

# THE "NEW NATIONALISM"

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Nationalism is of course a state of mind. It is a way of thinking which seizes a rather large group of people, usually all living in the same area, and causes them to consider themselves a nation; that is, as an actual or potential governing organization to which they give their loyalty. We continue to live in an era of nation-states. To give one's primary political loyalty to a sub-national group is to be provincial, to give it to another nation is to skirt being subversive, and to give it to a group of nations is to espouse supranationalism. In this context, what does it mean to speak of "the new nationalism"?

There are many surprises in the use of the term "new nationalism." It sometimes refers to nationalism typical of a new nation. Much more often, a hasty survey of the literature shows, "new nationalism" is to be found in an *old* nation. "New nationalism" in an old nation means bad nationalism, like a middle-aged man who ought to know better than to chase after young girls. It means a revival of ideas which should have been outgrown.

"New nationalism" usually refers to the outward looking aspects of nationalism, to relations between the nation and other nations or international organizations. It is not often used with reference to internal national developments; not, for instance, to "black nationalism" in the United States.

"New nationalism" is usually employed in a negatively critical way from the point of view of a kind of ideal cycle of nationalism. In the young country it is assumed that nationalism helps bring about self-respect and confidence in formerly exploited peoples, a focus for rebellion against foreign domination, a solidarity among disparate racial, religious or economic groups, a willingness to die for country which is the beginning of military power, an acceptance of decision-making by others far away in the capital city, and a readiness to sacrifice for long-term goals. In the mature nation, internal cohesion having been achieved, nationalism permits and is transcended by adherence to international law, cooperation with other countries, reluctance to use force to settle disputes, an end to chauvinism and overweening cultural superiority claims, a disposition to help less fortunate

outsiders, and a certain willingness to be regulated by international bodies in matters of concern to many nations; in short, national behavior in accord with the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations. In this concept of a community of responsible states nationalism is a *necessary* stage of political development before international cooperation is possible. In the really "good" country, however, nationalism is outgrown or somehow repressed in order to bring international cooperation to its highest pitch. Measured against such an ideal, the term "new nationalism" means backsliding.

How many countries today see "good" and "bad" nationalism in this context? How many nations today who do look at the subject this way are in a position to criticize others on backsliding from their devotion to the ideals of the United Nations? How many nationalisms are sufficiently mature that a political scientist or international lawyer can apply any tests of virtue? This kind of approach to the subject is likely to lead to invidious comparisons and hairsplitting. Virtue of the sort postulated is not plentiful. Nationalism of all kinds is to be found everywhere. It is more productive, therefore, to drop the adjective "new" and just consider contemporary nationalism, in its manifold varieties, in relation to the prospects for peace and international responsibility.

*Nationalism in Western Europe.* In Western Europe we see the oldest nation-states on earth, in which an attenuated form of nationalism still survives. The nation-state not only remains the locus of sovereignty in this area but is also still the focus of supreme loyalty for most peoples of Western Europe.

The France of President de Gaulle is regarded as a unique case of nationalism in large part because it has been widely assumed that nationalism as such was dead or dying in Europe until his return to power in 1958. What is the evidence for that belief? It consists of these facts: first, most European statesmen and publicists have desisted from publicly proclaiming their nations to be the grandest jewels of creation, as had been the habit as late as 1939 in many places; second, all of these nations were so caught up in the larger confrontation between West and East that the possibility of any quarrels of their own leading to conflict had become unreasonable; third, their military forces, formerly the talismans of national inde-

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pendence, were, for the most part, integrated into a larger military structure; fourth, and most important of all, some of these states — only six, it should be noted, out of some fifteen — had adopted joint institutions whereby some of the functions formerly reserved to the nation-state had begun to be exercised in common.

All four of these trends continue and all have as their effect, among other things, a de-emphasis of the kind of nineteenth century nationalism which some consider the prototype of nationalism. But it is unwarranted to speak of nationalism as having been dead or dying in Europe until President de Gaulle resurrected it. For all the progress that has been made even among the six members of the communities to integrate their economies, and among the members of NATO to coordinate their defenses, it is still the national governments of these states that retain ultimate power of decision over their affairs and it is still to these governments that the loyalties of their citizens flow.

It should also be noted, however, that the four trends mentioned earlier, and other developments working in the same sense, have molded the surviving nationalisms of Europe into a new and unprecedented system. The six governments in the European communities, and others that wish to join, have reached the common conclusion that many vital problems are optimally handled by groups of states taking decisions together. From this there has emerged a clear "community spirit," de Gaulle notwithstanding. This does not mean that governments have given up the pursuit of their national interests; it does mean that they are now pursuing them "by other means," to transpose Clausewitz's classic phrase.

