

places, the dominant liberal complacency is so strong that unless its nakedness is demonstrated the issues cannot be intelligently discussed. In such a place, dramatic pressures may still be needed.

Radicals need to know that if force arouses counterforce, they are the weakest party. It is not wise to commit all one's resources in the beginning. Liberals need to know that, so long as resort to force is the only way

to have unpopular viewpoints listened to and acted upon, the university does not promote freedom but only the appearance of freedom, a carefully managed and profitable freedom.

In the present crisis, genuine and free diversity is being born in American universities. It is no wonder that the established are becoming alarmed. They would like everything their way, in their style.

THE UNIVERSITY AND THE UNHINGING OF SOCIETY

James V. Schall

The attention of the Western world has been concentrated very forcibly in recent years on the meaning and the place of the university in contemporary society. Student unrest and political "activism" have gained widespread publicity in all communications media and in every legislature. In France, Mexico, Czechoslovakia, Japan, Germany, Spain, Italy, and the United States, the university confrontation has occasioned grave civil crises that have shaken the very stability of government itself. The origin and nature of this phenomenon is rooted in the intellectual history of the modern world which has sought to effect a humanism totally subject to man's intellectual and technological control. What we are now seeing is how this control is passing from thought and technique to political and messianic action, to movements which profess to "re-create" man in the midst of his most pressing crises of poverty, race, war, and equality.

Why does the university show itself today to be the center of cultural unrest? Let us consider five inter-related sets of institutions which have direct influence over its being and structure — the family, the economy, the church, the government, and the university. Each of these institutions contains within itself a two-fold function — one of introducing newness and change, the other of preserving and adjusting what has already been created and handed down. In different ages and cultures, change, revolution, stability and conservation can find a spearhead or focal point in any of these aspects of society. Indeed, their coun-

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tervailing force is required to prevent a destruction or maladjustment of the whole.

The family is founded upon the birth and early growth of the human child as an absolutely new and unparalleled event whose ultimate consequences can never be fully comprehended. In a sense, the newborn child is the model of all revolutionary action because he represents the introduction of unpredictable alteration into what is routine and ordered. His possibility, the fact that the child "can" be born at any moment, challenges the fullness of the present, always hinting that it can be different, can be greater if it chooses to be. The family, or its substitute in the orphanage or nursery, has the task and the glory of introducing the mysterious child to human life and society, of enabling him to find a place in this worldly life. Yet the family, and consequently society itself, never fully escape the fact that each child represents something unique, so that things will never be quite the same again.

The economy, in classical thought, was intrinsically connected with the family household, but, in modern society, it has come to be based on the much wider extent of the city, the nation, the region, the continent, or even the world. The economy represents the organized human effort to "take care of itself," *autarkia* as the Greeks called it. What lies behind the economy is the need to provide for the "necessities" and the "non-necessities" which enable man not just to survive but to flourish and to develop. What characterizes the economy is the creation of a "sufficiency" and more fully of an "abundance."

The economy is impelled by a newness whose source is either in population growth or in "rising expectations." These two motor factors, as it were, require

constant innovation and improvement in order to achieve the abundance levels required by the growth of man. But behind all economic institutions lies the belief that man can and should provide within his culture the physical goods required for a complete human life produced out of the raw materials of nature. Indeed, the very fact that nature "can" be so formed by man's efforts suggests that man's growth and evolution, in great part at least, depend upon his efforts to translate nature into human purposes.

The church represents a disturbing element in society because it does not spring from human society alone. The church transcends human institutions because it believes that human culture is not a total enclosure within itself but is capable of receiving a call, of an openness beyond its own capacities. The church touches man at all his ultimates — at life, love, knowing, and death. It is founded on the newness of God, in his capacity for elevating life, love, knowing, and death into something more than mere products of our sociological and cultural experience. "The fundamental fact about each human being," Professor Ernest Becker has recently observed, "is that his early growth is in large part a denial and a masking of his anxiety, his powerlessness, his felt finitude . . . *The whole cast of one's muscles and nerves is shaped as a denial of his real insignificance*" ("The Evaded Question: Science and Human Nature," *Commonweal*, February 21, 1969). The church, on the contrary, believes man is made in the image and likeness of God. Therefore, it tells man that "the cast of his muscles and nerves" is profoundly significant and not a mere biological accident. The church stands as witness to the belief that the transformation of society and of man need not only be man's exclusive initiative, that in human history, as in human muscles and nerves, there may be something more than mere man. The church is, therefore, unsettling because it always affirms that the best efforts of man are never enough, even for man, even when he thinks himself to have created a lasting city. Man's vision of man, in short, is too narrow, even for man. The church, then, is, in fact, a group of witnesses to the resurrection, the last foolishness and the ultimate hope.

