

lect place or time of life, exempt from the obligations of civil law, social responsibilities, and realities of life.

The university, then, is not just a place for new truth and new men, but also a place for old truths and old men. Wisdom is not the exclusive right of the old — little children are often very wise — but the traditions which associates wisdom and age — the Greek, the Chinese, the Hebrew — are not accidents. Furthermore, violence and anger are the least likely atmospheres for truth. The university, as we know it, a privileged place for early manhood, exempt from law and responsibility, is dying. Knowledge and truth will have their rights even when their assigned patrons no longer know them. Today, we are all students. Or perhaps more exactly, as Marshall McLuhan proposes, we are all adults (*The Medium Is the Massage*, Bantam, 1967).

The university, then, as a group of specializing late-adolescents will have to disappear precisely because adolescents will no longer be the main part of the

“students” who seek knowledge and truth. Furthermore, we will define anyone after eighteen both socially and politically as an adult. This is, in fact, the trend among student groups themselves (Cf. Thomas Hayden, “Student Social Action: From Liberation to Community,” *The New Student Left*). The pursuit of truth, of course, will always be unsettling for society. But it is a sober task. For the ancient suspicion that the false and the harmful could be presented as modern and avant-garde is still valid. The real crisis of the university today, then, is about the true and the false. And it is the not altogether vain fear of the general public that its students and professors have forgotten the difference. This is why they are no longer fully willing to trust it. But there is more to the problem than this. For society itself has changed — moved by the newness of knowledge and science — so that the intelligence-preserving and truth-seeking institutions must be adapted to the new world. Today the task of society itself is intelligence. *This* is the new world.

## NON-VIOLENCE, PEACE AND THE JUST WAR

*Bryan Hehir*

This work is at once a testimony of faith in non-violence and a theory of political morality. In response to it, the attitude of a reviewer should be one of critical respect. *Respect*, because a statement of faith, held with conviction and argued with clarity as is this one, is worthy of respectful attention. *Critical* respect, because a statement of moral theory invites rational scrutiny from those to whom it is proposed.

One could concentrate on the case made for non-violence which is articulated throughout the book under the rubric of the cross and politics; the case is argued with penetrating analysis at some times and passionate conviction at all times — it is worth the reader's time and effort.

On a broader plane of interest, one could analyze the book, especially Part Two, “Cross and Church,” as a statement of a moral theory of force; here one confronts the author's announcement and analysis of the death of the just war doctrine in Christian tradition, and his substitution of “the natural law imperative of non-violence” for it. I will concentrate on Mr. Doug-

lass' presentation of the morality of force in an attempt to grapple with a prevalent trend of which Mr. Douglass' work is an articulate example: the misunderstanding and misuse of the teaching on just war.

James W. Douglass, *The Non-Violent Cross: A Theology of Revolution and Peace*. Macmillan. 292 pp. \$6.95.

The author's position on the teaching can be illustrated by a representative quotation drawn from the chapter entitled, “Anatomy of the Just War.”

The state of the just war doctrine in contemporary Catholic thought is roughly equivalent to that of the prohibition against contraception: it has lost its cogency in terms of current theological thought and continues in use primarily as a point of reference for those who wish to go beyond it.

The demise and death of the just war doctrine, predicted and pronounced throughout the book, is attributed to several causes: its criterion of judgment is opposed to the Gospel of Peace; it is judged to be an unfit instrument for measuring the threat of nuclear destruction; it is vulnerable to the casuistry “of weapons technicians and theologians of a like inclination”; in

Father Hehir is a student of ethics and international affairs.

the end, it is reduced to a notion of "legalized fratricide."

To fill the void left by the bankruptcy of the doctrine, Douglass turns to the philosophy of non-violence with its techniques of suffering love and non-violent resistance to injustice.

The reverse side of violence is suffering, and in the interaction of these two forces in the world, the force of violence and the force of suffering, the nature of true power is gradually revealed in man's history. Power is revealed not as violence . . . , but as Truth, which resists injustice through voluntary suffering, and as Love, which in that suffering resistance opens victim to executioner . . . .