The governments that have built this new system of decision-making, for the most pragmatic reasons of self-interest but also with the hope that an ever closer European union may emerge, have been motivated only in the broadest sense by the purposes that have been laid down in or foreshadowed by the United Nations Charter. Yet the European nations have, almost without noticing it, renounced force for the settlement of disputes among themselves. They have continued extending assistance to large parts of the underdeveloped world, albeit largely to their own former colonies, but making a significant contribution to the health of those regions nonetheless. Some of them have built up a new system of decision-making that can rightly be looked upon as a novel and highly constructive contribution to the rule of law.

The kind of "international responsibility" which these developments reflect is of a highly practical

and pragmatic kind. These changes are not a reaction against the excesses of Western European nationalism but a reinterpretation of the relationship between national and international society.

*Nationalism in Eastern Europe.* In Eastern Europe one tries to understand and keep up with the complex interrelationships between two of the great driving forces of our times, nationalism and communism. All too long we thought of these forces as being necessarily in conflict, based largely on our hopes for the Eastern European countries, or indeed for Soviet minorities like the Ukrainians. This is indeed part of the story but more typically communism and nationalism are intricately interwoven, with communism serving as a vehicle of expression for especially cohesive forms of nationalism.

As a force for peace and international responsibility in Communist Eastern Europe, nationalism might be credited with both sublime and ridiculous consequences. It seems ridiculous that Byelorussia and the Ukraine vote as nations in the United Nations. It is, however, a blessing, that the monolithic, threatening thing fashioned by the Red Army at the end of World War II has become something quite different, certainly not monolithic. Communism has not succeeded in taking over any advanced Western countries but has made its impact in countries where there was a great sense of inferiority toward the West coupled with a sense of real worth and dignity based on past glories or on a high evaluation of future potential. Russia fitted this bill in 1917 and for many years thereafter and the Soviet Union has expressed itself forcefully in claims to leadership of communism everywhere. These Soviet pretensions stirred up strong nationalist reactions in many countries of Eastern Europe as was shown in Yugoslavia in 1948, in Poland and Hungary in 1956, in the independent tendencies shown by Rumania in the last few years, and finally in the amazing changes in Czechoslovakia which culminated in Soviet armed intervention. Nationalism is very much alive in Eastern Europe, the Soviet doctrine of a "socialist commonwealth" notwithstanding.

The United Nations and "international responsibility" also gain some dividends from efforts of Eastern European countries to be independent of Moscow. Two examples illustrate such benefits: Tito's efforts to coordinate political and economic activities by neutral nations and Rumania's initiatives in 1966 and 1967 with the "Group of Nine" to explore areas of "peaceful coexistence."

*Nationalism in East Asia.* Another Communist who could not stand Soviet leadership was Mao, especially when the Soviet leader was such a junior dog-

matist as Khrushchev, and Communist China has gone on to proclaim its captaincy of the true revolutionary forces in the world. The Sino-Soviet split and the Cultural Revolution are very large subjects but it seems quite clear that Chinese nationalism has had much to do with both and that both have made major differences in a series of questions about world peace during the last decade, some of which are all too painfully with us. Even aside from the struggle with the United States, the Chinese Communists have run the gamut of attitudes toward their Asian neighbors. From the impeccable "Ten Bandung Principles" of 1955 which Chou En-lai helped draft, through Communist China's support of Malayan Communist insurgency, its attack on India, its support of the abortive P.K.I. coup in Indonesia, the enunciation of the doctrine of "people's war," and all the way to the abandonment by Peking in June, 1967 of its thirteen-year-old friendship with Burma and its announced support of the White Flag—through all this Communist policy has been unfriendly to more and more countries.

During a slightly longer period Japanese nationalism has progressed in the opposite direction: from armed aggrandizement, through defeat and prostration, to recovery and development now into the most powerful and one of the best behaved nations in the Far East.

The nations of East Asia and the Pacific are by no means the youngest in the world and yet their record on cooperative endeavors is not very encouraging. The gaps in culture, ideology and the lack of common experience are too great. Some of the most primitive people and some of the most advanced civilizations live not far apart. Egocentricity has not helped either, as we think of the colorful, dominating personalities of Sihanouk, Mao, Sukarno, Syngman Rhee, Ne Win and Chiang Kai-shek.