The government is fundamentally concerned with the peace and order of man in this life. The government too has its origins in human needs and abundance, but it sees — and this is its earthly glory — that "this life" can be noble, more than just a vast emporium of riches. The task of government is always concrete — what is possible with these particular, fallible, finite men. Government is the institution that, more than others, must deal with and handle the consequences of man's weaknesses and failures. It has less room for illusions,

the darker side of life cannot be forgotten for long by the public official. The police, the army, the jail, the law are institutions we might, in our piety, prefer to be without, but we know that they are necessary. We find that their destruction multiplies, not lessens evil. Without them, the alternative is not universal peace and justice, but more probably the rule of the most vicious and ruthless.

Human political evolution has been in the direction of ordering and defining the scope and use of these coercive bodies in the name of law, man, and progress. But even their most legal and tempered use will always be harsh. The government is responsible for confronting disaster and irregularity whenever it occurs. Only the government can provide the overall environment for peaceful change of a whole society. Government, indeed, is man's classic response to chaos and violence, it is his attempt to order change. Historically, government is man's most necessary institution when he comes together in large numbers; it is also his most dangerous institution. Not without reason is the most perilous organization we know the state which believes itself to be also a church, an economy, and a university.

The university is not simply a school. The medieval university was conceived as a guild, a corporation of students and scholars. But what specifically distinguished the university corporation from all others was that it was organized to pursue truth, to preserve, gain, and increase knowledge. Traditionally, the university has had three functions: (1) to know what has happened to man in the past, that is, to preserve and classify what man has done and learned, (2) to separate the true from the false, yet to know the false, to record it, to keep it, but to know that it is false, and (3) to provide a means to learn, a methodology and a context for passing on and increasing knowledge.

The university has grown with society. "The (modern) university is being called upon," Clark Kerr has written, "to educate previously unimagined numbers of students, to respond to the expanding claims of government and industry and other segments of society as never before; to adopt and channel new intellectual currents" ("Ferment in the University: The New Involvement with Society," *Dialogue*, n. 1, 1968). Thus the modern university has added two other functions which are connected with, though still somewhat distinct from, these three basic functions. *First*, the university is the organizer of social mobility through the imparting of skills and knowledge so that the student can enter into and grow in complex modern society. *Secondly*, the modern university is the primary, though not the only, locus for the advancement and development of science. Since it is precisely from

the growth and application of science that most specifically modern problems originate, the connection of the university to the growth of science is crucial.

But it is altogether possible in today's hectic climate of opinion that science will quietly leave the university both because the university atmosphere — Clark Kerr's "intellectual currents" — is no longer conducive to its presence and because university students are no longer especially interested in it. This is why Eugene Rabinowitch is correct when he suggests that the requirements of science and its place in any hope for human betterment are the least understood concepts of the professional revolutionaries themselves. "Intellectual rebels of today seem largely unaware of the fact (or deliberately ignore it?) that the main problems of contemporary society are those created by the scientific and technological revolutions" ("Student Rebellion: The Aimless Revolution?" *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, September, 1968). What is striking is that the political and sociological structure, rather than technological and scientific competence, are believed to provide the solution to man's problems.

The shadowy spectre behind this turmoil, however, is the ever-growing suspicion that the university is becoming less and less a place whose primary goal is devotion to knowledge and truth. It is now at least an open question whether the future of intelligence is still in the rapidly politicized university atmosphere. We can, consequently, ask with Professor Philippe Nonet, "is the university dead?" ("La Mort de l'Université?" *La Revue Nouvelle*, January, 1969). Does the politicization of academic life and the content of studies necessarily compromise and ultimately threaten to defeat the classical ideal of the free pursuit of knowledge and truth? "Today the loudest voices are not merely making proposals or asking for participation in policymaking," Paul Woodring has noted, "they are issuing ultimatums and threatening to close the colleges by violence if the administration and faculty fail to capitulate" ("A View from the Campus," *Saturday Review*, January 18, 1969). When the university becomes a staging ground for revolutionary action on the premise that peaceful or rational inquiry into truth no longer suffices, have we then ennobled knowledge by throwing it into action or have we prostituted truth to the latest social movement?

The crucial question, then, especially for the university, is truth, the search for which is the chief business of the university. The most serious doubt cast on the integrity of this mission is the defeat of history as a relevant critique of present action. In a way, as Jacques Ellul has submitted, the vast mass of available knowl-

edge has had the result in the young of a rejection of all knowledge, especially all disciplined analysis ("L'inadaptation des jeunes, signe d'une société," *Economie et Humanisme*, January-February, 1969). This has the effect of cutting off one generation from another.

