“Our policies should determine our weapons, not vice versa.” The statement is that of Carl Kaysen, but the sentiment has been variously expressed for many years. A good part of Robert Batchelder's *The Irreversible Decision*, an admirable study of how the decision to drop the first A-bombs was made, drives to that conclusion. And one could find many honorable precedents to this analysis. Mr. Kaysen's statement is not, then, one that many people would dispute. Abstractly, that is. The continuing debate over proposed anti-ballistic missile systems proves that in practice his judgment encounters heavy opposition.

The new Nixon Administration is faced with many tough decisions, and high on that list is the decision about A.B.M. systems. The outcome of the present debate will tell us a great deal not only about the nature of the Nixon Administration, or the strength of the Pentagon, but about the future direction of U.S. policies, foreign and domestic. Both those who advocate a thick A.B.M. system and those who wish to maintain or reduce the thin A.B.M. system enthusiastically advocated by Robert S. McNamara when he was Secretary of Defense can find comfort in the men and the arguments enlisted in their support.

There are highly intricate and sophisticated arguments to support an expensive and extensive A.B.M. system—and these arguments have been made voluminously. Anyone who wishes to enter the debate in *extenso* must be prepared to cope with them. But it may be well to assert from the beginning that much of the emotional force in the present debate flows from reasons that are neither particularly patriotic, logical or disinterested. In *Worldview*'s first editorial comment on the A.B.M. (October 1967) we quoted Mr. McNamara's cautionary note:

> “There is a kind of mad momentum intrinsic to the deployment of all nuclear weaponry. If a weapons system works—and works well—there is a strong pressure from many directions to procure and deploy the weapon out of all proportion to the prudent level required.”

This warning—and it is nothing less—is still necessary. Applied to the proposed A.B.M. system it merits one qualification, for the strong pressure now being exerted is for a system of which it is impossible to say that it works well. Nevertheless, because the amount of money involved in its development and extension is enormous it has the almost automatic strong support of those industries—airspace and weapons industries, whose returns are very high—which will most profit from it. As a criterion to help determine the nature and extent of our weapons systems the desire for
soaring profits is no more sound than the political uneasiness of those who are turned off at the idea of A.B.M. sentinels near their cities. Yet both of these unhelpful attitudes are present factors and political realities.

In the pause engendered by the opponents in the debate, President Nixon and Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird have a measure of freedom to outline and advocate their own policies. It is a matter of concern that they stand some distance from each other—at least in terms of the rhetoric they employ. President Nixon has for practical purposes wiped out the contention that the A.B.M. is intended as a defense primarily against China, a contention previously accepted only by Americans and, it must be said, not by all of them. It must then be measured against standards provided by the Russians. And President Nixon went on to say that in terms of weapons systems in a nuclear age “sufficiency” is a more appropriate term than “superiority” or “parity.”

The Secretary of Defense, however, clings to the term and, we conclude, to the concept of “superiority.” If these words have not been deprived of meaning, the distance between the President and the Secretary is great. There is additional reason to be uneasy about the approach the Secretary of Defense brings to the A.B.M. debate. For he argues that the Sentinel A.B.M. system of the U.S. could be used as a bargaining point, i.e., that it could be sacrificed if the USSR would sacrifice something in return. As a primary argument to support the proliferation of an already enormous weapons system this is simply untenable. If, for example, the U.S. were not to win that bargaining point, it would be forced to go ahead with the threatened proliferation or to reveal its threat as empty. And even the dubious merits of the A.B.M. system would then be shined up for general approbation.

Although the world does not stand still, least of all in terms of armaments, there is little reason to question the judgment implied in the annual reports issued by Robert McNamara when he was Secretary of Defense: the U.S. and the USSR both have a second-strike capability. Both great nuclear powers have, that is, a sufficiency; they could effectively destroy each others’ society. The major task now, as it has been for some time, is to extend not the arms race but the area in which the major powers can agree to further self-imposed limitations.

J. F.

THE PUEBLO: TRADITION & CHANGE

As the Pueblo affair dies down, at least temporarily, and Commander Lloyd M. Bucher’s fate commands less of the nation’s attention, the questions posed by the entire Pueblo episode remain resistant, compelling and unanswerable.

There was nothing romantic about Cmdr. Bucher’s capture, imprisonment or the messy circumstances of his release. Nor did his own uneven response to a number of hard questions win him additional sympathy. Nevertheless there will be quite justifiable uneasiness if whatever burden and blame is to be assigned rests wholly or even primarily on his shoulders.

Something unsatisfactory inheres in the very mechanisms by which Bucher’s actions are to be assessed. For those actions are to be considered within a framework, a tradition that was appropriate and adequate to a time that seems suddenly far removed. It is Bucher’s fate to reveal by his actions and his trial how inadequate much of that tradition is today. The U.S. Code of Conduct thus joins the honorable list of traditions now being re-examined.

We are pleased to announce that with this issue, Ernest W. Lefever becomes a regular columnist for worldview. Mr. Lefever is on the senior Foreign Policy Studies staff of the Brookings Institution and is an adjunct professor of international affairs at The American University. A frequent contributor to both scholarly journals and critical journals of opinion, Mr. Lefever is the author of a number of books, including Ethics and United States Foreign Policy, The World Crisis and American Responsibility, Crisis in the Congo and co-author of Profile of American Politics. Most recently he has written Uncertain Mandate: Politics of the U.N. Congo Operation.