Even racial and cultural homogeneity has not withstood the shocks of ideological differences. Korea and Vietnam have been split in two and kept divided by violent conflicts in which the issue of communism has been central.

Not every force is centrifugal, however. All are represented in the United Nations except Communist China and both halves of the other two divided nations. Thailand and Cambodia used the International Court of Justice to settle the Preah Vihear temple dispute between them. The 1966 establishment of the ten-member Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC), the 1967 creation of the five-nation Association of South East Asia Nations (ASEAN), and

the Southeast Asia Ministers of Education Secretariat are illustrative of beginning attempts by non-Communist Asian leadership to use Asian regional organizations to assist in solving national and Asian problems.

*Nationalism in the Near East and South Asia.* In the countries stretching from the Eastern Mediterranean through India, nationalism is both inner- and outer-directed.

Nationalism can be thought of as an ideology embodying social and economic goals which express what the nation is and should become. Such nationalism is a compendium of reflections of the problems that many new nations face. In several of the Arab countries social renovation has been a primary goal. President Bourguiba has said, "For us, nationalism implies social action." It has been Nasser's practice of and publicity about Arab socialism, as well as his charismatic personality, which has projected his image in the minds of Arabs outside Egypt, especially in Syria and Jordan, so that "Arab nationalism" is supranationalism.

In India national unity has been the cry of leadership, and unity has been desired not only in political organization but in the removal of the caste and class barriers that separated Indians from each other.

The empathy which is newly felt in many developing nations toward the Soviet Union or Communist China is due to the fact that these large new nations have attempted social revolution and the creation of internal unity.

Nationalism among the countries of the Middle East and South Asia, as with many other former colonies, is very much an assertion of identity, answering the questions, "Who and what am I?" and, "By whom am I to be ruled?" To those of us who have long been comfortable with our American identity these questions are not easy to appreciate. From the point of view of the black American however, the questions are immediately pertinent. In the words of the President's National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders: "Just as Lincoln, a century ago, put preservation of the Union above all else, so should we put creation of a true union — a single society and a single American identity — as our major goal."

In pursuit of their own identity, and rejecting their colonial garb, some nations appear to us amusingly or outrageously nationalistic. It would appear sometimes that international cooperation is to them a denigration of their individuality. This should be looked on as a necessary part of their political development. As these peoples become surer of the viability of their nationhood and make progress toward unity and economic and social betterment,

international cooperation may be easier for them.

External threat as well as internal diversity and struggle foster strong nationalism. Israel fears the Arab states and the Arabs fear Israel. The question has been asked, "If India did not exist, could Pakistan?" And "neo-colonialism" is often cited by the new states as a threat to their freedom to grow in their own way. Some of these external threats are real. Some are exaggerated. If a threat has been largely invented, or introduced wishfully, to salve internal frustration, greater willingness to be neighborly will of course come only as the internal problems are resolved.

The competition between the great and superpowers has provided a number of the new states an opportunity to enhance their sense of identity and purpose. Nehru saw India as a nation neither "Eastern" nor "Western" but as a bridge between the two both culturally and politically. President Nasser has had fair success with his tactic of dealing with both the Soviets and ourselves and to a degree playing each against the other.

Nationalism, then, can be considered to be a cohesive force for nations under stress from within and from outside. A reasonable case can be made that such pressure and response are intrinsic to modernization. For many peoples it brings the excitement of self-discovery if not of self-realization.

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*Nationalism in Africa.* Turning to Africa, one finds examples of these facets of nationalism and also some additional nuances. The continent contains what might be termed second-degree nationalism, and even third-degree nationalism. Take Kenya, one of those large patches which used to always be colored United-Kingdom pink in the atlases. Carved out in the nineteenth-century African space race with France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Belgium, Kenya became one of the more profitable and better managed colonies. Its boundaries and size are no more accidental and arbitrary than many other patches now left to become nations. Kenyatta, rebel fighter, now statesman, architect of Kenyaism, second-degree nationalism, is now trying to unify by purifying. He is making life difficult for those South Asians who did not opt for Kenya citizenship after independence, a group which could not, or would not — we shall never be sure — be assimilated in the new nation of Kenya. To the extent that the Asians insisted on keeping to themselves and having their own group, should we call that third-degree nationalism? And what kind or degree of nationalism is it in England, wishing to keep the Asians out? Or in

India, wishing to avoid taking them in?

Africa has dozens of new nations all born in the last ten years. Nationalism, of the good old-fashioned, introverted, slogan-making variety, will be an essential ingredient in the efforts of Africa's statesmen to keep their new nations going. Pride of race, exaltation of past and newly created traditions will help them overcome tribal heritages and enhance a larger people's sense of belonging. Nationalism will be especially meaningful in a continent that has only yesterday become free of colonial domination and still feels the stigma of former subordination.