The whole of the West, in a way, retains a kind of diabolic forgetfulness of the French Revolution, of how quickly the highest motives and hopes pass from the destruction of the old order, to the control of thought, to the terror, to Napoleon. Probably what is so remarkable about the "conflict of generations" today is the worry of the older generation that we are again on our way to the terror and to Napoleon. Indeed, it often appears that in many university circles we may have already reached it. Meanwhile, the young retain the firm belief that this degeneration is impossible since they have such good intentions and high ideals. What we must do, therefore, we must do rapidly, tear down the "society of consumption," distribute the remaining loaves to the hungry, and thereby gain liberty and independence through overturning the dead weight of the established, bureaucratic past and present.

The conception of its "enemy" determines how the university world is coming to look upon its public, revolutionary task. "The systematic, authoritarian repression of all its (i.e., student movement's) efforts in this direction has provoked the violent response of the movement," Silvano Bassetti has written in a typical European analysis.

Its own subversive burden has been exalted by the myopia and logic of the conservers of political and academic power. The student's task of global confrontation, anti-authoritarianism, anti-capitalism, and anti-imperialism is the necessary response to a political structure felt and analyzed to be oppressive and repressive. ("Perché lottano gli studenti?" *Dibattito Sindacale*, March-April, 1968.)

The question for the university, then, is whether it must reject its past. "The university is a place," Mario Savio informed us from Berkeley, "where people begin seriously to question the condition of their existence and to raise the issue of whether they will be committed to the society they have been born into" ("An End to History," *The New Student Left*, ed. M. Cohen and D. Hale, Beacon, 1966). Curiously, it is to be noted that, for Savio, history means the future, not the past. The editorial writers of the *National Catholic Reporter*, commenting unfavorably upon the well-known letter of Notre Dame's president Theodore Hesburgh on student violence, reflect the same mentality: "The reason the . . . letter falls short of doing the service it might have is that it is a piece of advocacy. It takes for granted that the university, along with the society of which it is a part, is worth pre-

servicing" (March 12, 1969). Again, the implication is always that society is not worth preserving and that external, violent political action is necessary to achieve the goals passionately believed to be true. When this point is reached, of course, the university is no longer a university and failure to win an argument leads to rebellion.

So the only alternatives for the failure of the university are either, as Ivan Illich has recently suggested for Latin America, to abandon the university since it merely increases society's divisions, or to take guerrilla-type action to destroy society itself (Illich's views in *Siempre*, summarized in *The Catholic Messenger*, December 12, 1968). But it is the direct action alternative which, more than any other, threatens the university, either because it politicizes the content of instruction without an actual struggle or because it succeeds in "burning the place down," a familiar American cry.

Edith Eucken-Erdsiek has pointed out that there are three arguments for "direct action." The first is that the upholders of law and order are bound by "the rules of the game," consequently, they are at a serious disadvantage before those who are bound by no law. Secondly, everything becomes political, nothing is exempt — church, justice, science, art. Thirdly, what causes real change is direct guerrilla action which can be introduced in the developed world by the students. In this light, Professor Eucken-Erdsiek's conclusion is worth sober reflection:

The youth believe that a civilization based on fear has no more prospective to offer it. And still great problems await it. Our world progresses inexorably. Hard exertions will be necessary, new ideas, a thorough-going transformation; all that, however, can, in general, only succeed in union with the best of our tradition. Our society has weaknesses, many institutions impede development. Still it is the order which we must thank for justice, freedom, and welfare. Our troubles as our hopes can direct themselves only on their further construction, on their ever greater perfection. There is no other alternative than anarchy and, in the end, dictatorship. ("Jugend, die nicht Erbe sein will: 'Direkte Aktion' und der Traum von einer besseren Welt," *Die Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, n. 51, March 1, 1969.)

When we forget that our institutions themselves are built on concrete human nature in confrontation with the loss of liberty and truth, we approach sheer tragedy. The alternative to a society which no longer knows why it has rules and procedures is anarchy and naked power.

Yet, the die seems to be cast. The university, as we know it, seems surely to be dying. We must begin to understand what will take its place. "The youth of today," Françoise Giroud has concluded in an analysis of French youth, "no longer live 'after.' It lives 'before,' impatient, mobile, demanding with regard to

the future Everything that restrains the exercise of liberty is evil: authority, hierarchy, every form of dependence" ("La Nouvelle Vague," *L'Express*, February 24-March 2, 1969). In this atmosphere, can we begin to see the outlines of new institutions wherein truth — which is always more important than institutions designed to protect it — can grow in freedom? The first conclusion that seems evident is that the monastery, secular or religious and whatever it might be called, is more necessary than ever before. For the historical role of the monastery was to preserve truth and intelligence when their cultural safeguards could no longer fulfill their appointed task.

The phenomenon of seminars or institutes or "intelligence corporations" connected with the corporations, the army, the churches, the family, the specialized professions, even with the university but outside its normal functioning, is no accident. They exist because truth is not safe in the politicized university atmosphere of today and because intelligence is not being followed there. The democratized, politicized university which is obliged to teach mainly what the students want, in the way they want to learn it, can no longer pretend to the high level of excellence and truth which is the vocation of the university.

