

in the magazines

"The logic of the *political* which alone can devise and master the social order, has become subservient to the logic of the *apolitical*," Robert Strausz-Hupé commented in an address at a meeting of the International Political Science Association at Istanbul, reprinted in *The Review of Politics* (Jan. 1968). "It is as if our society insists upon giving to Karl Marx's crude hypothesis what our economic experience withheld; we are about to validate Marxist determinism by the failure of our political imagination rather than the failure of our economic system. It seems as if the contrivances of science and technology now tell us not only what we should do with them but also how to order our lives."

What, then, is the nature and role of *political* investigation? "In politics," Strausz-Hupé asserted, "one cannot look for anything and hope it find it, if one's search is not guided by the principles of universal and abiding ethics. It is these principles which supply the criteria for selecting from the mass of data those which are relevant to political science. Since they are a hindrance to that impersonal objectivity which is supposed to be the hallmark of scientific-technological achievement, we are advised to abandon them. If we take this advice, then the fruits of our search will be more data piled upon more data. Then the gathering and computation of data become a purpose in themselves, barren of insight." . . .

"The facts that matter to the investigation of the political scientist are beliefs about power and rule and the institutions which enshrine these beliefs. Factual questions about these beliefs do require factual answers. Some of these answers can be obtained, with varying degrees of accuracy, by the application of rigorous techniques of search; some only by inferences relying on intuitive judgments, more or less confused. It is impossible to order — 'scale' — the data thus obtained without introducing value judgments, that is, the investigator's own moral philosophy. These value judgments cannot be derived from political phenomena observed, for it is the observer's moral philosophy which identifies the phenomena and formulates the hypothesis about them. Facts about man in society are facts about man as a moral being. One man's perception of another depends on what they both are — on how one man perceives himself and the other as moral beings. Thus, understanding between and of men is an exchange, the terms of which are set by apprehended facts about moral choices. That these facts cannot be apprehended except by introspective inference, this irreducible uncertainty of meaning delimits the range of empiricism in the science of society. This is the Iron Law which governs the relationships of men — and, hence, of societies — with one another."

• "American policy in Vietnam" is "mistaken, although not immoral," Joseph W. Bishop believes, and thus his indictment of "The Reverend Mr. Coffin, Dr. Spock, and the ACLU" will not be based on disagreement about ends to be achieved but the means of dissent to government policy (*Harpers*, May).

Yale Chaplain Coffin becomes a particular target for Bishop (who is Professor of Law at the same university) because of the former's "total reliance on conscience" in these matters. "The fact is," Bishop states, "that the Divinity's built-in conduct regulator is sadly unreliable; even the best consciences do not all point in the same direction at the same time. Conscience is certainly a worse guide to conduct than the Constitution of the United States; it may be even worse than Congress. It is practically impossible to say that A, but not B, should have a right to be guided by his conscience and thus to practice civil disobedience whenever the conscience points in one direction and the law in another. . . ."

Furthermore, "the Bill of Rights . . . is to this day the best solution ever devised to the dilemma expressed in Lincoln's famous question, 'whether any government, not too strong for the liberties of its people, can be strong enough to maintain its existence in great emergencies.' . . ."

"The function of the Bill of Rights, which in the English-speaking countries ended the alternating persecutions of temporary minorities by temporary majorities, is to set bounds to the power of the majority to coerce the minority — and, as the price of this protection, to delimit the outer boundaries of the minority's freedom to disobey with impunity the majority's laws. I will defend the proposition that it is the best governor ever invented for the democratic engine and that, indeed, it is the principle reason why our democratic engine has lasted nearly two hundred years. . . ."

"The American Civil Liberties Union has been the most influential and effective protector of the citizen's freedoms under the Bill of Rights. Until March 2 [when its National Board reversed an earlier stand and voted to supply money and counsel to Spock, Coffin et al, accused of conspiring to help young men resist the draft], it had by and large managed to do so without making moral or political judgments as to the rightness or wrongness of that citizen's ideas and without identifying itself with any political philosophy other than a devotion to personal freedom. The Union's stand has been (and may still be) that there is no privilege to disobey a *constitutional* law, no matter how unwise, or even immoral, that law may be without paying whatever price is attached to that disobedience," despite what one may read into the March 2 decision. *Continued on p. 5*

in the magazines . . .