Dissent to Douglass' case against the just war ethic is based on three assertions: that Mr. Douglass incorrectly formulates the fundamental ethical issue raised by the nuclear age; that in response to a misleading question he constructs an account of the just war doctrine which is deficient; finally, in order to validate these two positions, he simplifies the complexities of history from Constantine to the Cuban Crisis by forcing it through a non-violent filter. Each assertion requires some elaboration.

Douglass' formulation of the ethical question posed by war in the nuclear age begins with the historical and theological argument that the Nuclear Age is in fact the Eschatological Age, because modern technology has provided "eschatological weapons" which make possible a universal death-wish for humanity. Thinking in eschatological terms about nuclear weapons leads the author to chide Paul Ramsey and John Courtney Murray for cautiously positing the possibility of limiting nuclear conflict; it also moves him to define the basic ethical issue of a doctrine of force in the following terms:

To grant theological significance to the larger perspective of a global holocaust, which is recognized as the deepest moral issue by every thinking non-theologian, would be to shut the just war door permanently. "Eschatological war" and man's common good do not mix well.

Eschatological adjectives and pre-eschatological ethics do not mix well either. Surely a closer reading by the author of some "thinking non-theologians" (especially those with professional credentials in the study of international politics) would encourage a rephrasing of the ethical question. "The perspective of global holocaust" provides the *context* for the development of a political ethic today, it does not provide its *content*. There is no doubt that the *dimensions* of the ethical question of war have changed in apocalyptic fashion with the advent and development of the nuclear age; all would agree to this. On the other hand, there is severe doubt whether the *nature* of the problem has changed; political ethics, especially in the arena described by Raymond Aron as diplomatic-strategic behavior, is still a question of means and ends.

To dissolve the structure of the ethical question, incarnated in a complex web of determination of goals, delineation of tactics and decisions of policy, into the alarming but amorphous "moral issue" of whether global holocaust is good or bad is to forfeit the function of ethical discourse and reflection in international politics. That function is to establish the parameters of policy and to impose restraints upon power. It seeks to legitimate the use of force only in the face of injustice and to limit the instruments of force by rational political purposes. In political terminology this function is described as the subordination of military objectives to political purposes; in ethical discourse the function has been conceived and articulated in the criteria of the just war doctrine.

In James Douglass' view, the eschatological age of apocalyptic destructive power has rendered the just war doctrine irrelevant because,

the foundations of just-war theory do not have the strength to sustain adequately the kind of witness demanded today by its own moral logic, which taken by itself compels one to relinquish all recourse to modern war.

The eschatological age is the era of absolutes — permanent peace, perfect justice, universal truth; a political ethic for the pre-eschatological period must deal with contingencies — peace is a process not a state, justice is constantly threatened and only gradually achieved, at times by the use of force. If one defines the fundamental moral issue in eschatological terms — the search for absolute peace by expunging the possibility of resort to force from history — the danger exists that the more limited tasks of ethics, i.e., preventing resort to force at some times, limiting the use of force at other times, will be disregarded. The laudable goals of the "absolutists" which make them impatient with the modest objectives and limited methods of the traditional ethic of force might be tempered by a consideration of the fate of the two political attempts in this century to banish war completely from human history. The "war to end all wars" and the post-war attempts to eliminate military power by a transformation of the political system both sacrificed limited restraints for absolute goals; in the process they failed to attain the absolute and were left without any restraints on power.

To ignore the staggering new dangers posed for humanity by modern technology and strategy would be irresponsible. Nuclear weapons have introduced a quantitative change producing a qualitatively new political and ethical issue. But to become mesmerized by the danger of nuclear holocaust to the point of abdicating the moral task of subordinating power to the rule of reason would be equally irresponsible; it would be a moral and intellectual surrender.

The task of explicating and applying the rule of reason to the strategic and diplomatic uses of power is the purpose of the just war doctrine. It seeks to bring a complex of differentiated criteria to bear upon the initial decision to use force and the subsequent decisions about the uses of force. The purpose of this web of restraint and restriction has been described by John Courtney Murray as the triple goal of condemning war as evil, limiting the evil it entails and humanizing its conduct.