Secondly, a much more profound change is taking place. Education as something given to the young adult as a separate vocation in society, a separate class, is itself out-of-date. "In advanced industrial societies, the student revolution does not signify only a revolution made by students, but a revolution which a society in its young, in its mature, and in its creative proletariat, reveals itself to be entirely composed of students" (Henri van Lier, "La Révolution Etudiante," *La Revue Nouvelle*, January, 1969). Both on the side of intelligence and on the side of participation, higher education in post-industrial society is the affair of adults and a recurring life-time process. The advance of science and the explosion of knowledge makes this necessary. The world we live in is rapidly becoming a world of leisure in the classic aristotelian sense. Education is what happens when the work is done; education becomes, in fact, the work to be done. Peter Drucker was quite right when he proposed that a man wastes his time to go to the university immediately on finishing school. What the young man or woman lacks, precisely in order to be capable of education, is the experience of life itself — of marriage, family, war, business, evil, struggle (Interview, *Psychology Today*, 1968). When he has some experience of life, of what he needs to know, higher education can then begin in earnest. Thus, the university can no longer be a se-

lect place or time of life, exempt from the obligations of civil law, social responsibilities, and realities of life.

The university, then, is not just a place for new truth and new men, but also a place for old truths and old men. Wisdom is not the exclusive right of the old — little children are often very wise — but the traditions which associates wisdom and age — the Greek, the Chinese, the Hebrew — are not accidents. Furthermore, violence and anger are the least likely atmospheres for truth. The university, as we know it, a privileged place for early manhood, exempt from law and responsibility, is dying. Knowledge and truth will have their rights even when their assigned patrons no longer know them. Today, we are all students. Or perhaps more exactly, as Marshall McLuhan proposes, we are all adults (*The Medium Is the Massage*, Bantam, 1967).

The university, then, as a group of specializing late-adolescents will have to disappear precisely because adolescents will no longer be the main part of the

“students” who seek knowledge and truth. Furthermore, we will define anyone after eighteen both socially and politically as an adult. This is, in fact, the trend among student groups themselves (Cf. Thomas Hayden, “Student Social Action: From Liberation to Community,” *The New Student Left*). The pursuit of truth, of course, will always be unsettling for society. But it is a sober task. For the ancient suspicion that the false and the harmful could be presented as modern and avant-garde is still valid. The real crisis of the university today, then, is about the true and the false. And it is the not altogether vain fear of the general public that its students and professors have forgotten the difference. This is why they are no longer fully willing to trust it. But there is more to the problem than this. For society itself has changed — moved by the newness of knowledge and science — so that the intelligence-preserving and truth-seeking institutions must be adapted to the new world. Today the task of society itself is intelligence. *This* is the new world.

NON-VIOLENCE, PEACE AND THE JUST WAR

Bryan Hehir

This work is at once a testimony of faith in non-violence and a theory of political morality. In response to it, the attitude of a reviewer should be one of critical respect. *Respect*, because a statement of faith, held with conviction and argued with clarity as is this one, is worthy of respectful attention. *Critical* respect, because a statement of moral theory invites rational scrutiny from those to whom it is proposed.

One could concentrate on the case made for non-violence which is articulated throughout the book under the rubric of the cross and politics; the case is argued with penetrating analysis at some times and passionate conviction at all times — it is worth the reader's time and effort.

On a broader plane of interest, one could analyze the book, especially Part Two, “Cross and Church,” as a statement of a moral theory of force; here one confronts the author's announcement and analysis of the death of the just war doctrine in Christian tradition, and his substitution of “the natural law imperative of non-violence” for it. I will concentrate on Mr. Doug-

lass' presentation of the morality of force in an attempt to grapple with a prevalent trend of which Mr. Douglass' work is an articulate example: the misunderstanding and misuse of the teaching on just war.

James W. Douglass, *The Non-Violent Cross: A Theology of Revolution and Peace*. Macmillan. 292 pp. \$6.95.

The author's position on the teaching can be illustrated by a representative quotation drawn from the chapter entitled, “Anatomy of the Just War.”

The state of the just war doctrine in contemporary Catholic thought is roughly equivalent to that of the prohibition against contraception: it has lost its cogency in terms of current theological thought and continues in use primarily as a point of reference for those who wish to go beyond it.

The demise and death of the just war doctrine, predicted and pronounced throughout the book, is attributed to several causes: its criterion of judgment is opposed to the Gospel of Peace; it is judged to be an unfit instrument for measuring the threat of nuclear destruction; it is vulnerable to the casuistry “of weapons technicians and theologians of a like inclination”; in

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