From "Purpose and Planning in Foreign Policy," by Zbigniew Brzezinski (The Public Interest, Winter): "To help define the fundamental principles of foreign policy for a great country that itself is changing both in its values and social organization and that operates in a world that is experiencing the most convulsive changes of its entire history is no mean task. It requires the qualities of a prophet (or an ideologue), of a strategist, and of a gadfly. The prophetic function is to sense the thrust of history, to keep its pulse and to assist the policy-maker in keeping pace with it. The strategist defines relevant concepts and broad programs. The gadfly role becomes necessary when history takes a turn. Top policy-makers are necessarily so busy with daily affairs that they reflect little, and precisely because of that their tendency is either to ignore broader principles or to become so wedded to them as to transform them into rigid doctrines. That rigidity is particularly characteristic of second echelon policy-makers, once they have internalized a generalized concept articulated by their superiors. They value the ideologue only as long as he reinforces their strongly held beliefs. But creative ideologues, though they operate within a framework that provides continuity, are usually inclined to develop their own ideas, and they change them more readily than do their consumers. The resistance of some U.S. policy-makers to the idea that the Atlantic concept, once a creative and relevant idea, would have to be significantly reshaped to fit the new realities, is a good illustration of how the valued ideologue comes to be resented when he becomes a gadfly."

What are some of the implications for foreign states of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, and what are the external factors affecting the Revolution's nature and extent? Concludes John M. Swomley, Jr., professor of Christian ethics at St. Paul's School of Theology (World Outlook, January): "The net result of the continuing power struggle in China, so far as it affects the U.S., seems to be fourfold. (1) Mao and his forces are not thinking of any immediate military confrontation with the United States. (2) The Cultural Revolution has not interfered with the primacy or strength of the army. (3) The Mao-Lin emphasis on guerrilla warfare and the development of a young People's Militia in the form of Red Guards and others indicates a readiness to deal with the U.S. on the level of present military technology should a U.S. invasion occur. (4) The three nuclear tests in 1966 and a thermonuclear test in June 1967 reveals the Chinese determination to provide an eventual deterrent to neutralize the present U.S. military policy and make Chinese land armies decisive in Asia.

"All of this means that China is apparently for the foreseeable future too involved with her internal problems to pose a military threat to any of her neighbors. This is likely to be the case for years to come, since the economic losses from the disruption of the Cultural Revolution will have to be regained, to say nothing of the problem posed by continuing rivalry with the Soviet Union."

"Apparently also China believes that American policy in Asia will eventually lead to an attack on her soil. . . ."

"Many Americans who have taken comfort from the Chinese internal upheaval should be aware of its enormous future implications and of the impetus given to it by American policies. The American milli-"
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military presence in Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Okinawa and Vietnam leads as inexorably to a hard line within China as the presence of Russian or Chinese forces in Nova Scotia, Puerto Rico, the Bahamas and Mexico would lead to a harder anti-Communist policy in the United States. Once China becomes a well-developed nuclear power, it will be increasingly difficult for the United States to maintain garrisons and bases around the rim of China without the possibility of dangerous confrontation, including border incidents and guerrilla warfare.

"It is possible to take Chinese proposals and efforts to appease the United States as a sign of weakness, which is apparently the position of the State Department and Pentagon. Among these proposals was a Chinese offer to discuss nuclear controls, which the State Department rejected in 1965. But it is also possible that China would welcome peace in the Pacific area and some form of nuclear and/or conventional disarmament if she were welcomed as a great power into the family of nations.

"Both the Cultural Revolution in China and the war in Vietnam contain a lesson — that Asians must be treated with dignity and respect if the world is to have peace."

In introducing the Fall issue of Cross Currents designated "For White America: Perspectives on Development and Social Change," James J. Lamb, director of the new Center for Study of Development and Social Change, notes that "thoughtful Americans by now use 'Development' as common currency. This seems to suggest at least theoretical acceptance of efforts to organize in such a way as to advance man's well-being. One must be for Development. Regrettably, however, meager disciplined attention has been devoted to conceptual frameworks and concrete programs based on the necessary re-examination of root assumptions and insistence on 'criteria of the human being.' In practice, economic determinism, cultural imperialism, and idol-worship of 'stability' underlie research, planning and action. What frequently results is anti-development and heightened anguish in the face of social change, actual or threatened. . . ."

I. F. Stone on biblical rhetoric for state occasions (January 27): "Isaiah is our favorite prophet. Ordinarily we would have been pleased when Nixon let it be known that he would take the oath of office on a Bible with its pages open to Isaiah. But we could not forget that Johnson — who could also sound like Billy Graham — started out by leaning heavily on Isaiah, too. His favorite quotation, particularly in his campaign against Goldwater, was Isaiah's 'come, let us reason together' but it fell into disuse after he began bombing North Vietnam. Nixon chose that page of Isaiah in which the Prophet spoke of beating swords into plowshares. This would be heartening if Nixon's speeches on the need for bigger arms spending during the campaign, and his choice for Secretary of Defense, did not seem to suggest that we might have to beat plowshares into swords. . . ."

"We would be more impressed with the peaceful sentiments expressed in the Nixon inaugural if they had not become standard fare. Kennedy and Johnson, too, spoke evangelically in their Inaugurals of the terrible power of the new weaponry, the need for peace and for diversion of resources to human need. Then they added a 'but' about remaining strong, and this — if strength can be measured in more arms — was serious. 'Let us cooperate,' Nixon said, 'to reduce the burden of arms. . . . But to all those who would be tempted by weakness, let us leave no doubt that we will be as strong as we need to be. . . .' Kennedy, too, made the same pledge and then in almost the same words added, 'We dare not tempt them with weakness.' Kennedy proceeded to step up the arms race and Nixon is pledged to do the same. Nixon announces an era of negotiation as Johnson promised 'we will be unceasing in the search for peace.' In less than two months he was bombing North Vietnam. Henry Cabot Lodge was then his special advisor and soon to be Ambassador in Saigon as he will now be Nixon's at the Paris talks. Though the objective circumstances have changed, the parallels are not reassuring.

"Our Presidents at their Inaugurals have all come to sound like card-carrying members of the Fellowship of Reconciliation. It's easier to make war when you talk peace. They make us the dupes of our hopes. . . ."

The new Nixon Cabinet appointees, writes Alistair Cooke in the Manchester Guardian Weekly for January 23, is admittedly long on business experience and short on statesmanship. The Cabinet is, as they say, 'business-oriented.' And this may be no bad thing, when it is recalled that the Russians' first team, too, is one of bureaucrats. There is nothing the Russians admire with fewer reservations than a first-rate American industrialist.

"It is possible, or worth a hope anywhere, that the missile control business, which the Russians say they are now ready to begin, may proceed with more practical dispatch between the two countries now than it could have done when the liberals were at the helm here. For, by another well-observed paradox, there are few Americans the Russians are more suspicious of than liberals, who once were thought to be halfway along the road to Moscow."

FAMPHILUS

February 1969 5