tion treaty, for example, will (if it is a good thing) require more, not fewer, far-flung commitments of the U.S. to guarantee the security of non-nuclear powers against direct nuclear blackmail and against even conventional or insurgency assaults that are backed by nuclear threat. It simply will not be sufficient for us to say that since war is evil the less of it the less threat of it or commitment to it the better, or that since God wills the unity of mankind unilateral national action resorting to armed force or to the threat of force should always be frowned upon. We had better begin re-educating ourselves, and the greater or lesser magistrates who will listen to us, in the elements of Christian political realism.

This includes, I believe, a great work of practical reason removing the limited-war doctrine from the minds of men and replacing it with the just-war doctrine on the use of force. It is increasingly clear that any overlap or resemblance between these two views is more or less coincidental. The teachings about *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* (when is war right? and what is right in war?) do not simply locate decisions to resort to armed force among the situational ambiguities, or suggest that such judgments are solely to be determined by a choice of a lesser evil that a less evil may come. This teaching does not set forth some sort of circumstantial "exception" in political ethics.

On the contrary, the "just-war" theory seeks and believes that it finds "moral permissions," moral obligations to use force, a charitable and just determination of the "moral laws of war." It defines right doing that good may come of it, not wrong doing quixotically alleged to be warranted solely by consequences expected to follow. It is a theory of statecraft, marking out the place of force in politics. It, then, attempts to define the justice of and the moral limits upon this activity of the nation-state in the international system.

He who cannot grasp the nettle of the fact that there are moral permissions in regard to war — indeed, responsibilities to be discharged in this regard — should retire from offering advice to Princes (which means all citizens and their political leaders in a democratic state).

If we are going to deepen our common understanding of ethics and foreign policy, the fostering of this understanding must have at least secondary priority, while we also and primarily seek to inculcate in ourselves and among men generally and in the culture at large an understanding of how new practices and institutions may be planted and take root and flourish in the international system.

The Challenge of the Future

Kenneth W. Thompson

No task in political science or diplomatic analysis is more baffling and uncertain than that of political prediction. To say that we are at a watershed in the unfolding of contemporary international relations is to postulate the existence of deep running social and political forces so powerful that they will carry international society into a new era. That important forces exist affecting international politics is beyond dispute; that these aspects of the present day world are capable of transforming the relations among men and nations is far less susceptible of proof.

It is sobering to look back to the dominant views concerning international society which were prevalent two decades ago. First, many saw in the establishment of the United Nations the possibility of removing power politics and rivalries among states from the international scene. It was widely hoped and believed that a new organization dedicated to the maintenance of security and peace would usher in a reign of international law and order. The main debate centered on whether the powers of this institution, which many considered an advance over the League of Nations, should not have been hammered out in the mold of a genuine world government. Forgotten or overlooked was the persistent character of national ambition and the quest for national security. The struggle for peace and order still took place in a nation-centered world. Moreover nations, like individuals, tended for the most part to put their own interests or conceptions of their interests first, thus moving along a fateful collision course with others proceeding on the same tack.

There have been, if anything, a larger number of well-publicized conflicts involving ambitious and insecure nations than had been the case in an earlier era. Far from being a shrine for memorializing international peace, the United Nations has become the cockpit of worldwide conflict and strife. Those who saw in the U.N. the means of transforming the world have, with each passing year, grown more skeptical if not cynical about its role. Had the political predictions concerning the United Nations emphasized its

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capacity to provide new avenues for the limiting and controlling of inevitable conflict, some of this pessimism might have been avoided.

Another prediction which has been largely realized but with consequences few could foresee, has been the emergence of a large number of smaller and new states, some with few if any attributes of national sovereignty and power. Francis Pimlton has coined the word "mini-state" to describe their characteristics. An international organization which numbered some 54 states at its birth, now has more than 120, with no immediate end in sight. The preoccupation of many of these states is local and not worldwide. Their contributions to international society are difficult to evaluate at this point. The hope that newer states would avoid the parochial and selfish patterns their European forebears had displayed has scarcely been borne out in practice. New states have not ushered in a new world. They have helped to complicate and extend the problems of the old world, making more intricate and demanding both the problems and opportunities which the international society confronts.