Although international cooperation in Africa, as elsewhere, will continue for a long time to depend on the nation-state as the basic unit, there are several extraordinary factors which tend to push groups of countries to act together, or at least talk about acting together. One such factor is solidarity against outside control. This accounts for the attitudes of such an extreme nationalist as Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana who professed that his first loyalties were to "Africa" and indeed who saw to the inclusion in Ghana's 1960 constitution of a provision that would enable Ghana to surrender its sovereignty to a union of African states.

Another clustering force comes of course from the language links, the sentimental ties and the continuing economic shelter of the former mother countries, especially France and England. These holds are probably weakening.

A third unifying subject for nearly all African countries is the hate objects in South Africa and the Portuguese colonies. Here is a case where "international responsibility" means to the Africans pitching in-money and equipment for what we call subversion and arming of guerrilla fighters.

It is not surprising therefore that they hold a different view of the applicable international law. African states consider themselves justified in supporting the efforts of Africans in Southern Africa to rid themselves by force of white minority domination. "National liberation" efforts from Tanzania against Mozambique are not considered aggression, and the existence of *apartheid* in South Africa is regarded as a threat to the peace which would justify Security Council action under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. This difference in thinking between the new nations of Africa and the older founders of the United Nations points to a political and legal — if not military — battleground for the future.

*Nationalism in Latin America.* In Latin America, not only has nationalism been pronounced fervently when dealing with the United States but it is reflected in the dealings of these countries with their

neighbors as well. Border disputes concerning remote and apparently valueless lands are very real issues to the countries involved.

What is changing about Latin American nationalism is its widening base. Through modern communications, education and other development factors, the scope of the populace touched by a sense of national identity is growing rapidly. The "them and us" concept in the national context is beginning to undermine narrower loyalties to family or region. Governments, both popular and authoritarian, have learned the utility of nationalism as a unifying force, the adhesive force to make people willing to sacrifice in the short run in order to achieve long-range goals.

Because of the unique relationship of the United States to Latin America, nationalism is frequently manifested in anti-U.S. attitudes. American economic, political and cultural influence in the area is often the target for those who wish to strengthen their sense of national identity or play on it for their own political or economic purposes. While these attitudes frequently irritate bilateral relationships between the individual country and the U.S., they do not generally affect the broader spectrum of international relations. There are exceptions to this, of course. Brazil's opposition to the Non-Proliferation Treaty reflects a sense of nationalism carried to the point of great nation "manifest destiny."

Some international institutional growth, particularly relating to regional trade and development, has reflected an awareness by many of the Latin American states of this field of mutual interest and need. The Latin American Free Trade Association and the Central American Common Market, while still limited in their effectiveness in expanding regional trade, are at least steps in that direction. The newly formed Andean group, a sub-regional grouping within LAFTA, and the proposed River Plate development organization are more directly concerned with regional development schemes but also represent an awareness of the necessity for cooperation among neighbors to attain common goals.

Despite the strength of nationalism in the Latin American countries, they have always been strong supporters of the principal international political organizations, particularly the United Nations and the Organization of American States. Recognizing the limits of their influence as individual states, they have found these institutions useful in dealing with the world powers on significant issues that might affect their security or sovereignty.

*Nationalism at Home.* When we are looking at another country from the viewpoint of United States history and objectives it is rather easy to distinguish

between narrow nationalism and high-minded dedication to the community of man, between "bad" and "good." When we look at our own foreign policies, however, it turns out to be a surprisingly difficult and disputacious question.

Let us examine two propositions on the subject and then look at several test cases. First, it may be suggested that measuring nationalism in foreign policy means to strike the balance in a particular situation between long-term and short-term considerations. A highly nationalistic policy is one in which a nation demands a more or less immediate "payoff" for its endeavors. At the other extreme, an "internationalist" or "altruistic" policy accepts very little immediate return but expects a very large gain for everyone eventually, perhaps, in an indirect fashion.

Second, if we employ the term "liberal" and "conservative" in their conventional meanings of putting a higher value on change or on stability when the two come into conflict, the argument could be made that the difference in the United States between "altruistic," and "selfish," nationalism lies in the association of the former with domestic conservatism and of the latter with domestic liberalism. Now this would require a wrenching around of our habitual thinking, which has for many years associated selfish nationalism with conservatism and liberalism with internationalism. There is no necessary connection; only a parallelism or coincidence of outlooks in particular times and places, and it would appear that this coincidence has recently broken apart.