These limited goals are radically inadequate in Mr. Douglass' eyes; the only logical and honorable position for the doctrine to assume in his estimation is unilateral disarmament on the national level and conscientious objection on the individual level. The possibility of placing limitation on force appears in this analysis to be beyond man's capacity. All war must be indiscriminate war; in the author's words, "any war today is necessarily an exercise in automated mass destruction." Reason stands paralyzed before the power it has created. Having made this admission, the rest of the argument about the irrelevance of the just war doctrine follows logically.

The traditional doctrine, once a humanizing influence in the arena of high politics, has now been depicted as a positive threat to peace; since its criteria are irrelevant, continued use of them actually prepares the way for war. Although Douglass admits that the original function of the doctrine was to restrain the sword, his theme in this book leads one to conclude that the use of just war today gives a state permission to resort to force. A legal and moral restraint has been transposed in this analysis into a legitimation and license for violence.

This seems to be the fundamental misconception about the just war doctrine inherent in Douglass' analysis: he confuses the purpose of the doctrine, i.e., to come to terms with the existence of violence in politics, with the introduction of violence into the world of politics. A consistent example of this misconception is the way Douglass undercuts (unconsciously, it appears) the central distinction between force (power restrained by reason in the service of order) and violence (power without limits and without goals). The author interchanges these two terms at will throughout the book; in his chapter on the "Anatomy of the Just War," he specifically identifies the theory as, "that doctrine which has always upheld the value of violence as a form of justice. . . ." This distinction between controlled and uncontrolled power is at the heart of the moral doctrine of just war. The consistent collapsing of the distinction achieved by Douglass' vocabulary misconstrues the form and function of the teaching.

One suspects that the reason for this misuse of terms and concepts is not due to a failure of competence (the author's writings on the whole negate this charge) but to Mr. Douglass' fervent conviction that non-violence is the only logical and ethical position open to a Christian today. In his desire to solidify his distinction between violent and non-violent modes of politics, the author appears determined to place the traditional doctrine in the service of violence. This task is executed in two ways: first, by an historical critique designed to illustrate that from the adoption of the just war doctrine at the outset of the Constantinian era, its history has been a long succession of compromises of the cross with the sword; secondly, by an analytical argument asserting that both *Pacem In Terris* and *Gaudium et Spes* of Vatican II have transcended the framework of the just war teaching.

Both of these supporting arguments for Douglass' non-violent position appear to this reviewer to be open to ready criticism. The historical case fails to consider adequately the sometimes antithetical relationship which exists between the desire for peace and the demands of justice in the pre-eschatological age. An example of this failure is Mr. Douglass' account of the substance and significance of the Cuban missile crisis; after reading the accounts of Sorensen, Schlesinger, Hilsman and Kennedy, the mildest critique one can offer about the author's analysis is that it is simplistic. International politics in the nuclear age is a mix of psychology and power; both elements were at stake in the missile crisis and Mr. Douglass' critique fails to come to grips with either.

The author's contention that *Pacem In Terris* and *Gaudium et Spes* are documents of non-violent theory and should be placed in opposition to just war teaching is also open to question. This reviewer had the impression that non-violence was being imposed on these documents rather than elicited from them. We are first told that in Pope John's *Pacem In Terris* non-violence "is as pervasive as it is undefined." Then we are told that for "the Johannine vision of man, non-violence is a natural law imperative." This second assertion apparently is supposed to prove the first, because in an encyclical which spells out in detail the requirements of a natural law order, this "imperative" is never stated. A key phrase in Douglass' case that the encyclical is a non-violent document is Pope John's dictum that disputes among nations should be settled by reason; a defense of the traditional doctrine might respond that this is precisely its function. In a world where military power exists and has not yet been wished (or loved) away, the just war doctrine seeks to order and control force by reason. One would not protest the use of the themes of the encyclical to sup-

port the non-violent case, but the appropriation of the document by this position, with the implication that any other ethic of force stands in opposition to the goals and methods of the encyclical should not go unchallenged.