Third, it was widely believed that the United States, which for decades had slumbered in isolation, would prove itself capable of evolving new concepts if not a doctrine of foreign policy to guide it in the choices it must make. Was it not evident that in World War II and in its championing of the United Nations, the United States had committed itself unequivocally to a course of building an international order? We no longer stand aloof from the struggle; we undertook to provide strong world leadership. Our inheritance had been passed down from British, French, and other centers of European experience and power.

While accepting the challenge, we eschewed the working principles that had guided those going before us. The view tended to persist in high quarters, and still does, that both in policy and exposition of policy. American leaders should not settle for following a pragmatic and empirical course. Instead our policy makers told us that the new world required devotion to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and these were simple and unequivocal. The irony of these propositions is that those who espoused them have been the architects of policies which set the United States at odds with the majority of the organization whose Charter had been quoted with such fervor.

The major challenge we face in the coming decades is, I would think, the development of an approach or a philosophy that would help us to differentiate among types of international and national conflicts and rational American responses. That conflicts will exist, particularly given the sweeping surge of development across the whole southern half of the globe, seems indisputable. That we need intervene or that the U.N. need intervene whenever or wherever the peace is threatened seems a more doubtful question. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, in his much-quoted Montreal speech in May of 1966, pointed out that over the past eight years there had been 164 outbreaks of violence within nations around the world. Most of these conflicts were civil conflicts; 82 different governments were directly involved. In only 15 of the 164 instances of violence were there military conflicts involving two or more states. In not a single one of the 164 conflicts was there a formal declaration of war. Indeed, since World War II, there has not been a single instance of a formal declaration of war anywhere in the world.

It seems clear that far from having become a safer world in which to live, this planet, over which the threat of potential nuclear warfare hovers, is a world of growing rather than diminishing conflict. In 1958, there were 23 prolonged insurgencies taking place throughout the world, while in 1966 there were 40. Outbreaks of violence, as distinct from insurgencies, also increased from 34 in 1958 to 58 in 1965.

The form and character of violence and insurgency in the world poses a double challenge for the United States. We must think through and develop some consistent and rational view of what role the U.S. and the U.N. can and should play in the face of these conflicts. It must be evident that not every conflict has the same configurations. Conflict anywhere is not necessarily a threat to the peace. Peaceful processes, if they are to be effective, must often be local and long-term. The Charter of the United Nations itself pays tribute to this principle by stating that members should seek to resolve disputes and differences before bringing an issue to the U.N. The history of the years since World War II highlights the tendency of nations everywhere to throw their burdens on an already overburdened United Nations or to call upon the United States to assist them even while a fraction of those sending up the call express ambivalence about American involvement.

We have been the recipients of an outpouring of serious thought and worthwhile discussion about the role of the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security. Most, if not all, of this writing has assumed that the task of any international organization would be to preserve the peace in the face of conflicts between two or more nations. However, the serious conflicts which have either engaged the United Nations or have generated discus-
sion of its future role have by and large been civil conflicts. Korea, Berlin, East and West Germany, The Congo, and strife in Lebanon and Vietnam illustrate the emerging pattern.

The U.N., whose architects imagined that most international disputes, as had been the case in the 18th and 19th centuries, would involve sovereign states, has confronted internal conflicts. The involvement of other states has taken the form of participation by sponsors of the status quo or of revolutionary change who, like their forerunners engaged in supporting the Spanish Civil War, have tried to shift the balance of power to one side or the other. The U.N. has faced the problem of being restricted by Article II, Paragraph 6, to non-intervention in domestic affairs. While it has found ways to transcend this limitation, no one has drawn clear and definite lines distinguishing permissible from impermissible intervention.

However, if the problem confronting the United Nations in the elaboration of a doctrine is severe, that of the United States is even more tragic and far reaching. We are spending 30 billion dollars per year intervening to maintain stability within a small Southeast Asian state. Other changes in far more vital and important areas of the world such as China itself did not engage American resources. We have accepted either the maintenance of a tyrannical system or order within particular Eastern European states or have stood by while far-reaching social and political changes took place in Cuba, a few miles from our shores. The best we have been able to do has been to utter a few truisms concerning the Monroe Doctrine, the Inter-American System, and the self-determination of peoples. We seem to follow, like persons caught up in a subway station surge, the onrush of events which force a course of action that at best can be rationalized and at worst seems at odds with any effort at formulating a doctrine of foreign policy. What we do in some areas of the world is often sensible and successful but the grounds on which our choices are made are seldom spelled out or clarified.

