A British columnist offers a plan of "Crisis Uniformity Control," which "aims not to eliminate crises but to administer them better." Disputing the widely held notion "that foreign affairs are 'just one crisis after another.'" ["Would that they were!"] Geoffrey Taylor argues that "in fact they are several crises at the same time." (Spectator. January 12.) Still, "crises have a functional role in international affairs, both in sublimating aggression and in relieving monotony. Often they draw attention to countries which would otherwise be forgotten. It is an old truth that the quickest way to get foreign aid is to hold a crisis. This makes it all the more important that crises not only take place but should be seen to take place." But "as the pace of interlocking crises quickens, the strain of statesmanship may become too heavy to bear. A workable system of crisis management has thus become an urgent need."

Taylor's contribution is "a system of weighting ... so that the graver crises may take precedence over the lesser." Applications would be made to a "Crisis Uniformity Control Headquarters (CRUNCH), which would allocate a date." The months of August and September, for example, would be set aside for the use of countries with minimal ratings, and points would be deducted from a crisis "which, because of its repetitiveness, becomes too tedious to follow." Unformulated as yet are "rules for unprompted crises, if any, and natural disasters." And, Taylor suggests, "CRUNCH may also wish to multiply (or divide) by an Ethical Constant any crisis judged to be a Moral Issue."

From an editorial by Roger Shinn in the January 8 issue of Christianity and Crisis: "President Johnson's latest complaint against his critics on Vietnam ended with the wish 'that those who bewail war would bring me just one workable solution to end war.' That lament, heard frequently in recent years, is one of the most plausible, yet deceptive, of the statements regularly ground out of Washington."

"It is plausible because it contains an element of good sense. Almost everybody struggling with a tough responsibility sometimes wants to answer glib critics by saying, 'Well, what would you do?' Responsible criticism must always take account of perplexities facing the policy-maker who must choose among real options, not wishful dreams." "Yet this protest is deceptive because it implies that criticism is invalid unless it comes programmed with alternative operational plans. But that implication is clearly wrong. Men often have the right and duty to point out portentous errors, whether or not they can themselves resolve them. Sometimes you can spot a reckless driver without yourself knowing how to drive."

And further: "To the critics we say: 'Don't be glib. The facts are that the Government faces grave dilemmas. It is hard for officials to admit past mistakes when political opponents, often more war-like than the men in office, crouch ready to pounce like jackals on any victims who offer themselves. The President has to try to preserve some national prestige, not solely out of vanity, but because a humiliation would lead to an orgy of scapegoating, witchhunting and repression. Any answer will require skillful maneuvers to assemble a coalition and persuade a society to accept the costs of what some will call defeat. Deals for perfect solutions help no one, especially when America is barely capable of imperfect ones. Nor is there virtue in propaganda that demonizes the Administration or lacks a sense of its true perplexities. And there is no salvation in peace-talk motivated by malice and 'lacking a tragic sense of history.'"

"To the Administration we say: 'Don't condescend to critics who offer ideas that are less than perfect. Such ideas are all that are available. Measure their possibilities not against illusory utopias but against the realities of the present catastrophic policy. Above all, don't try to humiliate your critics into silence by impugning their patriotism or insisting that Washington knows best. You can't convince us that way. We have seen too many of your mistaken analyses and shattered predictions to let you play that game. We take no glee in recalling your errors; nobody has 100 per cent foresight. But fallible officials cannot demand infallible solutions."

A professor of psychiatry at the University of Wisconsin, director of its student psychiatric services, writes that he has "become convinced that a substantial number of male students who accept the 2-S deferment pay an enormous psychological price for this privilege. Not surprisingly, they are plagued with guilt, an unremitting guilt which dominates every aspect of their existence. Although this guilt is often denied or rationalized, it is a significant factor among the causes of unrest on our campuses, and it contributes to a deep sense of personal despair in the lives of many students." (The Progressive, February.) Dr. Seymour L. Halleck's article examines "the emotional impact of unequal conscription upon those who are favored by it;" and, briefly, the effect upon faculty and administration as well.

"The problem with many youths," Dr. Halleck notes, "is that they are so intellectually committed to their idealism that they cannot honestly face them-

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current reading

How Communist China Negotiates
Arthur Lall. Columbia Univ. 291 pp. $7.95

Still unpublished are the records of the 1961-62 Laos Conference “which resulted in the only international agreement as yet to be signed by both the Secretary of State of the U.S. and the Foreign Minister of the Peking Government,” but Arthur Lall, chief Indian negotiator, was one of six who participated in a series of unpublicized meetings where “the crucial . . . issues were worked out.” Now he relates the story of the Laos negotiations, analyzing them “in the context of the Chinese Communist theory of international relations” and commenting on the nature of the Chinese presence at such conferences and the training of its negotiators.

Peace, Power and Protest
Donald Evans, ed. Ryerson Press (Toronto). 314 pp. $2.95

This book was commissioned by the United Church of Canada, but the foreign policy issues with which it deals necessarily affect both Ottawa and Washington. Contributors to the discussion of “the moral dimension in international affairs, the causes of war and the movements for peace” are clergymen, theologians and political commentators, and the editor has provided a commentary to each essay.

The Radical Liberal: New Man in American Politics
Arnold S. Kaufman. Atherton. 175 pp. $5.95

Dr. Kaufman, a member of the philosophy faculty at the University of Michigan, provides a scorecard with which to tell the players in the divided ranks of American liberalism, distinguishing an authentic liberal tradition and “two defective political styles”—the politics of “pseudo-realism and self-indulgence.” From this critique he turns to the “strategic principles liberals ought to adopt” and then applies “the results of what has gone before to problems that have produced the disorder that today agitates most liberals—civil rights, higher education, and foreign policy.”

Western Policy and the Third World
Thomas Patrick Melady. Hawthorn. 199 pp. $6.95

Dr. Melady, president of the Africa Service Institute, is the author of The Revolution of Color, the first book in this series of the same name written for the general public. International rivalries and special problems which threaten progress in Asia and Africa are described, as well as the special role of the Vatican and the state of Israel in development of the Third World. Essentials of U.S. and Western European policy toward the developing countries are outlined, and there is a good-sized collection of recommended readings, charts, and appendixes.

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selves when they compromise that idealism. Cynicism does not come easily to the young. In the depths of their consciences they are able to find only two ‘pure’ answers to their personal involvement with the war in Vietnam. If the war is right, then they should not shirk their duty but should help fight it. If the war is wrong, they should do everything in their power to stop it. Although neither course of action is feasible as long as one is a student, there is a part of every student’s conscience that says to him, ‘You either belong in the army or in jail.’ Anything else is at best a rationalization, at worst a cowardly compromise or ‘sellout.’

“I am not arguing that this view is rational. Nor am I insisting that it is consciously understood by the majority of students. I do know from my experience in treating and talking to male students that sooner or later they relate much of their malaise, their depression, and their anxiety to guilt over their privileged status . . . .”

Dr. Halleck states at a later point that “if one opposes the war and is troubled by his protected status, the most rational and psychologically useful action he can take involves joining an activist movement which seeks to end the war. More and more students are choosing this alternative.

“The problem with anti-war activism as a means of dealing with one’s own conscience is that there is not much that students can do to end the war. As the student perceives its efforts to be ineffective, as he observes the relative non-involvement of his parents and professors, and as he contemplates the business-as-usual atmosphere on the campus, his frustration grows. The activist student cannot understand how supposedly idealistic men like his professors can continue to live their lives as though nothing was wrong. It is not surprising that his anti-war energies come to be directed against the university itself.”

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