of how the resources of our country should be employed. Given the terms of the present A.B.M. debate, Mr. McNamara seems to be leading from strength. J. F.

in the magazines

"What is happening today to the Soviet man? Is he becoming less a Stalinist and more a Khrushchevite or Titoist? Is he becoming less a Communist and more a democrat or liberal? How do the changes come about? . . ." Questions like these, says Lorand B. Szalay in "Soviet Domestic Propaganda and Liberalization" (*Orbis*, Spring 1967) "relate to an historically little understood dimension of the Soviet system, namely, the Soviet man—his attitudes, opinions, beliefs, as well as the changes he has undergone under the influences of the Soviet socio-political environment." Thus he has attempted "to analyze recent trends in Soviet propaganda in relationship to its target, the Soviet citizen."

"In view of our fundamentally pragmatic, utilitarian approach," Szalay notes, "it is especially difficult for us to understand people with an abstract-doctrinaire approach toward life. Political ideologies are alien to American thinking in any case, and it is hard for Americans to conceive the process of indoctrination which attempts to organize and control human life on the basis of a single abstract theory such as Marxism-Leninism. When this theory is applied to the environ-

ment, a new world is built. In this new world, things and events acquire new and different meanings. These meanings do not derive from natural experiences, but from strict definitions, by a 'logical' formulation of their roles and places determined by the ideology."

Of course, this writer concludes, "the extent to which Soviet domestic propaganda does indeed manage to maintain and promote the integrity of a closed Soviet world outlook, eliminate inconsistencies, and argue away the contradictions of political reality is an open question. Nevertheless, we may conclude that it shows considerable flexibility in overcoming and taking advantage of the difficulties which emerge in the changing domestic political situation. Many tactical shifts in content and emphasis are performed within the framework of the Marxist-Leninist ideology without sacrificing fundamental doctrines. Although the logic and argumentation used in Soviet propaganda frequently appear from the outside to be artificial, inconsistent, or even an insult to intelligence, they seem to be well adapted to the indoctrinated strata of the population. In a political situation characterized by less reliance on open force and suppres-

sion, by a more effective penetration of ideas from the outside and by a heightened spirit of criticism from within, Soviet domestic propaganda makes extensive efforts to counter this challenge by exploiting such topics of general human appeal as patriotism, the moral order and national pride. Since these elements are redefined and used in clear subordination to ideological doctrines, it would be wrong to interpret their tactical use as a deviation from Marxism-Leninism. The changes do not signify a break with the Soviet past, and even less a transition to a bourgeois-nationalism way of life."

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Writing from Athens, Robert Gorham Davis, a professor of English at Columbia, describes the pressures, sometimes subtle, sometimes overt, with which the military junta has attempted to establish "complete control over Greece's social and cultural life, in the fanatical spirit of what Hugh Trevor-Roper has called 'barrack-room Buchmanism'" (*New Leader*, Aug. 28).

He also observes that "the writers and teachers I talked to—definitely anti-Communist and not particularly enthusiastic about Andreas Papandreu—are baffled about the future. The military men clearly intend to impose thought-control and youth indoctrination as complete as that in the Communist countries they profess to despise. The most creative people here think there will be no future for them in Greece if the Army should succeed. They will have to get out. What they count on is an early split within the triumvirate, or between the triumvirate and the King and other Army leaders. Then they hope, counterreactionary influences, especially from abroad and especially from the United States, would help them secure the minimum civil liberties which have been abolished.

"Greeks feel, unhappily, that the United States Government is sympathetic to the coup." Dr. Davis "found in private talks with U.S. officials that they actually were apologists for the regime. Before the coup American officials had taken pains to make public their dislike of Andreas Papandreu. Though he had taught in the United States and advocated a New Deal-type program, though former Ambassador John Kenneth Galbraith and ex-Governor Pat Brown of California interceded for him after his imprisonment, U.S. officials were afraid the young man would take too independent a course. But the Greeks say the U.S. wanted a military government in Athens to secure its flank in case of trouble in the Middle East. They also refer frequently to the fact that a huge contract to develop tourism and other industries throughout the country was signed with Litton Industries, an American company with high connections in Washington, only a few days after the new government seized control.

"What is said by American officials in defense of the present Greek government is flagrantly incon-

sistent with the Jeffersonian and Lincolnesque sentiments so conspicuously displayed in the windows of the USIS reading rooms. To our friends in Greece it makes us seem hypocrites, or worse."

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"Aggression is by now a respectable object of study among students of human behavior," Bruno Bettelheim observes in the September 15 issue of *Peace-news*. "But in this essay I should like to refer to violence, which the same scholars tend to ignore or else treat with contempt."

Dr. Bettelheim says that "it is high time that both the myth of original sin, and its opposite, that of original innocence, were dispatched to the land of the unicorns. Innocence is neither an inborn characteristic nor a useful weapon; most of the time it is little more than an anxious clinging to ignorance.

"Particularly in matters of violence is there no protection in ignorance. Elsewhere I have tried to point out that one's ignorance of the nature of violence, as during the Nazi regime, did not lead to bliss but to death. Those under Hitler who wished to believe that all men are good, and that violence exists only in a few perverted men, took no realistic steps to protect themselves and soon perished. Violence exists, surely, and each of us is born with his potential for it. But we are also born with opposite tendencies, and these must be carefully nurtured if they are to counterbalance the violence. To nurture them, however, one must know the nature of the enemy, and this is not achieved by denying its existence."

Though Dr. Bettelheim recognizes the problem, he "must admit" that he is "at a loss to suggest what we should do. Maybe we should not go so far in suppressing violence in our children. Maybe we should let them experience (within safe limits) how damaging violence is, thus not denying them acquaintance with a tendency that they must learn to control. But it is not the only way. If our experience at the Orthogenic School may serve as an example, children seem to want to learn *about* aggression, and not just to discharge it, though they want that too. . . .

"Maybe if our educational procedures were to acknowledge aggression, our children would not have to be glued to the television screen to see a bit of violence. Maybe there was some psychological wisdom to those old-fashioned books where the child was told over and over again what cruel fate befalls the evil-doer. While these stories scared the children, they allowed for some vicarious discharge of hostility, and, having discharged it, the children's positive tendencies could be freed for the learning process. We can do even better. We can tell children through stories that people are sometimes angry at each other and quarrel, but that they can make up, and that if they do they will have a better-life together."

PAMPHILUS