Let us take three examples of U.S. foreign policy problems and see what they look like in this framework. At one end of a spectrum one would certainly put foreign aid. It seems a clear case of the "old" internationalism, but in recent years the matter has gotten awfully mixed up. Foreign aid has become almost completely "tied" to U.S. exports so that it often feeds back quite directly into the hands of producers of certain industrial and agricultural products. Some of these naturally conservative quarters have therefore become strong supporters of elements of our aid programs. At the same time, some domestic liberals have become more and more alarmed at what they consider the inadequacy of our programs for domestic social change. While generally not hostile to foreign aid, they have become less disposed to fight for it, more disposed to accept tradeoffs in favor of our own poverty programs. Consider tariff policy. For a hundred years, liberals and free trade have been identified with each other. Within the past few months the Kennedy Round of tariff reductions has

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marked what many feel is the virtual end of a very long road: the development of a situation in which tariffs no longer are a really serious impediment to the flow of goods among developed countries. And ironically, at this moment of triumph for classic liberal internationalism, the demand for protective tariffs has revived in this country to an amazing degree. The first wave of this new protectionism has been led by what we are accustomed to consider conservative elements, but they are already joined by substantial labor union forces, and if the underlying currents which are making these waves do not die away, protectionism will soon be advocated by some of our most radical progressives who will fear the consequences in, say, the Detroit slums of unemployment derived from massive imports of foreign autos and steel. At the end of March, 1968 the Senate approved new import quotas on textiles.

Finally, our policy in Vietnam, and in less acute ways, the whole range of our military commitments abroad make up the most obvious and most painful example of this reversal of alliances. We are all familiar with the tensions today between the "old liberals" with their deep commitment to mutual security, and the "new left" with its profound skepticisms about the value of almost any effort by the United States to influence events abroad.

Can one draw any conclusion from this crossing of lines, beyond the truism that the world is very complex and fundamentally mixed up? Perhaps only another truism, which is that there is no such thing as a "pure" policy — one favored for only one clear reason by a cohesive body of public opinion. A proper comprehension of this complexity should lead us to be suspicious of labels.

This brings us back to where we started, rejecting the use of the label "new nationalism."

Having surveyed the varieties of contemporary nationalism, we see that nationalism is indeed a prevalent "state of mind" in the contemporary world. It is far from clear that all present nationalisms will survive the strains of their constituent provincialisms. Supranationalism, even on a regional basis, seems very remote.

International cooperation—the U.N. idea—will no doubt continue for some time to be the most effective means of coping with the interplay of nationalisms. The varieties and the strengths of nationalisms suggest, however, that the success/failure balance in international cooperation is likely to undergo more violent and radical swings than most founders of the United Nations imagined. This may suggest that the foundations for peace are precarious, but that is hardly news.

Pain and tragedy often teach men, and sometimes nations. Comfort mothers conceit more surely than necessity does invention, and torment accompanies the birth of thought as it does that of men. Even in Vietnam there is that much hope; national anguish may lead us to a new and better understanding of the world and of our role in it, and to a foreign policy which avoids the grim and needless alternatives that have confronted us in Southeast Asia.

The hope, however, is ambiguous. Pain should stimulate the search for causes and cures, but it may produce no more than flight. In intellectual as well as physical matters, there are hurts so great as to be "blinding." "A cat which has sat on a hot stove lid will not sit on one again, and that is well," Mark Twain wrote, "but she will not sit on a cold one either." Like Twain's cat, men are prone to develop associations with agony which run far beyond the cause, overreactions which lead them to shun fearfully not only threatening situations but also compelling opportunities. Generals fight the last war, diplomats seek the last peace, and both end disastrously. So long as nations can do no better, they fall victim to an analogue of manic depression, oscillating between rashness and cowardice, pride and innocence, intervention and isolation.

The moral law may be eternal, but under it the political world changes. Statecraft is a thing of judgment, an applied moral science that cannot afford fixed rules. The decision to war or not to war, like all the less dramatic choices which impose themselves on political man, is a choice of means to an end which must vary with the times. In this, as in many things, we would be wise to be guided by the third chapter of Ecclesiastes.

Choice in politics is fearful because it partakes of the uncertainty of man's condition; good intentions may produce evil, and bad motives may lead to good results. In a more than usually fearful world — more uncertain because of change, more threatening because of modern technology — it is no surprise if many fall victim to the temptation of believing that

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