The great need, then, or so it seems to me, is for a working theory of foreign policy that would at least formulate the questions in advance: When should our national blood and treasure be committed in the national interest and when should it be withheld? When should we turn to other national or regional or worldwide bodies and when must we, in the national interest, be compelled to carry the burdens ourselves? Is the ancient and historic tradition surrounding the ideas of national security and the national interest still relevant as a guideline to action or does its only purpose arise in rationalizing or justifying action taken in accord with other purposes? How are we to define our national objectives if having put them in such narrow terms throughout the first three decades of the 20th century we now define them as involving total and indiscriminate preservation of peace and order everywhere in the world? What are the strategic and political differences between the insurgencies which affect our national security and those that do not? What distinguishes the 15 military conflicts out of 104 instances of national violence, and how are both of these types to be differentiated from the seven instances in which American power and military capacity were engaged? Where are the elements of a strategic doctrine which would help us to think through before the fact what policies we should follow in the face of violence and conflict close to our shores or at farflung outposts?

The other aspect of the problem concerns the relationship between the poor nations and conflict. It would be a grievous error to equate lack of economic development or burgeoning population growth with the inevitability of war. We could overnight become the new non-Marxian economic determinists of the 1960’s if we embraced this view. Nevertheless, most of the conflicts which are arisen appear to have involved the poorer nations. Secretary of Defense McNamara has pointed out that there are 27 rich nations with a per capita income of $750 a year or more since 1955, and that only one of these 27 nations has suffered a major internal upheaval within its boundaries. However, among the 38 very poor nations with per capita incomes of less than $100 a year, 32 have been victims of significant conflicts. Indeed, nations in this group have had on the average of two major outbreaks of violence per country in the eight-year period. Since 1955, 69% of the very poor nations, 69% of the poor nations and 48% of the middle-income nations have been plagued by internal strife and violence. Secretary McNamara concludes that “there can . . . be no question but that there is an irrefutable relationship between violence and economic backwardness. And the trend of such violence is up, not down.”

Some effort is being made to reduce the number of economically backward nations and yet every responsible study indicates that the economic gap is widening rather than growing smaller. By the year 1970, over half of the total population of the world will live in the southern half of the planet. These people will command less than one-sixth of the world’s total goods and services. By 1975, dependent chil-
Children under 15 years of age in these underdeveloped countries will equal the entire population of the developed nations of the world. By the end of this century, at present rates of growth, the most that the 80 underdeveloped nations who are members of the World Bank can hope for is a per capita income of $170 a year. In this same period, the U.S., whose current level is $2700, will have risen to $4500.

The second great challenge, therefore, facing the United States is to develop working concepts on how to assist in conquering or ameliorating at least the worldwide poverty and economic deprivation which seems to be growing rather than diminishing. That we have only begun, if that, to face the problem is evident in the annual congressional spectacle over foreign aid. The Congress seems likely to pass the smallest foreign aid bill in history at a time when the need is greater than ever before. There is little if any foreign aid constituency in the wider American public and no clearcut and accepted view on how the U.S. should proceed. Programs which have gone forward with some success both in public and private sectors are little known beyond those immediately involved. It is fashionable to speak with contempt of most efforts in foreign aid. Perhaps extravagant talk about the “development decade” now drawing to a melancholy close has helped to spawn this kind of cynicism.

Yet it should not be beyond the wit of men to think through on some more organized and systematic basis what can and cannot be done to assist developing nations. There are experiences in the field of agriculture overseas which bear on the problem. I would commend as a first reading on this problem the recent book by J. George Harrar, Strategy Toward the Conquest of Hunger. Some efforts in population stabilization have been more successful than others. It will not do to dismiss these as accidents of geography or history; we need to know more about success and failure that have taken place in technical assistance experiments. The Marshall Plan, AID’s efforts in Pakistan and certain U.N. programs may point up hopeful avenues for the future. The whole area of education, given various experiences with university development programs abroad, can be studied. Fresh thinking and new approaches may be called up by drawing on the past but not being limited by it.

The double challenge of working out clearer concepts and working principles for programs of national and international security and economic development around the world are, in brief compass, the challenge of the future.

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