Continued from p. 2

Bishop "personally believe[s] that Dr. Spock and the Reverend Mr. Coffin have not exceeded those freedoms which the First Amendment allows them," and that "the Union could have argued that point with all vigor and authority — not as counsel to the defendants, but as a friend of the court and a friend of the Bill of Rights." But "to go farther, to endorse their political views (as it will surely be taken to have done), is to recast the saying of Voltaire, so that it reads, 'I approve of what you say, and I will therefore defend to the death your right to say it.'"

One aspect of "The Ministry and the Draft in Historical Perspective" which George Hunston Williams develops briefly in the latest issue of the ecumenical quarterly *Una Sancta*, is "The Church as People of Sanctuary." A few years ago, he notes, "during the civil rights movement, especially in the South, Christians and other citizens had the sanction of the Federal Constitution and the Supreme Court in their conscientious civil disobedience and other demonstrations against local infringements on the rights of Negroes as citizens of the United States and on their rights as human beings." But now, when people resort in good conscience to civil disobedience to protest the Vietnam war, "it is precisely the Federal Government or at least the present Administration which they resist." And so, the Harvard professor of divinity states, "it may well be the universal Church, long the repository of the just war theory, that will have to serve as the ultimate sanction and sanctuary for those citizens, whether avowed Christians or not, who, though not conscientious objectors to all forms of coercion and war, cannot in conscience regard warfare in Vietnam and the escalation there of aims and means as falling within the traditional or updated canons of the just war. Until such a time as American society with its legislature and courts finds a place for selective objectors to war, the Church has an unusually precarious but socially prophetic role to play independent of the state. The Church is the only symbol in and above any society of man's allegiance to a community of solidarity and conscience transcending a nation. . . ."

"Although the Pilgrims who came to America in [the reign of James I] and Puritans in the great migration to the Bay Colony did not carry with them any medieval or scriptural notion of a city of refuge or of a church edifice as an asylum, they readily regarded the whole of the North American continent as a refuge 'for the reformation of the reformation.' In time the whole American Republic was conceived of as 'a nation of immigrants,' forsaking the ways of the Old World and participating by pledges of allegiance in a new kind of secular covenantal commonwealth. . . ."

"At the present juncture in the evolution of the human conscience . . . the Church can reconceive itself as a People of sanctuary for those young men of conscience and their kinsmen everywhere who sense that the present war is wrong and be unto them in their conscientious protest like 'the shadow of a Great Rock in a desert land' (Isaiah 32:2)."

The Paris talks between the U.S. and North Vietnam occasioned the following *New Statesman* editorial (May 10): ". . . whether they lead to a renewal of the war, or a wrangling armistice, or a genuine settlement of the whole area, they are another significant step towards an American diplomatic revolution. To talk on equal terms with an adversary a tenth their size is light years away from Dulles's encircling pacts or the strategists' two-person zero-sum confrontations with the Soviet Union. It is a humiliation as well as a release; the first lesson is surely that the lesson should not be repeated.

". . . But theory and practice can drift indefinitely far apart. In theory, the anti-Dullesian revolution took place in 1960, when John Kennedy told the nation that it could not expect an American solution to every world problem. But Kennedy's practical innovations were cost-efficiency reforms of means, not fundamental reforms of ends. Counter-insurgency schools were a cheaper means of containing revolution than military pacts; they did not imply that there were areas where revolution neither could nor should be contained. The Americans are therefore now fighting a Dullesian war without even the benefits of a Dullesian ideology. In the same way, there is a considerable danger that the resolution to have no more Vietnams will be thought to be a new foreign policy in itself. . . ."

"America was, is, and will be a great power, and a world power and a Pacific power. But the content of the term changes more rapidly than the importance attached to it. The enemy is not only arrogance, but nostalgia. American policy in Asia has been clouded not so much by blind anti-communism as by the historical obsession with China and China's neighbors; just as British policy in the Middle East owes as much to the emotional legacy of Cromer and Lawrence as to a consciously formulated policy on Russian influence or oil supplies. 'Containing China' is intellectually inadequate and historically naive as the basis of America's Asian policy. Where the moral case for it was clearest — in Tibet — it was not even attempted. It may be a further humiliation to the United States that talks should take place under the aegis of a European leader who has most consistently urged them to keep up to date with history, while being purely reactionary when it suits him. But in revolutions, one must go to school everywhere."

PAMPHILUS