The case made by the author for *Gaudium et Spes* is somewhat different. The chapter devoted to this document is an illuminating one, because Mr. Douglass draws upon his experience as an advisor at Vatican II and makes available previously unpublished information about the chapter on peace and the international community. On the whole, he appears disappointed with the text, in spite of his assertion that it has passed beyond the just war ethic. He gently chides its endorsement of non-violent resistance for evidencing "fear where there should be faith." More damaging still is the familiar just war tone and theme reflected in the Council's acknowledgement of the need for defensive forces in the existing international system. The picture is not as clearly non-violent as Mr. Douglass would like it.

On the question of deterrence, the stumbling block of the Conciliar document, the author offers a detailed and informative study of the preliminary discussions on the issue. The account of the work of Abbot Butler, Cardinal Ritter and Mr. Douglass himself provides a good perspective for understanding the final text. The position adopted by the Council is described by the author as a compromise between the original draft, which sanctioned the policy of deterrence, and the position he advocated, condemning a nation's conditional intention to wage total war which is contained in its public threat of deterrence and its preparation of deterrence weapons for ready execution. Douglass attributes the hesitancy of the bishops to condemn nuclear deterrence to a desire to avoid passing judgment on the interior intentions of statesmen.

Two dissenting comments about the section on deterrence can be entered here. First, the author disposes of the distinction posited in different forms by writers such as Paul Ramsey and D. Dubarle without elucidating the logical implications of that distinction, i.e., that deterrence policy and combat policy in contemporary strategic policy are two distinct acts of policy. The link between these two acts is the bedeviling problem for strategists and policy-makers. Joining the two acts by a conditional intention and then condemning the entire policy may be too simple a solution.

Secondly, Douglass expands the conclusion of the Conciliar document to outlaw all forms of war because, "the intention to wage total war is therefore at the root of even those defense policies which seem to resemble most a just war ethic." This second step illustrates how the margin of confusion increases from a

failure to distinguish deterrence policy from combat strategy. In a laudable desire to rid the world of the danger of deterrence, many would support the author's unequivocal condemnation of it; one suspects that the number of supporters would diminish if the implications of the condemnation were made to reject the possibility of any recourse to arms in the present international system.

Mr. Douglass' own position about the use of force in this is elaborated in detail in the first and third sections of this book. The first three chapters explicate in a sensitive, creative, almost mystical style the Gandhian foundation of his non-violent philosophy and its relation to Christian faith. Douglass' position is that transformation is the mode of politics in the Nuclear-Eschatological Age; the transformation of political man through Truth and Love. This transformation will require a new definition of political realities (e.g., of power), and a new method of political technique (suffering love). Gandhi is the prophet of this position and Pope John's writings are described as the application of the position in the nuclear age. Douglass applies it himself in his third section, "Cross and History."

It is not possible to explore here the anthropological assumptions, historical perspective, and political program which undergird and structure this non-violent philosophy. Some general comments will have to serve as a summary. Highly important is the need to make clear that the obvious disagreement expressed throughout this review is not intended as a rejection of Mr. Douglass' goals or of the role which non-violence can play as part of the Christian response to the dilemma of war and peace in the Nuclear Age. The precise reservations of this review are in the realm of means not ends. They are the following:

—that the philosophy of non-violence advocated here is a legitimate personal response to the nuclear age, but an inadequate institutional morality for it;

—consequently, that Douglass' attempt to replace the just war doctrine with his position is insufficient; few would deny the need for a renovation of the doctrine, but it still supplies a better structure for an ethic of force than Douglass' position;

—the penchant of the author to discuss political issues in theological categories (e.g., repentance and redemption) tends to confuse rather than relate the two orders.

To return to the categories used at the outset of this review, this book as a statement of non-violent faith is impressive, persuasive and filled with personal conviction. As a statement of moral theory, applicable to the use of force, it is not as impressive or persuasive. One is left with much respect for the author's position and some reservations about his theory.